

The Change in the U.S. Economy and Security and Their Effects on People's Sentiments toward Immigration

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It is generally believed that Americans have differing sentiments toward immigration, based on the state of the economy at any given period in time, and the extent to which national security concerns are being pondered.

The theory put forth in this study is that during periods of economic downturn, Americans in general will have negative sentiments toward immigrants and immigration. Conversely, in economically good times their sentiments toward immigration will be less negative. Additionally, when Americans become more concerned about their security, then their attitudes toward immigration will also change for the negative.

While Americans in general have negative attitudes toward immigration, the retrospective economy by itself is not a major contributor. When security concerns are heightened, Americans will prefer a reduction in the level of immigration.

The United States is unmistakably a land built on immigration. In *The Uprooted*, Oscar Handlin (1951) opens with the following statements: "Once I thought to write a history of the immigrants in America. Then I discovered that the immigrants were American history." In spite of this, different immigrant groups have come under fire, from time to time, as over the years immigration has been punctuated by massive waves of newcomers. Recent immigrants are usually looked at and treated with disdain.

While some periods in U.S. immigration history are characterized as being less restrictive towards immigrants as are evidenced in the Immigration Acts of 1965 and 1990, the current legislative landscape is strewn with proposals and laws to reduce immigration, implement stricter border controls with Mexico and Canada, and cut government expenditures by limiting immigrants' access to government services and benefits. Most notable are the 1996 Welfare Reform Act and the Patriot Act of 2001 implemented in response to September 11, 2001. These are the results of increased intensity in policy conflicts, as politicians and interest groups on both sides of the issue are striving to shape mass opinion with arguments about the costs and benefits of immigration (Clad 1994; Passel and Fix, 1994) and the possible dangers of the same.

At different times in American history, immigration restriction laws have come into effect as a result of national security concerns. As early as 1798, fear of being drawn into European wars by immigrants from that region, caused the enactment of the Alien and Sedition laws. Concerns about threats to republicanism and democracy gave way to the Chinese exclusionary laws of 1882. Most recently the 2001 Patriot Act, a response to September 11, 2001, has been implemented.

As Fetzer (2000) states, nativism¹ not only threatens to destabilize domestic society but also jeopardize relations between host and sending countries. Proposition 187 in California was not taken lightly by the Mexican government as they saw it as gross disrespect for the dignity of their nationals (Fineman, 1994). Nativism is not only a problem for international peace, prosperity and security now, as Fetzer (2000) points out, it promises to continue to trouble us for decades to come.

Most of the popular explanations of anti-immigrant sentiments and scholarly studies of public attitudes are dominated by economic interpretations. Harwood (1986) states that economic concerns are tantamount to the increased opposition towards immigration, whether it is legal or illegal. Simon and Alexander (1993) claim that immigrants represent a greater threat to the livelihood and living standards of lower-status respondents than they do to persons with higher education and more skills (Star and Roberts 1982; Hoskin and Mishler, 1982; Day, 1990, Fetzer, 2000). Other researchers such as Sears et al. (1980) and Green and Shapiro (1994) are concerned about the direct bearing on the material well-being of individuals in their private lives. Kinder and Kiewiet (1981) emphasize an individual's perception of the national economy as a whole, rather than his/her personal "pocketbook" considerations. Some common claims made by natives about immigrants are that they "take our jobs," contribute to unemployment, and reduce wages and working conditions in selected occupations. As Simon (1987) observes, the poorer native workers are, the greater are their fears that these consequences will materialize.

Other factors such as gender may also play a role in formulating opinions on the immigration issue. Espenshade and Calhoun (1993) find that females tend to have a more negative view of undocumented immigrants than do their male counterparts. There are differences of opinion among the various racial and ethnic groups (de la Garza et al., 1993; Espenshade and Calhoun, 1993). Members of the same group tend to develop an aversion to individuals who do not share the relevant group characteristic or identity (Sidanius, 1993; Stephan, 1985; Hood and Morris, 1998). Another influencing factor on an individual's opinion towards immigration is age. Hoskin and Mishler (1983) find that as age increases so does one's aversion to new immigrants. Party identification may give some clues as to who may prefer more stringent or less stringent immigration policies, thereby preferring less or more immigration.

Certain migratory movements can endanger the security of a country as migrants are suspected of bringing crime, terrorism and drugs into the country (Teitelbaum and Weiner, 1995). Therefore, it is expected that if security is of concern to Americans, and a link is made between security and immigrants, they will prefer a reduction in the immigration quota.

The cursory review of the literature reveals that the economy has an impact on how people perceive immigrants and immigration. Most of these studies have been done at the state level. This study deviates from the norm in two respects. First, it is concerned with attitudes among Americans in general and focuses on national level economic and security data analyses. Second, the security dimension has been introduced, as another possible explanation of American attitudes, and in light of recent events this may prove helpful.

Theoretical Framework

The theory put forth in this study is that perceived economic downturn and increased concerns about security, will cause Americans to become more negative in their sentiments toward immigrants and immigration. The diagram below depicts these sentiments:

(See Figure 1-1)

Hypotheses

The real or perceived costs and benefits of immigration (ATEI), will condition peoples' attitudes toward immigration quota (IQ). Therefore, *hypothesis 1 states that: If Americans believe that immigrants strain the economy and make it worse, then American opinion will respond by preferring a reduction in immigration quota/level (IQ).*

One can expect to find a difference in attitudes among *racess, income/employment groups, age cohorts, and gender (RSDC)* toward immigrants in general, and certain immigrant groups in particular (IQ) among the groups of respondents that are affected most economically. Consequently, *hypothesis 2: If Americans sense that their economic positions are being threatened by emerging immigrant groups, then American opinion will respond by preferring a reduction in immigration quota/level (IQ).* This behavior is more likely to be displayed among minorities (non-Whites) the lower income and the less educated. Leading up to and in the wake of September 11, this has taken on new significance, hence the need for a third hypothesis.

Hypothesis 3: If respondents feel the need for added security, increased military spending or any real or perceived threat (ATSI), they will become less tolerant of immigrants, thereby displaying more negative attitudes toward them by preferring a reduction in immigration quota/level (IQ).

