Water Policy in the Hashemite Kingdom

Melodee M. Baines
Old Dominion University

“[d]uring the past three centuries, the Islamic world has lost its dominance and its leadership, and has fallen behind the modern West and the rapidly modernizing Orient.” (Lewis, 2003, p. 4)

     Since the coronation of King Abdullah II in 1999, Jordan continues to see economic improvement and to maintain internal stability; however, water scarcity continues to plague his reign, as it did his father’s and grandfather’s. Jordan is one of the ten most water poor countries in the modern world. The populations of Transjordan have skillfully managed water shortage since ancient times, serving as the eastern breadbasket of the Arabian Peninsula to the Roman Empire. At the Nabatean ruins of Petra, “an aqueduct chiseled from the rock next to the path reminds one that this was an ancient city whose greatest problem was water” (Hussein, 1962, p. 213). The status and importance of water within Jordan’s modern borders has changed little since then.
     Adequacy of resource management, on the other hand, has not maintained the ancient integrity that King Hussein so admired and promoted in his writing. In his autobiography, King Hussein poetically waxes that Jordan, “dotted with the ruins of empires once great, is the last resort of yesterday in the world of tomorrow” (Hussein, 1962, p. 2). Jordan’s 92,500 million square meters experiences “remarkable seasonal and inter-annual fluctuation” in rainfall (Ferragina, 2002, p. 347). In addition, “the per capita consumption of water in Jordan is the lowest in the region” (Allan, 1996, p. 185). It was only in 1924, when King Abdullah I incorporated southern Trans-Jordan, that the Hashemite Kingdom gained an outlet to the sea at Aqaba (Hussein, 1962, p. 73).
     There are several factors in modern Jordan’s 61-year history that have contributed to the enduring water scarcity. The specific focus of this paper is policy decisions under King Hussein I and his grandson and successor King Abdullah II. Among policy considerations is governmental and institutional resource mismanagement, not the least of the problem, which continues to interfere with domestic and international development and improvement projects. Since 1946 Jordan’s changing borders, often the result of miscalculated strategic military and political decisions, led to the forfeiture of access to important water resources. After 1948 “in a matter of months Jordan changed not only in size but in character” (Hussein, 1962, p. 103). Interregional water-sharing agreements likewise have proven to be nothing but symbolic acts of foreign policy.
     Water scarcity seriously interferes with economic and social development projects in Jordan. At the time of the last official census of refugees in July 1961, more than three quarters of a million Palestinians were living in camps and frontier villages (Hussein, 1962, p. 103). Despite King Hussein’s assertion in 1962 that “it is not the fault of the Arab peoples that they are burdened with the Palestine problem” (Hussein, p. 75), there exists nonetheless a Jordanian sense of obligation to absorb much of the responsibility of providing for Palestinians. That obligation stems in part from Jordan’s status in the region as an island of peace. Thus, despite a regionally low birthrate per capita and an increasing average age of marriage, migration and a healthy, aging populace contribute to the growing strain on resources.
     The population is growing faster than any of the top 10 water scarce countries, and water use exceeds the absolute water table by 10 per cent (ITT, 2003). Jordanian Ministry of Water data shows an official population of 5.7 million in 2006. However, official population calculations do not account for the undocumented migrants, including “hundreds of thousands of [undocumented] Palestinian and Iraqi refugees. There are more than 600,000 Iraqi refugees, nearly 250,000 Egyptian workers and hundreds of thousands of other Arab nationals - including Syrians, Palestinians and Lebanese - already in Jordan” (Ferragina, 2002, p. 346 and IRIN, 2006). The population presents a tremendous complication to development projects.
     Lack of water is also a gendered problem. Men and women have different orientations toward water use. Whereas women’s relationship to water orients largely toward the domestic side of daily life, “men’s primary interest in water in rural settings is within the public domain; that is, agricultural production and irrigation.” In Jordan, it is the elites (men) who influence the legislators who determine the allocation of resources. “In some communities, there may be infrastructure for irrigation when there is none for drinking water, as men’s work is regarded as part of the productive economy and therefore more worthy of investment” than the domestic work that women carry out, interfering with personal hygiene, domestic sanitation and nutrition (IRIN, 2006).
     Interregional water sharing agreements have largely failed to ease the strain on water resources. Interregional interaction compounds the problem of water shortage for Jordan, as a result of bi- and multilateral agreements of water sharing. Indeed, “Jordan is a country that depends on good neighbors for its existence,” but is also vulnerable to its neighbors, whose own best interests often prevent maximized mutual benefit (Hussein, 1962, p. 85).
     Economically, projections for water resources are contributing to dissuasion of investors. Lack of water coupled with ongoing regional strife maintains the stagnation of Jordan’s prosperity. For example, the funding and maintenance for many (and perhaps most) of the active and excavated archaeological sites originates outside of Jordan. Economically the implication for tourism is promising; however, Jordan’s current infrastructure is insufficient for supporting the water and sanitation demands of western tourists, whose normal per capita water use far exceeds the availability for Jordanians.