Data and Methods

The data that are used for this study come primarily from the 1992 and 2000 National Election Study. These years approximate the situation referred to earlier, where high levels of immigration coincide with intense public concern about unemployment and economic decline (Pomper, 1993; Passel and Fix, 1994), alongside some security concerns. The 1990 Immigration Act signed by President George H. W. Bush increased total immigration, while in the months that followed there was a recession which became a major factor in the 1992 elections. The unemployment rate was 7.5 percent at the time. By 2000 the economy had improved significantly. March 1991 to March 2001 was the longest expansionary period in the history of the United States (NBER, 2002). The unemployment rate was 4.0 percent. Also, the year 2000 witnessed the highest absolute levels of immigration in history (Goldsborough, 2000; Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2004).

In addition to the above mentioned, the objective economic criteria used in the selection of these years is based on the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) findings and publications. According to their report, a recession is a significant decline in activity spread across the economy, lasting more than a few months. This is visible in industrial production, employment, real income, and wholesale-retail prices (National Bureau of Economic Research, 2002).

The relevant socio-demographic variables include: Respondents' level of *Education* (0-17 years); *Race* (White, Other); *Gender* (Male, Female); *Age* (17-96), *Party identification* (*Democrat, Republican*); *Employment status* (*Fully employed, Unemployed, Laidoff, Retired, Disabled, Homemaker, Student*). Other variables include *Defense spending*; *Government spending for border control*; *Use of military force to solve international problems*; *U.S. position in the world*, (a combination which will give some that is called *National security*); *Perceptions of the national economy* (*Retrospective economy – better, worse or remain the same over the last year*); *Perceptions of the economy now compared to four years ago* (1988 *Economy – gotten better, stayed the same, gotten worse – asked in 2000*); *Should immigrants be eligible for welfare as soon as they come* (*immediately, wait a year or more*); *How likely are the growing number of Hispanics to take away jobs from people already here*; *How likely are the growing number of Asians to take way jobs from people already here*.

Due to the limitation of available data points, time series analysis is not permissible. The limitation is a result of not having the immigration question asked in the NES or any other data set on as consistent a basis as with the polls. Ordered probit - a nonlinear probability model will therefore be utilized to analyze the data. This will mitigate any underestimation that is due to correlation between the error terms and independent variables (Agresti, 1984; Becker and Kennedy, 1992; Kennedy, 1992).

Data and Measures

American sentiments toward immigrants in times of economic upturn or downturn, coupled with national security concerns, will be tested with data from the Warren, Kinder and Rosenstone 1992 and 2000 National Election Study. The 1992 and 2000 studies all focus on an issue that is of major concern on the restrictionist agenda. As such, the dependent variable refers to policy preferences regarding whether “*the number of immigrants from foreign countries who are permitted to come to the United States to live should be increased, remain the same, or decreased.*” A series of ordered probit analyses of the immigration policy question are utilized to determine whether or not the influences of economic and security motives survive the rigors of controls, in an effort to more fully elucidate the causal underpinnings of the preferences of Americans. The coefficient estimates represent the impact of a one-unit change in each explanatory variable on the dependent variable. The appropriate probit equation is depicted as follows:

$$Y_i \sim \text{Bernoulli}(\pi_i), \quad \pi_i = \Phi(X_c \beta)$$

Where the formula for π , the simulated probability that the dependent variable y takes on a value of 1, is $\Phi(X_c \beta)$. Φ is the cumulative distribution function (c.d.f.) of the standard normal distribution (King, Tomz & Wittenberg, 2000). See the endnote for the coding of predictor variables in ordered probit

analysis.² All other variables retain their original categories once the missing values/categories are accounted for. White and Other are used instead of specifying the different races because of the lack of consistent categories within the data set across the years under consideration and also the way in which Hispanics are identified in the survey. The SPSS missing variable analysis is used to account for the missing cases, in order for the appropriate probit analysis to be run. The bivariate correlations that show the relationship amongst the relevant variables are also based on these “adjusted/predicted” variables (See Appendix).

Correlates

The economic and security variables relate in different ways to the demographic variables and to each other as is demonstrated by the bivariate correlations using the Pearson correlation index with the predicted variables, depicted in Tables 1 and 2. In observing how the variables correlate with *Immigration*, it is worth noting that *Defense Spending (Defense Sp)*, *Take away jobs Hispanic (HTJ)*, *Take away jobs Asians (ATJ)*, *Race*, and *Education* are all significant in the year 1992. In the Appendix Table A-5 and for 1992 for example where the original variables are used, *Defense Spending (Defense Sp)*, *Eligible Aid (Aid)*, *Hispanics Take Away Jobs (HTJ)*, *Asians Take Away Jobs (ATJ)*, *Race and Education* are significant. As can be seen from Table 1, all the variables maintain their significance, except for *Eligible Aid (Aid)*. In Table A-4, *Economy*, *World position (World Pos)*, *Defense spending (Defense Sp)*, *Border control (Border Con)*, *Education*, *Gender*, and *1988 Economy (88 Econ)* all bear significant correlations with *Immigration*. They all retain their significance with the exception of *Economy*, even with the predicted values as is evidenced in Table A-6. It is justified to use the predicted values as suitable alternatives and predictors of the original variables.

Results

The pertinent equations below and Table 4 reflect the primary findings of these analyses. A positive (negative) coefficient estimate means that a respondent expressing/possessing the corresponding position/belief is more (less) likely than his counterpart (Espenshade and Calhoun, 1993), to prefer a reduction in the level of immigration.

Equation 1 (1992):

$$D = 0.014B_1 + 0.004B_2 - 0.172B_3 + 0.404B_4 + 0.039B_5 - 0.230B_6 + 0.113B_7 - 0.058B_8 + 0.584B_9 + 0.934B_{10} + 0.350B_{11} + 0.413B_{12} + 0.503B_{13} + 0.598B_{14} + 0.683B_{15} - 0.275B_{16} - 0.065B_{17} - 0.051B_{18} - 0.001B_{19} + 0.014B_{20} + .007B_{21}$$

Equation 2 (2000):

$$D = 0.011B_1 - 0.030B_2 + 0.036B_3 - 0.176B_4 - 0.001B_5 - 0.146B_6 - 0.349B_7 + 0.146B_8 - 0.883B_9 - 1.389B_{10} - 1.129B_{11} - 1.014B_{12} - 0.936B_{13} - 1.052B_{14} - 1.025B_{15} + 0.056B_{16} + 0.122B_{17} + .072B_{18}$$

D is the dependent variable *Immigration level/quota*. For Equation 1 *B*₁ is *Retrospective economy*, *B*₂ *U.S. world position*, *B*₃ *Take away jobs Asians*, *B*₄ *Eligible for Aid*, *B*₅ *Use of military force*, *B*₆ *Take away jobs Hispanics*, *B*₇ *Republican*, *B*₈ *Democrat*, *B*₉ *Fully employed*, *B*₁₀ *Laidoff*, *B*₁₁ *Unemployed*, *B*₁₂ *Retired*, and *B*₁₃ *Disabled*, *B*₁₄ *Homemaker*, *B*₁₅ *Student*, *B*₁₆ *Race*, *B*₁₇ *Gender*, *B*₁₈ *Education*, *B*₁₉ *Age*, *B*₂₀ *Defense spending*, *B*₂₁ *Economy four years ago (1988) compared to now (1992)*.

For Equation 2: *B*₁ is *Retrospective economy*, *B*₂ *U.S. world position*, *B*₃ *Defense spending*, *B*₄ *Spending to control borders*, *B*₅ *Age*, *B*₆ *Education*, *B*₇ *Race*, *B*₈ *Gender*, *B*₉ *Fully employed*, *B*₁₀ *Laidoff*, *B*₁₁ *Unemployed*, *B*₁₂ *Retired*, *B*₁₃ *Disabled*, *B*₁₄ *Homemaker*, *B*₁₅ *Student*, *B*₁₆ *Democrat*, *B*₁₇ *Republican*, *B*₁₈ *Economy in 1992 compared to now*.

When examined by itself, national retrospective economic considerations in none of the years under consideration, accounts for any substantial change in the preferences of respondents in their opposition to more *immigration*. However, other economic factors such as *Hispanics take away jobs*, *Asians take away jobs*, and *Immigrants eligible for aid*, maintain strong statistical associations between respondents' opposition to more *immigration* in 1992, as indicated by Table 3. When compared to now (1992), the 1988 economy is not seen as significantly different to matter. This is not the case in 2000 when respondents are asked to compare the 1992 economy to now. Respondents detect significant differences between the two with the 2000 economy being markedly better than the 1992 economy. These findings are consistent with the objective economic indicators of the unemployment rate in these two years 1992

and 2000. Therefore, both the subjective (respondents' view) and the objective (Bureau of Labor Statistics figures of 7.5 percent unemployment for 1992 and 4.0 percent for 2000) indicators are in agreement.

On the matter regarding the demographic variables, *education* and *race* have consistently demonstrated significant influences, while *gender* in 2000 has echoed similar effects. *Age* is of no consequential significance to the *immigration level* debate, according to these findings. Party identification in the form of *Democrat* and *Republican* is weakly related to opinions about *immigration* reduction. In 2000, among the categories of employment status, those who are *laidoff*, *unemployed* and *homemakers* have shown consequential reactions to the immigration reduction question.

Except for *Spending for border control* in 2000, the security variables all express latent sentiments, as they are not considered potent enough to generate strong inclinations toward the opposition to more immigration.

A closer look at the Clarify (Tomz, et. al., 2003) probability results adds more clarity to the above-mentioned findings. The probability of respondents preferring a reduction in immigration is $E(Y_i) = \pi$, an intuitive quantity of interest, is represented in Table 4. The probability and the uncertainty surrounding it is estimated for the three different options - favor more immigration, unsure and oppose more immigration, and across the entire range of each independent variable. Only the probability that there is opposition to more immigration is referred to in the table. The probability of uncertainty is the difference. The minimum and maximum values of each independent variable are considered, while holding other variables at their medians. In each case the expected value algorithm is repeated $M = 1000$ times to approximate the 95 percent confidence interval around the probability of whether respondents will favor more immigration, are unsure, or oppose more immigration.

Starting with the economic variables in 1992, respondents who believe that it is extremely likely that Hispanics and Asians take away jobs from Americans have a 68 percent and 65 percent probability respectively, of opposing more immigration. Additionally, there is 55 percent likelihood that these respondents, who would require immigrants to wait a year or more for aid, will also oppose more immigration. Based on these responses, immigrants are seen as a drain on government resources at least in the short run and more respondents would prefer them to wait a year or more to be eligible for government aid, at the same time that respondents are in favor of a reduction in *immigration*. When the aforementioned probabilities are compared to their "not likely" (Hispanics), "not likely" (Asians), and "eligible now" (Immigrant), counterparts marked differences are noted as they are represented by 41, 45 and 39 percent probabilities of opposing more immigration, correspondingly.

As far as the retrospective economic evaluations are concerned, whether respondents believe that the economy is doing better or worse, they are about even in their probability preference for opposition to more immigration in the different years: 53 compared to 55 percent in 1992; and 63 to 65 percent in 2000. In 2000 a comparison between the 1992 and 2000 economy reveals that there is a 72 percent probability among those who say that the 1992 economy was worse to favor a reduction in immigration, compared to a 62 percent probability among those who believed that the economy was better. However, since this is so far in retrospection, some caution must be exercised in this interpretation and the one that should carry more weight here is the retrospective economy. Notwithstanding, what this reveals is that eight years later, more Americans are putting more blame on immigrants for the 1992 economy and as a result prefer less immigration. When the 1988 economy is compared to the 1992 economy, respondents are about equal whether they believe the 1988 economy was better or worse, to be opposed to more immigration.

In 2000 security seems to be of major concern to the respondents when it comes to spending for border control. Those desiring an increase in spending have a 64 percent chance of wanting reduction in the immigration level, as opposed to 25 percent for those who would like spending to be decreased. For all the other security variables, use of military force, U.S. world position and defense spending the differences are marginal (52 to 58 percent probability, 55 and 55 percent probability, 53 to 56 percent probability; in that order). Americans see the borders as not being secure, therefore, in an effort to secure the borders it is reasonable to believe that the Americans, who would require an increase in spending to do so, will also want to see the immigration numbers reduced as well.