     Historical uneven development and exploitation throughout the Hashemite Kingdom brought about the current environmental contribution to water scarcity. The large-scale deforestation that occurred during Ottoman occupation of Transjordan significantly reduced underground fresh water resources by interfering with the capacity of the land for water absorption. By 1924 “most of the country’s forests had long since vanished to make sleepers (or even fuel) for the fantastic Hijaz (sic) railway” (Hussein, 1962, p. 73). The cavities left behind once the underground resources dry up become potential sinkholes, or ‘death traps’, caving in and swallowing up vehicles and people (IRIN, 2006).
     Deforestation, along with inefficient and often nonexistent waste management and removal indirectly contribute to desertification. For example, plastic bags, which plague both the urban and rural landscape, are perhaps most detrimental along the countryside. There they frequently get caught in desert plants and consequently smother the fragile plant life. Industrial pollution complicates effective water management, as Jordan strives to compete in the global economy. Indeed industrial and agricultural water needs compete with basic human needs. Development projects often add to the problem. Firstly, development projects in Jordan are not evenly distributed geographically. Northern Jordan, the greener, more populated part of the country receives more development attention than the arid, semi-mountainous desert south.¹
     The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan became an independent state in 1946, ruled by King Abdullah I until his assassination in Jerusalem in 1951. After the brief rule of his father King Talal, King Hussein I ascended the throne in 1953 just prior to his 18th birthday. At the time of his death from cancer in 1999, he was the longest serving head of state in the world (Rodgers, 1999). At his death, he was the only ruler most Jordanians had ever known. During Hussein’s reign Jordan’s borders had shifted more than once and her population had experienced exponential growth, exacerbating the challenge of resource allocation. Hussein’s rule of Jordan witnessed serious conflict, four significant waves of inward migration and the end of the Cold War. The 1994 peace with Israel, while greeted with protest domestically, was well received internationally.
     Water scarcity is an economic issue both internationally and domestically. The extant scholarship on water policy, while varied and comprehensive, is often overly broad in focus. The weakness of the literature in general is that works that examine the political facet of water policy in the Middle East are not country specific. The pieces that are country specific are technical in nature. My research seeks to breech that deficit by providing water policy analysis that is specific to the case of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Instead of offering policy prescription, I instead consider the direction in which the current water policy in Jordan is taking the country. I am interested strictly in the political implications of water management schemes, and not in the technical nature. The purpose of this paper is to explore the water policy decisions (and the factors influencing them) of King Abdullah II in order to understand their affects on the security, stability and the potential for prosperity of the Hashemite Kingdom. This paper will compare his water policies to his predecessor and grandfather King Hussein in an effort to understand if Jordan under King Abdullah is indeed in transition.
King Abdullah II
     Compared to the 46-year reign of King Hussein, far fewer dramatic events have tested the short reign of King Abdullah II. King Abdullah II represents the “strong, new generation of leaders” in Jordan, while King Hussein continues posthumously to signify “the contribution of Jordan to world peace” and the Jordanian legacy of respect for the international community (ACI, 2007). In the nine years since King Abdullah II has ruled Jordan, the country has seen marked economic improvement and integration into the global economy. However, in other realms including water management “little real progress has been made” (Joffé, 2002, p. xx). Well into King Abdullah’s reign, the water deficit remains. The current causes are rooted in incomplete implementation of policies affecting water supply (Hambright, 2006, p. 180). “The fundamental assumptions of Hashemite power appear to be unchanged, even if more modern concerns have also entered the political arena” (Joffé, 2002, p. xx). The executive branch of the government of Jordan is the king, and “the monarchy’s general treatment of those dissenting from its policies seems to suggest that, despite liberalization, the king still considers himself above the political process” (Joffé, 2002, p. xvi). Contemporary Jordanian policy making seems to follow the “traditional survival strategy” of “walking the tightrope…between economic success in a global context and failure in national isolation” (Joffé, 2002, p. xxi).
     The major internal political hurdles posed to King Abdullah II have been numerous. King Abdullah II dissolved Parliament in June 2001. Parliamentary and municipal elections were held during the summer of 2003. The current Prime Minister, Marouf Bakhit, was appointed by the king in late 2005. His cabinet has drafted a ten-year reform plan, known as the National Agenda. The National Agenda address the possibility of combining the efforts of the Water Sector and the Agricultural Sector (which consumes over 60 per cent of water) in future policy development. “The policy will focus on rationalizing the use of water for agricultural activities” (Drew, 2004, p. 55-56).
     The government of Jordan under King Abdullah II has begun to address the development disparity between the urban and rural populations. “The Ministry of Agriculture has initiated an agricultural sector development program for the period 2001 to 2010, which aims at addressing the needs of rural people and contributing to balanced development in Jordan” (Drew, 2004, p. 127). In the realm of rural development and poverty alleviation, plans feature “creating an enabling environment for investments in large-scale tourist and agricultural enterprise projects in rural areas” (Drew, 2004, p. 57). The government is also seeking to improve infrastructure through the development of the transport center. Plans include the extension of “the network of rural and agricultural roads in all governorates” and the modernization of the shipping sector (Drew, 2004, p. 56). Several rural agricultural development projects focusing on the protection of natural resources and improved allocation of arable lands to new farms are planned (Drew, 2004, p. 57). Governmental afforestation programs have successfully increased forest areas over about one per cent of the country (Drew, 2004, p. 127).