Over the years in consideration, the demographic variables that demonstrate significant differences among their categories to warrant closer attention are; education and race for all years, and gender in 2000. For those same years, the direction of preferences is the same with the most educated having a lower proclivity towards immigration reduction than the least educated: For 1992 it is 47 percent to 59 percent, and for 2000 it is 47 percent to 79 percent. Such results confirm previous studies (Citrin et al, 1990; Day 1990; Hoskin, 1991; Citrin et al 1997) that opposition to immigration decreases as the respondents' level of formal education increases.

Race is a factor in 1992 and 2000 with non-Whites less inclined than Whites to prefer immigration reduction (44 percent to 55 percent in 1992 and 51 percent to 64 percent in 2000). In the mean time, gender only surfaces in 2000 as a significant contributor with males 58 percent and females 64 percent likely to oppose more immigration. For 1992 the results are close, indicating that both groups are similarly affected in the job market, for example. As far as party identification goes, the Democrats along with the Republicans express similar views on the issue of immigration. In 1992 the Democrats are 52 percent and the Republicans 59 percent likely to oppose more immigration. For 2000 the figures are still close with 66 percent to 69 percent, in that order. The weakness of party identification in its connection with the immigration question may be a reflection of the political reality that recent immigration reforms are a divisive issue for political leaders in both major political parties (Tichenor, 1994).

When the different levels of employment are observed, the year 2000 is worthy of attention as significant reactions take place. In all categories besides the fully employed there is between a 20 - 30 percent probability of opposing more immigration. With the fully employed there is a 64 percent probability, a sizeable difference when compared to 20 percent for those that are laid off, 25 percent for the unemployed, 28 percent for the retired, 30 percent for the disabled, 27 percent for homemakers, and 28 percent for students. Yet this does not trigger a correspondingly significant effect when the ordered probit estimates are observed. What are observed instead are the negative coefficient estimates of all the employment status categories and the significant effects of the unemployed, laidoff and homemakers in their attitudes toward immigration (see Table 3).

In 1992, the categories are closer in their probability preferences with the fully employed less likely than the other groups to oppose more immigration. The coefficient estimates for 1992 for the employment status categories are all positive and non-consequential (See Table 3). Overall, Americans would prefer immigration levels to be decreased. Yet, the probabilities vary from year to year, variable-to-variable, and even among different categories of the same variable.

Discussion

Contrary to expectations, the data show that the immediate retrospective economy by itself, does not play as significant a role in determining what Americans think about the level of immigration, as previously thought. Nevertheless, for 2000 there is significance as far as the economy then compared to 1992, in respondents' stance on the immigration issue. However, the main reason for looking at this question was to show what people thought about the 1992 economy compared to 2000 as an indication that these years are significantly different economically to justify using them. Borrowing from the policy-oriented hypothesis presented in Kiewiet (1983), while voters' decisions are retrospective in nature, they depend more heavily on their experiences of the recent past.

Therefore, the question of how the respondents view the economy last year, the measure that is called retrospective economy in this study, is more appropriate. Hence, there is weak support for hypothesis 1 based on the data. However, when other economic factors such as Hispanics take away jobs, Asians take away jobs, Immigrants eligible for aid are considered, the data reveal that they do have significant effects on how the respondents view the reduction in the immigration level in 1992 for the three variables listed above. For the year 1992, the less prosperous year, respondents are concerned about Hispanics taking away jobs, Asians taking away jobs and Immigrants receiving welfare benefits as they contemplate their positions on the immigration question. It can be said then, that there is stronger support for hypothesis 2 than for hypothesis 1.

Only in 2000 do any of the security variables serve as a significant predictor of the level of immigration. Spending for border control is that variable which has significantly altered respondents'


opposition to more immigration. As the need for more security increases, Americans seem to prefer a reduction in immigration, supporting hypothesis 3. In other word when security concerns become paramount, as in the year 2000, the reactions of respondents become more profound as they will prefer reduced *immigration*, and increase spending for border control.

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Figure 1- 1: Attitude-Quota Diagram



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RSDC is respondent's socio- demographic characteristics

ATEI is attitudes toward economic impacts of immigrants

ATSI is attitudes toward security issues

IQ is immigration quota conditioned by attitudes

And the functional relationships between the variables expressed are indicated in the endnote³.

Table 1: Bivariate Correlations 1992 (Part A).

	Immigration	Economy	Full	Laid-off	Unemployed	Retired	Disabled	Homemaker	Student	Democrat
Economy	.025									
Full	.004	-.056**								
Laid-off	.028	.008	-.155**							
Unemployed	-.030	.036	-.297**	-.028						
Retired	-.009	.008	-.534**	-.050*	-.095**					
Disabled	.003	-.020	-.254**	-.024	-.045*	-.082**				
Homemaker	.015	.055*	-.430**	-.040	-.077**	-.138**	-.066**			
Student	-.005	.020	-.214**	-.020	-.038	-.069**	-.033	-.055*		
Democrat	-.042	.132**	-.072**	-.008	-.002	.075**	.058**	.011	-.033	
Republican	.041	-.196**	-.004	.010	-.056**	.038	-.042	.021	.009	-.430**
World Pos	-.008	-.183**	.066**	.006	-.008	-.022	-.027	-.042	-.033	-.128**
MForce	.011	.071**	-.035	-.044*	-.040	.033	.056**	.016	.026	.025
Defense Sp	.065**	-.087**	-.063**	.041	.012	.047*	.024	.029	-.046*	-.108**
Aid	.041	.019	-.042*	-.030	.014	.015	.008	.018	.054*	-.038
HTJ	-.240**	-.047*	.027	.021	.008	-.036	.007	-.019	-.004	-.008
ATJ	-.205**	-.029	.003	.012	-.024	.014	.017	-.009	-.020	-.014
Age	-.002	.022	-.414**	-.043*	-.123**	.638**	.072**	.078**	-.183**	.111**
Race	-.078**	.029	-.033	.009	.057**	-.064**	.083**	.014	.034	.206**
Education	-.120**	-.028	.306**	-.063**	-.090**	-.162**	-.151**	-.127**	.018	-.088**
Gender	-.006	.102**	-.234**	-.035	.034	.024	.004	.313**	.041	.090**
88 Econ	.010	.242**	-.009	.008	-.009	.001	.007	.014	-.004	.037

Table 1: Bivariate Correlations 1992 (Part B)

	Repub	World Pos	MForce	Defense	Aid	HTJ	ATJ	Age	Race	Educ	Gender
World Pos	.178**										
MForce	-.099**	-.032									
Defense	.157**	.082**	-.201**								
Aid	-.005	.005	.068**	-.002							
HTJ	.011	.077**	.102**	-.083**	.066**						
ATJ	.012	.067**	.098**	-.044*	.088**	.737**					
Age	.044*	-.067**	.073**	.055*	.033	.006	.037				
Race	-.147**	-.023	.023	-.032	-.012	-.003	-.001	-.051*			
Education	.109**	.043*	.003	-.178**	-.022	.147**	.083**	-.204**	-.083**		
Gender	-.066**	-.117**	.067**	-.031	-.003	-.042	-.034	.065**	.047*	-.107**	
88 Econ	-.041	-.060**	.069**	-.078**	-.011	.061	.046*	-.037	.040	.036	.035

N = 2168

** CORRELATION IS SIGNIFICANT AT THE 0.01 LEVEL (2-TAILED)

* CORRELATION IS SIGNIFICANT AT THE 0.05 LEVEL (2-TAILED)

Table 2: Bivariate Correlations 2000 (Part A)

	Immigration	Economy	Full	Laid off	Unemployed	Retired	Disabled	Homemaker	Student
Economy	.032								
Full	-.011	-.006							
Laid off	-.029	.037	-.134**						
Unemployed	-.040	.033	-.246**	-.018					
Retired	.016	-.022	-.619**	-.046	-.084**				
Disable	.044	-.005	-.278**	-.021	-.038	-.095**			
Homemaker	.012	-.014	-.374**	-.028	-.051*	-.128**	-.057*		
Student	-.027	.039	-.207**	-.015	-.028	-.071**	-.032	-.043	
Democrat	-.031	-.194**	-.059*	.014	-.009	.061*	.065**	-.027	.002
Republican	.041	.116**	.013	-.030	-.037	.010	-.052*	.042	.000
World Pos.	-.077**	-.161**	-.036	.023	.006	-.023	.031	.025	.050*
Defense Sp.	.105**	.061*	-.087**	.006	.015	.068**	.058*	.001	.000
Border Con.	-.306**	.041	.031	.009	.061*	-.078**	-.017	-.015	.059*
Age	.029	-.017	-.446**	-.048*	-.073**	.646**	.082**	-.003	-.195**
Race	-.020	-.018	.027	.009	.016	.007	.019	.025	.014
Education	-.219**	-.019	.234**	-.061*	-.053*	-.135**	-.172**	-.067**	-.005
Gender	.059*	.017	-.133**	.030	-.008	-.005	.031	.233**	-.003
92 Econ	.053*	.191**	.019	.053*	.010	-.072**	.019	-.011	.032

Table 2: Bivariate Correlations 2000 (Part B)

	Democrat	Republican	World Pos	Defense Sp	Border Con	Age	Race	Education	Gender
Republican	-.417**								
World Pos.	.171**	-.196**							
Defense Sp.	-.086**	.159**	-.136**						
Border Con.	.026	.007	.073**	-.124**					
Age	.107**	.042	-.032	.099**	-.070**				
Race	.011	-.008	-.009	-.024	-.008	-.001			
Education	-.079**	.121**	-.028	-.152**	.116**	-.126**	-.059*		
Gender	.091**	-.073**	.027	-.013	.022	.038	.011	-.077**	
1992 Econ	-.088**	-.008	.012	.015	-.001	-.105**	-.087**	-.127**	.081**

N = 1733

** CORRELATION IS SIGNIFICANT AT THE 0.01 LEVEL (2-TAILED)

* CORRELATION IS SIGNIFICANT AT THE 0.05 LEVEL (2-TAILED)

Table 3: Ordered Probit Analyses of Level of Immigration

	Years	
	1992	2000
Demographic variables		
Age	-.001 (.002)	-.001 (.002)
Education	-.051* (.017)	-.146* (.019)
Gender	-.065 (.055)	.146* (.060)
Race	-.275* (.070)	-.349* (.071)
Party Identification - Democrat	-.058 (.061)	.056 (.070)
Party Identification -Republican	.113 (.068)	.122 (.075)
Employment status – Full time	.584 (1.12)	-.884 (.523)
Employment status – Laid off	.934 (1.14)	-1.389* (.590)
Employment status - Unemployed	.350 (1.12)	-1.129* (.543)
Employment status - Retired	.413 (1.12)	-1.014 (.530)
Employment status - Disabled	.503 (1.12)	-.936 (.541)
Employment status - Homemaker	.598 (1.12)	-1.052* (.534)
Employment status - Student	.683 (1.12)	-1.025 (.555)
Economic Variables		
Retrospective economy	.014 (.026)	.011 (.027)
Economy 1988 and 1992 compared to now	.007 (.028)	.072* (0.33)
Take away jobs Hispanics	-.230* (.039)	-----
Take away jobs Asians	-.172* (.039)	-----
Eligible for aid (immigrants)	.404* (.063)	-----
Security Variables		
Use military force	.035 (.033)	-----
U.S. world Position	.004 (.017)	-.031 (.021)
Defense spending	.014 (.021)	.039 (.029)
Spending border control	-----	-.172* .016)
Log likelihood	-1832.5509	-1497.2152
LR chi ²	(21) ¹ 303.42	(18) ^a 276.77
Prob > chi ²	0.000	0.000
Pseudo R ²	0.0765	0.0846
Number of cases in analysis	2168	1733
* Significant at the .05 level		

¹ Indicates the number of variables in each section

Table 4: Clarify Probabilities That Respondents Will Oppose More Immigration
Percentage Probabilities by Year (%)