     The overlap of agricultural and water policy underscores the interconnectedness of the two. Measures have been established to maintain water allocation from agriculture at below 1998 levels by 2020 through an increase in treated wastewater. The forecasts for treated wastewater use as a portion of irrigation water are a reduction from 12 per cent in 2001 to 32.3 per cent in 2020 (Drew, 2004, p. 130). “Water is the main limiting factor for the increase of crop and livestock productivity” (Drew, 2004, p. 131). The government is promoting sheep, goat and cattle breeding as “the most suitable, feasible and practicable agricultural activity for the rural population in the dry areas” (Drew, 2004, p. 131). The “declining share of agriculture is a direct result of structural changes in the Jordanian economy;” however, the decline does not account for agriculturally related activities such as upstream and downstream linkage like agribusiness services, inputs and agro-industry (Drew, 2004, p. 132). Consequently Jordan is dependent on imports to meet its agricultural commodities requirements (Drew, 2004, p. 133). Future plans include “the increased use of localized irrigation systems in irrigated areas to increase water-use efficiency” (Drew, 2004, p. 134).
     A dearth of financial and human resources have somewhat prevented the implementation of water supply policies. However, water policy continues to receive lower priority next to development, infrastructure and tourism projects. Small public expenditures might reap water savings; however, the private sector currently bears the costs of the implementation of programs such as “municipal water conservation, expanded use of water saving equipment…and changed cropping patterns” (Hambright, 2006, p. 179). There is over four times more total irrigated land in Jordan today than in 1967 (Drew, 2004, p. 128). Jordan continues to cover the increasing water deficit “through overdrawing from highland aquifers and exploitation of non-renewable groundwater” (Drew, 2004, p. 129). Agricultural water allocation is the highest overall, although “its share dropped from 75 per cent to 70 per cent of the total water used” from 1985 to 1996. “The water for municipal uses showed the highest increase from…20 per cent to 25 per cent of the total water used” from 1985 to 1996. “Industrial water use is about…4 per cent of the total water consumption” (Drew, 2004, p. 129). At the same time, total water use countrywide increased 7 per cent. “Present government policy is to reduce this share…to minimize the over-exploitation of the groundwater and to meet the increasing demand for freshwater for municipal uses” (Drew, 2004, p. 129). Solutions in process include wastewater treatment for irrigation, water use efficiency via improved irrigation methods and maximizing the production per unit of water used for irrigation (Drew, 2004, p. 129).
     External political challenges have also been myriad. The 2nd Intifada of 2000 triggered another wave of Palestinian migration to Jordan. The United States led invasion of Iraq in 2003 caused Jordan to confront and evaluate her relationship with Iraq and the United States. It is in the best interest of the Hashemite Kingdom to maintain friendly relations with Iraq as a potential source of water provision. On the other hand, the trade relationship with the United States is vitally important to Jordan’s continued economic integration, liberalization and expansion. Furthermore the war in Iraq also triggered yet another migration flow. For its part, Jordan seeks to leverage the inconvenience of the Iraq war with the maximization of her economic benefit from its aftermath. A conference in the spring of 2007 focused on Jordan’s role in rebuilding and re-establishing Iraqi infrastructure.² King Abdullah seeks to preserve the “economic symbiosis between Iraq and Jordan, including Iraqi access to the Port of Aqaba (Ryan, 2002, p. 112).
     There are several facets to the modern challenge of water scarcity in Jordan. The urban population stands at 70 per cent, and “Jordan’s main water scarcity is drinking water” (Hambright, 2006, p. 164). In addition, there are more than 1.7 million refugees and displaced persons (many of them citizens)³ in Jordan. Low rain fall during the winter of 2001 interfered with the replenishment of water levels in dams (Hambright, 2006, p. 174). Ferragina wrote in 2002 that the water supply in Jordan had “reached its environmental and economic limits” (Ferragina, 2002, p. 350). There is a lack of storage basins on its territory and a lack of interconnection between ground waters and areas of high-level water consumption. In addition, increasing transport costs interfere with efforts to keep the cost of water low. The environment that welcomed King Abdullah II was one of extreme drought—the worst in 50 years (US, 2005). The loss and damage to agriculture and livestock is estimated to have exceeded hundreds of millions in USD.
     Jordan continues to engage in regional and international treaties and agreements centered on environmental preservation and protection. Among them are the Jordan-EU Association Agreement (effective May 2002), the Jordan-US Free Trade Agreement (effective December 2001) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) (in force since 2000). As noted in the mission statement of Amman Chamber of Industry, “a common feature of these accords is that they all seek…preserving the environment” (ACI, 2007). The 2005 report of the United States House of Representatives Committee on Ways and Means concluded that “Jordan adheres to all its commitments in international agreements regarding the environment.”