Variables	Categories	1992	2000
Age	Youngest	55	66
	Oldest	54	62
Education	Least educated	59	79
	Most educated	47	47
Gender	Male	57	58
	Female	55	64
Race	Whites	55	64
	Others	44	51
Economy	Gotten better	53	63
	Gotten worse	55	65
Economy 1988, 1992 compared to now	Gotten better	53	62
	Gotten worse	55	72
Take Away Jobs Hispanics	Extreme likely	68	---
	Not likely	41	---
Take Away Jobs Asians	Extreme likely	65	---
	Not likely	45	---
Eligible Aid	Eligible now	39	---
	Wait year +	55	---
Military Force	Willing	52	---
	Not willing	58	---
U.S. World Position	Weaker	55	66
	Stronger	55	62
Defense Spending	Grtly decrease	53	60
	Grtly increase	56	65
Spending for Border Control	Increase	---	64
	Decrease	---	25
Party Identification	Democrats	52	66
	Republicans	59	69
Employment Status	Full	55	64
	Laidoff	77	20
	Unemployed	62	25
	Retired	63	28
	Disabled	66	30
	Homemaker	70	27
	Student	70	28

APPENDIX

The Missing Values Dilemma

Missing data are usually problematic in statistical analyses. The missing completely at random data (MCAR) mean that the probability that an observation (X_i) is missing is unrelated to the value of X_i or to the value of any other variables. The data are considered to be missing at random (MAR) if the data meet the requirement that “missingness” does not depend on the value of X_i after controlling for another variable. If “missingness” is correlated with the outcome of interest, then ignoring it will bias the results of the statistical tests. If the alternative used is to drop the missing values, then such a practice will reduce the sample size and lower the power of the test being carried out. Other alternatives include -

imputing the missing data where the missing values are filled in by using some method, or modeling the probability of “missingness” if imputation is not feasible (Smith, 2002).

In this study cases where the dependent variable has valid responses (Newvar), are first selected. The remaining missing values are dealt with using regression-based imputation. A regression model in which the dependent variable has missing values for some observations is estimated. Then the estimated regression coefficients are used to predict (impute) missing values of that variable. The proper regression model depends on the form of the dependent variable. In this case the multinomial logistic regression is used. Each predictive variable is transformed into a new variable designated PGR_(name of variable). PGR is the representation for the predicted missing values, which is later renamed, transformed and computed. Any missing values that still remain are dealt with by using the SPSS Missing Values Analysis.

IMPUTING MISSING VALUES IN LOGISTIC REGRESSION PREDICTORS

The predictors are X1 to X5 (or Xn) and the dependent variable (DV) is Y. For each X1 to X5 (using X1 as an example), the following steps are performed:

1. Run a logistic regression analysis of X1 with X2 to X5 as predictors. Save the predicted value for X1 as a new variable. Using syntax commands, specify the name of the new variable for predicted the predicted X1 (called XIMP1 for example). If the Logistic Regression is run from the menu, there is no opportunity to choose the name of this variable. SPSS uses the name 'PGR_1' for the first such variable that it saves, followed by PGR_2, etc. for subsequent runs. By clicking on the designated name given by SPSS the name can then be changed as desired.
2. The new variables, XIMP1 to XIMP5, will have valid values for cases that had full data on the four variables used as predictors. Other cases will be sysmis on these variables. For cases that had valid values for the original X1, we want XIMP1 to hold that original X1 value, so we replace XIMP1 with the value of X1 IF there was a valid value for X1.
3. Open the menu Transform-Compute. In the Target variable, type XIMP1 (or PGR_1). In the Numeric Expression box, type or paste in X1. Click the If button near the bottom of the Compute dialog.
4. In the "Compute Variable: If Cases" dialog box that opens, click the "Include if case satisfies condition" button. In the white space that then becomes available, type 'Not(missing(x1))', click Continue and then OK. If asked whether it is OK to overwrite XIMP1, click OK. XIMP1 will then be set to X1 if X1 was not missing. Otherwise XIMP1 will be the predicted value from the logistic regression with X2 to X4 as predictors. If both X1 and the predicted value for X1 are missing, XIMP1 will still be missing.
5. Repeat this process with each pair of observed and predicted values - X2 and Ximp2, X3 and XIMP3, X4 and XIMP4, X5 and XIMP5, and so on (SPSS Missing Data Analysis Program with help from a SPSS assistant).

Table A- 1: 1992 Cross-tabulation –Newvar Case Summary

	Valid		Cases Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Immigration Level * Retro Economy	2148	99.1%	20	.9%	2168	100.0%
Immigration Level * Economy 1988	1993	91.9%	175	8.1%	2168	100.0%
Immigration Level * U.S. World Position	2128	98.2%	40	1.8%	2168	100.0%
Immigration Level * Military force	2139	98.7%	29	1.3%	2168	100.0%
Immigration Level * Defense Spending	2168	100.0%	0	.0%	2168	100.0%
Immigration Level * Age	2168	100.0%	0	.0%	2168	100.0%
Immigration Level * Education	2168	100.0%	0	.0%	2168	100.0%
Immigration Level * Gender	2168	100.0%	0	.0%	2168	100.0%
Immigration Level * Race	2168	100.0%	0	.0%	2168	100.0%
Immigration Level * Hisp-tk jbs	2135	98.5%	33	1.5%	2168	100.0%
Immigration Level *Asns-tk jobs	2129	98.2%	39	1.8%	2168	100.0%
Immigration Level * Eligible aid	2083	96.1%	85	3.9%	2168	100.0%
Immigration Level * Full	2168	100.0%	0	.0%	2168	100.0%
Immigration Level * Laidoff	2168	100.0%	0	.0%	2168	100.0%
Immigration Level * Unemployed	2168	100.0%	0	.0%	2168	100.0%
Immigration Level * Retired	2168	100.0%	0	.0%	2168	100.0%
Immigration Level * Disabled	2168	100.0%	0	.0%	2168	100.0%
Immigration Level * Homemaker	2168	100.0%	0	.0%	2168	100.0%
Immigration Level * Student	2168	100.0%	0	.0%	2168	100.0%
Immigration Level * Democrat	2168	100.0%	0	.0%	2168	100.0%
Immigration Level * Republican	2168	100.0%	0	.0%	2168	100.0%

Table A- 2: 1992 Predicted Cross-tabulation Case Summary

	Valid		Cases Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Immigration Level * Retro Economy	2168	100.0%	0	.0%	2168	100.0%
Immigration level * Economy 1988	2168	100.0%	0	.0%	2168	100.0%
Immigration Level * U.S. World Position	2168	100.0%	0	.0%	2168	100.0%
Immigration Level * Military force	2168	100.0%	0	.0%	2168	100.0%
Immigration Level *. Defense Spending	2168	100.0%	0	.0%	2168	100.0%
Immigration Level * Age	2168	100.0%	0	.0%	2168	100.0%
Immigration Level * Education	2168	100.0%	0	.0%	2168	100.0%
Immigration Level * Gender	2168	100.0%	0	.0%	2168	100.0%
Immigration Level * Race	2168	100.0%	0	.0%	2168	100.0%
Immigration Level * Hsp tk jbs	2168	100.0%	0	.0%	2168	100.0%
Immigration Level * Asns tk jbs	2168	100.0%	0	.0%	2168	100.0%
Immigration Level * Eligible Aid	2168	100.0%	0	.0%	2168	100.0%
Immigration Level * Full	2168	100.0%	0	.0%	2168	100.0%
Immigration Level * Laidoff	2168	100.0%	0	.0%	2168	100.0%
Immigration Level * Unemployed	2168	100.0%	0	.0%	2168	100.0%
Immigration Level * Retired	2168	100.0%	0	.0%	2168	100.0%
Immigration Level * Disabled	2168	100.0%	0	.0%	2168	100.0%
Immigration Level * Homemaker	2168	100.0%	0	.0%	2168	100.0%
Immigration Level* Student	2168	100.0%	0	.0%	2168	100.0%
Immigration Level * Democrat	2168	100.0%	0	.0%	2168	100.0%
Immigration level * Republican	2168	100.0%	0	.0%	2168	100.0%

Table A - 3: 2000 Cross-tabulation Newvar Case Summary

	Valid		Cases Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Immigration Level * Retro Economy	1718	99.1%	15	.9%	1733	100.0%
Immigration Level *. U.S. World Position	1708	98.6%	25	1.4%	1733	100.0%
Immigration Level * Defense Spending	1367	78.9%	366	21.1%	1733	100.0%
Immigration Level * Border Control	1696	97.9%	37	2.1%	1733	100.0%
Immigration Level * Age	1726	99.6%	7	.4%	1733	100.0%
Immigration Level * Education	1727	99.7%	6	.3%	1733	100.0%
Immigration Level * Race	1719	99.2%	14	.8%	1733	100.0%
Immigration Level * Gender	1733	100.0%	0	.0%	1733	100.0%
Immigration Level * Full	1733	100.0%	0	.0%	1733	100.0%
Immigration Level * Laidoff	1733	100.0%	0	.0%	1733	100.0%
Immigration Level * Unemployed	1733	100.0%	0	.0%	1733	100.0%
Immigration Level * Retired	1733	100.0%	0	.0%	1733	100.0%
Immigration Level * Disabled	1733	100.0%	0	.0%	1733	100.0%
Immigration Level * Homemaker	1733	100.0%	0	.0%	1733	100.0%
Immigration Level * Student	1733	100.0%	0	.0%	1733	100.0%
Immigration Level * Democrat	1733	100.0%	0	.0%	1733	100.0%
Immigration Level * Republican	1733	100.0%	0	.0%	1733	100.0%
Immigration Level * Economy since 92	1586	91.5%	147	8.5%	1733	100.0%

Table A -4: 2000 Cross-tabulation Predicted Case Summary

	Valid		Cases Missing		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
Immigration Level * Retro Economy	1733	100.0%	0	.0%	1733	100.0%
Immigration Level * U.S. World Position	1733	100.0%	0	.0%	1733	100.0%
Immigration Level *Defense Spending	1733	100.0%	0	.0%	1733	100.0%
Immigration Level * Border Control	1733	100.0%	0	.0%	1733	100.0%
Immigration Level * Respondent age	1733	100.0%	0	.0%	1733	100.0%
Immigration Level * Education	1733	100.0%	0	.0%	1733	100.0%
Immigration Level * Race	1733	100.0%	0	.0%	1733	100.0%
Immigration Level * Gender	1733	100.0%	0	.0%	1733	100.0%
Immigration Level * Full	1733	100.0%	0	.0%	1733	100.0%
Immigration Level * Laidoff	1733	100.0%	0	.0%	1733	100.0%
Immigration Level * Unemployed	1733	100.0%	0	.0%	1733	100.0%
Immigration Level * Retired	1733	100.0%	0	.0%	1733	100.0%
Immigration Level * Disabled	1733	100.0%	0	.0%	1733	100.0%
Immigration Level * Homemaker	1733	100.0%	0	.0%	1733	100.0%
Immigration Level * Student	1733	100.0%	0	.0%	1733	100.0%
Immigration Level * Democrat	1733	100.0%	0	.0%	1733	100.0%
Immigration Level * Republican	1733	100.0%	0	.0%	1733	100.0%
Immigration Level Economy since 92	1733	100.0%	0	.0%	1733	100.0%

BIVARIATE CORRELATIONS (1992 and 2000)

Table A - 5: Bivariate Correlations 1992 Original with Newvar (Part A)

	Immigration	Economy	Full	Laid-off	Unemployed	Retired	Disabled	Homemaker	Student	Democrat
Economy	.025									
Full	.004	-.056**								
Laid-off	.028	.008	-.155**							
Unemployed	-.030	.036	-.297**	-.028						
Retired	-.009	.008	-.534**	-.050*	-.095**					
Disabled	.003	-.020	-.254**	-.024	-.045*	-.082**				
Homemaker	.015	.055*	-.430**	-.040	-.077**	-.138**	-.066**			
Student	-.005	.020	-.214**	-.020	-.038	-.069**	-.033	-.055*		
Democrat	-.042	.132**	-.072**	-.008	-.002	.075**	.058**	.011	-.033	
Republican	.041	-.196**	-.004	.010	-.056**	.038	-.042	.021	.009	-.430**
World Pos.	-.017	-.207**	.117**	.001	-.010	-.036	-.056**	-.085**	-.037	-.137**
MForce	-.017	.084**	.018	-.046*	-.030	-.002	.003	.009	.008	.020
Defense Sp.	.065**	-.087**	-.063**	.041	.012	.047*	.024	.029	-.046*	-.108**
Aid	.187**	.028	-.015	-.025	-.014	.065**	-.006	-.004	-.049*	-.037
HTJ	-.314**	-.039	.074**	-.014	-.025	-.049*	-.022	-.033	.013	-.020
ATJ	-.296**	-.054*	.061**	-.024	-.049*	.007	-.056**	-.024	-.007	-.028
Age	-.002	.022	-.414**	-.043*	-.123**	.638**	.072**	.078**	-.183**	.111**
Race	-.078**	.029	-.033	.009	.057**	-.064**	.083**	.014	.034	.206**
Education	-.120**	-.028	.306**	-.063**	-.090**	-.162**	-.151**	-.127**	.018	-.088**
Gender	-.006	.102**	-.234**	-.035	.034	.024	.004	.313**	.041	.090**
88 Econ	.008	.432**	-.039	.022	.003	.011	.006	.034	.003	.073**