     The integrated approach to water management continues in Jordan. “The Jordan Industrial Estates Corporation (JIEC) was established to support and encourage the industrial sector, while increasing investment and minimizing industrial pollution” (ACI, 2007). Private sector organization and expansion has led to the creation of the Environmental Department. One of 9 departmental specializations within the Amman Chamber if Industry, it is “the first of its kind in the private sector.” The department handles industrial water waste treatment, pollution, and management, in addition to hosting relevant corporate and public sector training seminars.
     The formation of water policy in Jordan gives preference to her business requirements. The business requirements for the water sector for 2004-2006 included: improving water and sanitary networks in all governorates; improving and modernizing irrigation systems in the Jordan Valley; transferring to private ownership the management of potable water and sanitation in the northern governorates and irrigation water facilities in the Jordan Valley; establishing water companies in Amman for commercial management; restructuring the water, irrigation and sanitation tariff rates; and accelerating the implementation of large development projects in the water sector (Drew, 2004, p. 55).
     The business requirements of Jordan encapsulate additionally the large, privatized development projects in the water sector. Current privatization projects include programs in the northern governorates (the most populous and urban area of the country), Aqaba Governmental Company, As-Samra wastewater treatment plant (BOT), the Red-Dead Sea pipeline, the Disi Amman water conveyor (BOT) (Saudi Arabia), and the Al-Wehda dam (Syria). Policy reforms early this decade sought to accelerate the implementation of large development projects in water, including the Disi Aquifer conveyor, the Wehda Dam, Kherbet Al-Samra for water treatment, and the Dead Sea East Coast Development Project. The policy reforms additionally aspired to channel “public investment in upgrading water, sanitary and irrigation networks throughout the country in order to manage demand for water resources better and augment supply” (Drew, 2004, p. 55). Policy makers in Jordan currently are seeking to ferret additional investment in infrastructure development in order to attract private capital on a BOO [build, own, operate] and BOOT [build, operate, own, transfer] basis required for development projects. Policy efforts are focusing “on enhancing the role of the private sector in the delivery of water services in certain areas through management contracts, particularly in the northern governorates” (Drew, 2004, p. 55). As-Samra is the biggest natural treatment plant in the Middle East, utilizes solar energy and serves more than 50 per cent of population of Jordan (Allan, 1996, p. 190). The JWA is managing the Irbid Wastewater lift-up station at a cost of JD1.250 million. “The project aims to pump the wastewater from the camp to Al Nu'aimeh pumping station” (Al Wakeel, 2002).
     The plan for an integrated approach to water scarcity also accommodates the establishment of companies, technology and other measures. The water companies will be managed “on a commercial basis, especially in Amman and the northern governorates. The water tariff rates will also be restructured in a manner that will better reflect their true economic cost” (Drew, 2004, p. 55-56). The government is formulating plans to create an independent body for water resources that will focus expressly on the reduction of unbalanced use of water and degradation. The body will monitor a centralized database system that “will also augment efforts to manage the deteriorating capacity of finite water resources better, and minimize the exploitation of renewable groundwater resources at unsustainable and unbalanced rates” (Drew, 2004, p. 55-56).
     Large scale projects, including pipelines, continue to be fashionable in Jordan. Of the two largest, the first is the Peace Conduit, “a multi-billion-dollar undertaking to link the Dead Sea and the Red Sea with a 325km canal” (IRIN, 2006). As of August 2006, the World Bank had managed to recruit several donor countries to fund “a United States $15 million feasibility study on how to carry out the project.” The Peace Conduit or 'Red-Dead' project would require both a hydroelectric-power plant and a desalination facility. The government disclosed in December 2006 that the feasibility study had begun. The pipeline could reduce shrinking water levels of the Dead Sea as a result of industrial use. The second project involves the construction of a conveyor pipeline to pull water from the Disi aquifer in the south on a BOT basis. The Disi aquifer crosses the Saudi-Jordan border, and waters extracted go to surrounding farms and for domestic use for the port city of Aqaba. Estimates as of January 2007 project a $600 million price tag (Mahsaneh, 2007). Tender offers from several companies have been made to the government of Jordan and the project has been fast-tracked, although construction is estimated to require up to 14 years (Mahsaneh, 2007).
     The two largest projects face both international and domestic opposition. Israel opposes the Peace Conduit because it would interfere with other Dead Sea pipelines plans. Secondly, Saudi Arabia relies on the Disi aquifer to satisfy her water needs. Both pipelines have the potential to “cause a massive disruption of natural landscapes, transport saline seawater over areas containing freshwater aquifers and disturb the natural qualities of the [Dead S]ea" (IRIN, 2006). Jordanian water experts, including Dr. Dureid Mahsaneh, the former co-chairman of the Jordan-Israel Water Coordination Committee, objects to the Disi pipeline. He suggests that preventing illegal underground water drilling would provide more water at a lower cost. In addition, four privately-owned farms, under a 25-year concession agreement granted by the government in 1985, consume nearly a one-third of the kingdom's total supply of water from the aquifer for almost nothing. These farms owned by former senior government officials will prevent the success of the Disi project, according to Elias Salameh of the Ministry of Water.