Table A-5: Bivariate Correlations 1992 (Part B)

	Repub	World Pos	MForce	Defense	Aid	HTJ	ATJ	Age	Race	Educ	Gender
World Pos	.212**										
MForce	-.112**	-.144**									
Defense	.157**	.079**	-.287**								
Aid	.031	-.012	-.036	.037							
HTJ	.032	.063**	.095**	-.119**	-.139**						
ATJ	.030	.052*	.064**	-.094**	-.102**	.714**					
Age	.044*	-.100**	.002	.055*	.064**	-.027	.006				
Race	-.147**	-.089**	.010	-.032	-.089**	-.035	-.033	-.051*			
Education	.109**	.099**	.094**	-.178**	-.093**	.239**	.199**	-.204**	-.083**		
Gender	-.066**	-.165**	.043*	-.031	.010	-.051*	-.068**	.065**	.047*	-.107**	
88 Econ	-.111**	-.175**	.116**	-.111**	-.034	.041	.006	.005	-.028	.102**	.045*

N = 2168

** CORRELATION IS SIGNIFICANT AT THE 0.01 LEVEL (2-TAILED)

* CORRELATION IS SIGNIFICANT AT THE 0.05 LEVEL (2-TAILED)

Table A- 6: Bivariate Correlations 2000 Original with Newvar (Part A)

	Immigration	Economy	Full	Laid off	Unemployed	Retired	Disabled	Homemaker	Student
Economy	.051*								
Full	-.011	.030							
Laid off	-.029	.046	-.134**						
Unemployed	-.040	.046	-.246**	-.018					
Retired	.016	-.069**	-.619**	-.046	-.084**				
Disabled	.044	-.028	-.278**	-.021	-.038	-.095**			
Homemaker	.012	-.002	-.374**	-.028	-.051*	-.128**	-.057*		
Student	-.027	.031	-.207**	-.015	-.028	-.071**	-.032	-.043	
Democrat	-.031	-.224**	-.059*	.014	-.009	.061*	.065**	-.027	.002
Republican	.041	.129**	.013	-.030	-.037	.010	-.052*	.042	.000
World Pos.	-.077**	-.194**	-.036	.023	.006	-.023	.031	.025	.050*
Defense Sp.	.105**	.075**	-.087**	.006	.015	.068**	.058*	.001	.000
Border Con.	-.306**	.038	.031	.009	.061*	-.078**	-.017	-.015	.059*
Age	.029	-.056*	-.446**	-.048*	-.073**	.646**	.082**	-.003	-.195**
Race	-.020	-.024	.027	.009	.016	.007	.019	.025	.014
Education	-.219**	-.007	.234**	-.061*	-.053*	-.135**	-.172**	-.067**	-.005
Gender	.059*	.009	-.133**	.030	-.008	-.005	.031	.233**	-.003
88 Econ	.053*	.159**	.019	.053*	.010	-.072**	.019	-.011	.032

Table A-6: Bivariate Correlations 2000 Original with Newvar (Part B)

	Democrat	Republican	World Pos	Defense Sp	Border Con	Age	Race	Education	Gender
Republican	-.417**								
World Pos.	.171**	-.196**							
Defense Sp.	-.086**	.159**	-.136**						
Border Con.	.026	.007	.073**	-.124**					
Age	.107**	.042	-.032	.099**	-.070**				
Race	.011	-.008	-.009	-.024	-.008	-.001			
Education	-.079**	.121**	-.028	-.152**	.116**	-.126**	-.059*		
Gender	.091**	-.073**	.027	-.013	.022	.038	.011	-.077**	
1992 Econ	-.088**	-.008	.012	.015	-.001	-.105**	.081**	-.127**	.081**

N = 1733

** CORRELATION IS SIGNIFICANT AT THE 0.01 LEVEL (2-TAILED)

* CORRELATION IS SIGNIFICANT AT THE 0.05 LEVEL (2-TAILED)

¹ This is a sociopolitical policy, especially on the U.S. in the 19th century, favoring the interests of established inhabitants over those of immigrants.

² The dependent variable Immigration Level is coded into three categories: 1= Favor more immigration, 2=Unsure, 3=Oppose more immigration. Demographic variables: Gender: 1=Male, 2=Female; Race: 1=White, 2 =Other; Party identification: Dummy variables are created for Democrat and Republican; Employment status: Dummy variables are created for Fully employed, Unemployed, Disabled, Laid off, retired, Homemaker, Student.

³ Respondents' Socio-Demographic (RSDC) represent respondents' Education, Age, Gender, Race, Employment status and Party identification which help to condition Attitudes Toward Economic Impacts (ATEI) and Attitudes Toward Security Issues (ATSI, as they relate to Immigration Quota (IQ). ATEI include the variables Retrospective economy, and The state of the national economy now compared to four years ago (asked in 1992), or compared to 1992 (asked in 2000), all of which have direct effects on IQ. ATSI include the variables Defense spending, Use of military force by the U.S. to solve international problems, U.S. position in the world, Government spending to control borders, all having direct effects on IQ. RSDC, ATEI and ATSI are all independent variables. IQ is the dependent variable, and the question asked by the National Election Studies (NES) is: "Do you think that the quota of immigrants from foreign countries who are permitted to come to the U.S. to live should be increased a little, increased a lot (increased), decreased a little, decreased a lot (decreased), or remain the same as now?"