Water and Peace with Israel in the 21st century
     Peace with Israel continues to affect the amount water available to Jordanians. There exists in Jordan political opposition to peace with Israel. The government decision to forge peace is indeed a peace to maintain access to water (Ryan, 2002, p. 113). Despite donor willingness, political interference from Israel, who would prefer to link the Dead Sea to the Mediterranean, has stalled the momentum of the Peace Conduit project. An Israeli canal would link from the western side of the Dead Sea, and Jordan would not have access.
     In terms of water sharing, it is unclear if Jordan is receiving the portion allocated to her as per the 1994 agreement. Jordanian authorities claim that Jordan receives much less water than Israel. According to the historic agreement, the Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty, signed at Wadi Araba in 1994, “Jordan gets around 35 million cubic metres, which is equivalent to 3 percent of the total amount of streaming water. Israel gets the other 97 percent. Figures from the Ministry of Water and Irrigation in each country show the water consumption of one Israeli citizen to be equal to that of five Jordanians” (IRIN, 2006). According to the head of the geology department at the University of Jordan, Najib Abu Karaki, Israel has "for at least 30 years…diverted most of the Jordan River tributaries and controlled water coming from Tiberias Lake in a way that the river level was heavily affected" (IRIN, 2006).
     Israel does not officially acknowledge claims that Jordan receives less than her share of water, indicating that the 1994 agreement remains the solution to water sharing disputes between the two countries. However, informal “incriminations of infringements have been rife on all sides,” and “after Israel consented, in May 1997, to amendments (or at least amended interpretations) of the agreements favorable to Jordan, observers were almost immediately forecasting that the new understandings were untenable and doomed to failure.” Media and analysts generally diagnosed the ‘promises’ as ‘hard to keep’ (Sherman, 1999, p. 45). Nonetheless, “Jordan is extremely vulnerable to any rupture of the peace agreement, because she cannot meet her water supply deficit alone” (Hambright, 2006, p. 168). A solution may lie in brokering peace between Syria and Israel for Jordan’s benefit in terms of Yarmouk floodwaters, which are vulnerable to potential dams in Syria.
International Aid and Development
     In 2005, the Committee on Ways and Means of the United States House of Representatives compiled a report on the United States trade mission to Jordan and several other Middle Eastern states. Jordan benefits from one of the largest U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) programs. Water is one of the three issue areas; however, the success of projects in the other two issue areas (social sector—health and education, and economic growth) is contingent upon success in water sector development. “Economic and social development in Jordan depends in large part on the ready availability of good quality water” (Drew, 2004, p. 152). The second Wastewater Master Plan (a USAID financed endeavor) has been implemented in conjunction with the expansion of the As-Samra wastewater treatment plant that could furnish Amman with wastewater until 2027 (Drew, 2004, p. 159). As of 2005, 25 per cent of the construction had been completed according to USAID.⁴
     Both governmental and public opinion of donors as foreign invaders has presented a challenge to success to agencies like USAID. “The public affairs office at the Embassy has been seeking to change that perception by highlighting projects such as the water treatment facilities…The marketing strategy has helped to change public opinion, and USAID has recently received excellent press coverage.” Other United States led development projects include the creation of jobs via water management needs in the Qualified Industrial Zones⁵ (QIZ) and their factories. The 2005 report concluded that “particularly since 1999 U.S. aid to Jordan has been generous and has provided many benefits in water.” However, international non-governmental organizations continue to have little effective role in development because Jordanian civil society is quiescent as a result of the effect of patronage-clientage (Joffé, 2002, p. xvii). The neopatrimonial Jordanian government systematically overlooks infractions, including unlicensed wells (Ferragina, 2002, p. 350).
International (non)cooperation
     Jordan’s consistent adherence to international agreements has proven to be single-sided. The resultant lesson for the government has been that “approaches involving conflict have prevailed over negotiation and it seems very difficult to establish goals, strategies and division of responsibilities as far as regional water resource management is concerned” (Ferragina, 2002, p. 362). In addition to the 1994 peace with Israel, Jordan entered into an agreement in 1987 with Syria regarding the Al-Wehda dam. The World Bank refused to finance without Israeli consent (Allan, 1996, p. 109). Jordan will eventually need to call upon Iraq to share the waters of the Euphrates.
     Relations with Jordan’s neighbors overlap and work at odds. Syria “has been most ‘lethargic’ in fulfilling agreements with Jordan regarding projects for the exploitation of the Yarmuk” (Sherman, 1999, p. 41). Syrian impoundment of the head waters of the Yarmouk in the late 1970s “‘are in contradiction to their 1953 agreement with Jordan’ and threaten to deprive the Hashemite kingdom of water promised by Damascus” (Sherman, 1999, p. 41). Syria has failed to adhere to the Syrian-Jordanian Water Agreement of 1987. However, even if Syria had honored its commitments, the supply from the Yarmouk River would not meet increasing demand in Jordan (Mahsaneh, 2007).
     Informal relations with Iraq have proven hopeful. Economically, Jordan has benefited from the temporary loss of access to the Iraqi economy during the war. The loss triggered the restructuring of the economy and spurred the push toward integration in the global economy. Relations with Iraq are important as a future supplier of water from the Euphrates through existing pipelines in Jordan’s eastern desert. The modernization of the shipping sector is an additional opportunity to cooperate with Iraq. The port of Aqaba was publicly run before it was privatized in 2005. “As a result, Aqaba has seen significant improvement in its port operations” (US, 2005). Nonetheless, “Jordan is working with Kuwait and Iraq to improve highways” in order to stave off the future limitations of the port (US, 2005). King Abdullah has certainly not forgotten the shared Hashemite dynasty between Iraq and Jordan, and will seek to exploit the last vestiges of it.
     As of 1999 there was no bilateral agreement with Saudi Arabia regarding use of the Disi (Rum) aquifer in the Tebuk region. The International Association of Hydrogeologists and UNESCO’s International Hydrological Programme established in 2000 the Internationally Shared (transboundary) Aquifer Resource Management (ISARM) Programme. Part of ISARM’s mission is to assess and broker cooperation and management of the Disi/Rum-Saq Aquifer System between Jordan and Saudi Arabia. As of 2005, the management has been classified as “under consideration” (Puri et al., 2005). The upgrade plans for the Disi sandstone aquifer, whose excellent, pure water has potential to meet the needs of the Aqaba Special Economic Zone (ASEZ) until at least 2020, are currently inactive. Competing projects for the ASEZ, such as the exploration of desalination of ASEZ, will likely take precedence as long as Saudi Arabian cooperation is elusive. The ASEZ fortunately carries tremendous investment potential. Indeed expansion upgrades carried out earlier this decade are now yielding water suitable for landscaping, irrigation and industrial uses (Drew, 2004, p. 243-244).
Conclusion
     The capabilities of the MWI in carrying out successful water policies remain stunted. Patronage is the single largest obstacle to privatization (Ryan, 2002, p. 116). Private sector participation in “water resource management and pollution prevention and control” is weak (Hambright, 2006, p. 180). Gaps in the law and the unacknowledged priority of water management policy are hurdles to overcome. King Abdullah II wrote in 2004 in the foreword to Doing business with Jordanthat “recently Jordan has witnessed significant progress towards realizing our vision of becoming an active and dynamic contributor to the global economy and society” (Drew, 2004, p. xvii). Despite intentions, “water scarcity is undeniably the largest natural constraint to economic growth and development in Jordan” (Drew, 2004, p. xviv).
     Economic and political reform efforts were revisited in 1999 at Abdullah’s ascension. The result prompted “an accelerated pace of reforms…and new strategies and initiatives aimed at enhancing the welfare of the Jordanian people and propelling economic growth to higher and sustainable levels” (Drew, 2004, p. xviv). Thus “increased industrial development has placed unprecedented demands on water resources” (Drew, 2004, p. 54-55). MWI “has drawn up a comprehensive investment program covering the years 2002 to 2011,which seeks to provide solutions to both immediate and longer-term concerns” (Drew, 2004, p. 153).
     The long history of familial dependence on water subsidies contributes to policy challenges. Water tariff increases will be unpopular. “In the absence of options for increasing water supplies, greater efficiency in managing available water resources—including water consumption—is the only option left. An economic approach for making the most of Jordan’s water resources will have a greater impact on enhancing the water status in Jordan” (Hambright, 2006, p. 182). Economic solutions appear to be the most viable in the current context of Jordan’s situation. Insufficient human and financial resources stunt Jordan’s progress despite technological advances. In Jordan, “the institutions of state and society are not strong enough to enforce awareness of the environmental problems which would, in turn, lead to a new appreciation of the significance of national water resources.” (Ferragina, 2002, p. 364) It is uncertain how Abdullah might strengthen the institutions of state and society.
Comparison of water policy
     The consensus in the literature and in reality is that the greatest obstacle to the realization of policy plans in Jordan is politics. It is difficult to track the success of planned and forecasted projects begun during the 1990s. What is certain is that water continues to be heavily subsidized. Wasted water and illegal underground water drilling continue to contribute to inefficiency. Agricultural allocation, while receding slightly, continues to sap the majority of water resources. It is obvious that economic performance in Jordan is tied to the status of water.
     During both reigns foreign aid (largely from the United States) funded development projects. Then and now, development occurs at the expense of cooperation (Allan, 1996, p. 192). During Hussein’s reign, development and water projects represented trompes l’oeil for refugee camps and resettlement programs. “Water sector management in Jordan [during Hussein’s reign] has been characterized by short-term measures, aimed at increasing water supply and by the lack of an integrated approach to water resources planning” (Ferragina, 2002, p. 357-359). Water sector management during King Abdullah’s reign, while featuring large-scale plans for development, is thwarted by her neighbors’ refusal to cooperate and therefore relies on similar short-term measures without a strong foundation on an integrated approach.
     Water policy reform remains subjugated to economic and other reform. Likewise government and institutional mismanagement continue to muddle progress in alleviating water scarcity in the country. King Abdullah II, like his grandfather, is oriented politically and economically toward the West. In addition, there is no difference between the two kinds in their preference for large-scale, expensive projects whose long-term benefits are dubious.
Conclusion
     Theorists posit that “the first stage of economic growth [is] the [necessary] use of natural resources beyond sustainable levels…to develop the national economy and improve social welfare” (Ferragina, 2002, p. 355). So far Jordan has conformed to this path. The next step for Jordan to achieve successful, sustainable economic growth requires the “diversification of economic structure [connected] to integration in the global economy.” Once accomplished, the growth “can generate new options for resources, such as demand management policy, allocative efficiency measures and the evolution of a form of political and social consciousness of environmental problems that…can engender ‘natural resource reconstruction’” (Ferragina, 2002, p. 355).
     As with many scholars, I find myself with more questions than answers as I conclude my research. I ask along with Joffé whether democratization is “really possible in a society of the kind found in Jordan and what is the real role played within it by civil society and non-governmental organizations? And what is Jordan’s economic potential given its massive resource constraints, particularly in the water sector.” I wonder if “Jordanian entrepreneurs understand their limitations?” (Joffé, 2002, p. xii). At a presentation by scholar Lazlo Csicsman at the American Center for Oriental Research (ACOR) in Amman in July 2007, he discussed his dissatisfaction with the application of Western terms and definitions to the current situation in Jordan and the Middle East. He insists that Jordan not in transition and is thus not moving toward democracy according to Tom Carothers’ democracy transition paradigm (Carothers 2002). Another ACOR scholar, Jesse Karnes has penned the ‘Jordan Model’ to indicate Jordan’s western orientation for policy, good economic reform, manipulation of political process and the moderate Islam as set forth in the Amman Message.⁶ The peace industry, according to Karnes, has supplanted the peace process, and Jordan is but one player in that game.
     Globally Jordan is considered an island of peace in the Middle East. Analysis of bilateral and multilateral agreements regarding water reveals, however, that Jordan is the chump of the Middle East. Jordan consistently keeps international agreements, only to be slighted by her neighbors. Jordan accepts refugees from Palestine and Iraq and allows uncomplicated entrance into the country. King Hussein asked in his second book how long Jordan should be expected to reap only the consequences of the regional status quo.⁷ There are 10 official Palestinian refugee camps in Jordan (Drew, 2004, p. 169).
     There is little evidence that the optimistic proposals in 1994 for technological cooperation between Jordan, Israel and Palestine are occurring. I disagree with Sherman’s conclusion that “too much store should not be placed in the recently concluded peace accord between Jordan and Israel” (Sherman, 1999, p. 52). Indeed the peace between Jordan and Israel has allowed for increasing interdependence between the United States and Jordan, even if it remains asymmetrically favorable to the United States. Maintaining peace with Israel is much more economically beneficial for Jordan because of the fruitful interaction it affords between the United States and Jordan. The facts remain that the commitment to peace with Israel has benefited economic integration into the global economy. At the same time, economic growth and development are contingent on the availability of water. The 1994 peace with Israel has not improved the water scarcity in Jordan, and may even be detrimental. The regrettable inequitable water allocation as yet does not seriously threaten peace with Israel in large part because of the United States. The United States expects “Jordan to lead by example—to show other countries in the region that a country with the same cultural and economic background can reform and develop a strong, productive, and mutually beneficial trading relationship with the United States” (US, 2005).
     Ultimately it would seem that there is very little difference between the water policy of King Hussein and that of his successor, King Abdullah II. Writing in 2002, Curtis Ryan declared that, “it is difficult to be optimistic about the depth of change that has taken place in the kingdom” (Ryan, 2002, p. 105). “King Abdullah’s policy views mirror those of his father. He too is moderate and cautious” (Ryan, 2002, p. 111). Economic development, which defines King Abdullah, symbolizes a cure-all to ease the strain on water, normalize relations with Israel and integrate Jordanian society (Ryan, 2002, p. 131).
     King Hussein in his autobiography declared that “every Arab problem suffers from the irresponsibility of the responsible Arab class” (Hussein, 1962, p. 75). King Abdullah is suspected of seeking a nuclear program according to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. Because “Jordan is one of the poorest countries in terms of access to drinking water…his citizens are skeptical of King Abdullah's plans for making Jordan a powerful country capable of developing nuclear energy” (Eldar, 2007 and IRIN, 2006). In addition, independent tribal leaders dominate regional and parliamentary politics. These leaders comprise the political parties currently seated in the Parliament of Jordan, the majority of which represent right wing Islamist agendas. Development work carried out by NGOs is severely challenged by political suspicion. Islamist groups view NGOs as threatening foreign infiltrators (Ryan, 2002, p. 122). “The domestic political situation is…contingent on the generational change in attitudes within the elite that followed King Hussein’s death in 1999, and it remains to be seen to what extent political liberalization is a genuine option, or whether it remains subservient to the older imperatives of the neo-patrimonial state” (Joffé, 2002, p. x).
     In sum, this work proposes to expand the existing literature with a meaningful presentation of water policy in Jordan since 1956. The genre of literature that addresses the transition (assuming a transition has occurred) taking place in Jordan focuses on political and/or economic liberalization. The inability of Jordan to earn compliance from her neighbors in water sharing and water sector development will lead to delays in democratic development in the country. Foreign aid and development assistance is clearly not bringing about the solution to water scarcity that is sought. Global economic integration and an agricultural trade deficit ought to help reduce water use. There is no transition occurring in Jordan in the water sector. This non-transition will have the most impact on the future success of Jordan.

Works Cited
Al Wakeel, Dina. On visit to Irbid refugee camp, Monarch urges swift completion of infrastructure. Jordan Times. 4 June 2002.
Allan, J. A. 1996. Water, peace, and the Middle East: negotiating resources in the Jordan Basin. Library of modern Middle
       East studies, 9. London: Tauris Academic Studies.
Amman Chamber of Industry (ACI). Jordan's Economic Openness under Globalization.
       http://www.aci.org.jo/content_manag_en.cfm?i=100&L1ID=%21%28%40%20%20%0A&L2ID=%22%29HH%20%0A
       (Accessed 2 July 2007).
Drew, Philip, Jonathan Wallace, and Anthony Shoult. 2004. Doing business with Jordan. Global market briefing. London:
       Kogan Page.
Eldar, Akiva. "King Abdullah to Haaretz: Jordan aims to develop nuclear power." Haaretz. 20 January 2007.
       (accessed 14 August 2007).
Ferragina, Eugenia. “Social Adaptive Capacity to Water Crisis: The Case of Jordan.” 2000. in Joffé, E. G. H. 2002. Jordan in
       transition. New York, N.Y.: Palgrave.
Hambright, K. D., F. J. Ragep, and J. Ginat. 2006. Water in the Middle East cooperation and technological solutions in the
       Jordan Valley. International and security affairs series, v. 3. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
Hussein, and Freidoune Sahebjam. 1975. Mon métier de roi. Paris: R. Laffont.
Hussein. 1962. Uneasy lies the head; the autobiography of His Majesty King Hussein I of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.
       [New York]: B. Geis Associates; distributed by Random House.
IRIN (Integrated Regional Information Networks) “JORDAN: Water shortage remains a constant headache.” Humanitarian News
       and Analysis Service of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. 13 September 2006.
       http://www.irinnews.org/InDepthMain.aspx?InDepthId=13&ReportId=61829&Country=Yes
ITT. 2003. ITT Industries: Guidebook to global water issues. http://www.itt.com/waterbook.
Joffé, E. G. H. 2002. Jordan in transition. New York, N.Y.: Palgrave.
Lewis, Bernard. 2003. The crisis of Islam: holy war and unholy terror. New York: Modern Library.
Mahsaneh, Dureid. Bring the People to Disi Aquifer, not water to the city. Jordan Business Magazine. January 2007. Accessed
       25 October 2007. http://www.jordan-business.net/magazine/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=76&Itemid=40
Puri, S. and A. Aureli. Transboundary Aquifers: A Global Program to Assess, Evaluate, and Develop Policy. National Ground
       Water Association. 43, no. 5: 661–668. 2005
Ryan, Curtis R. 2002. Jordan in transition: from Hussein to Abdullah. Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Rodgers, Walter. “King Hussein is dead: Jordan's peacemaker king walked a narrow line in the Mideast.” CNN. 7 February 1999
       http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/meast/9902/07/king.hussein.obit/
Sherman, Martin. 1999. The politics of water in the Middle East: an Israeli perspective on the hydro-political aspects of the
       conflict. New York: St. Martin's Press.
United States. 2005. Report on trade mission to Tunisia, Jordan, Oman, and Egypt. Washington: U.S. G.P.O.

1. See Appendix Figures 1-8
2. See Appendix, Figure 9
3. United States State Department. http://www.state.gov/p/nea/ci/jordan/ (Accessed 16 July 2007)
4. USAID. As-Samra Wastewater Treatment Plant Project. http://jordan.usaid.gov/project_disp.cfm?id=35 (Accessed 16 July 2007).
5. Qualified Industrial Zones (QIZ): “a unilateral act by the USA in an innovation designed to encourage Jordanian exports to the U.S market, thus inviting National and International Companies to take advantage of this unprecedented initiative enabling Jordan to offer a unique opportunity to all Manufacturers.” As defined by the official website of Ad-Dulayl Industrial Park http://www.ad-dulayl.com/ accessed 30 August 2007.
6. The Amman Message. http://www.ammanmessage.com/
7. « Combien de temps durera encore ce statu quo dont nous avons à supporter seules les conséquences? » (Hussein, 1975, p. 258)