Biting the Bullet: LBJ and The Veto Power

Samuel B. Hoff
Delaware State University

Introduction
     This essay seeks to reconcile apparent opposites: the legislative performance of President Lyndon B. Johnson (LBJ) on the one hand, and his use of the veto on the other. As 36th president of the United
States, LBJ built a legislative record of achievement in domestic policy which would be among the most noteworthy in American history.  He enjoyed majority party support in Congress throughout his White House years and relied on an approach that emphasized consensus rather than conflict.  All of the latter features might lead and observer to conclude that LBJ didn’t need or want to issue vetoes, for there would ostensibly be no use for them.  However, Johnson did use the tool on occasion, with clear success in doing so. 
     Tapping original documents from the Johnson Presidential Library together with veto studies and secondary sources, this study is intended to unveil a little known area of the Lyndon Johnson presidency.  It does so by covering LBJ’s personal background, the circumstances under which he assumed office as chief executive, his approach to Congress, the veto strategy of the administration, his use of regular public vetoes along with private vetoes and pocket vetoes, the legislative reaction to his veto employment, and by comparing LBJ’s veto record to other presidents over the second century of American history.  The results of the research furnish a more complete picture of the Lyndon Johnson presidency and of the importance of the veto as a legitimate constitutional tool to utilize in a positive political setting.
Background
     Two features stand out in Lyndon Johnson’s early years which impacted his attitudes and behavior later on: his exposure to the common folk he came into contact with in rural Texas, and his emulation of his father’s political career. 
     Born on August 27, 1908 to Samuel and Rebekah Johnson, Lyndon was the eldest of five children.  Though both teachers at one point, his parents struggled to provide enough for the family.  The Johnson family moved from Stonewall to Johnson City Texas in 1913.  Lyndon worked various jobs to help the family, including as a hired hand on neighboring farms, as a printer’s apprentice, and as a shoeshine boy at a barbershop (DeGregorio, 2001).
     After graduating from high school, Lyndon decided to try to make a living on his own despite his parents’ wish that he attend college.  He spent at least a year in California working a number of menial jobs. Returning to Johnson City, he worked for a year on a road gang.  These manual labor jobs evidently convinced him to go to college.  Lyndon worked his way through Southwest State Teacher’s College in San Marcos, Texas, graduating in 1930.  During and immediately after his matriculation, he taught mostly poor students in Cotulla and Houston, an experience he later stated deeply affected his outlook toward poverty (Whitney and Whitney, 1993).
     The second major influence on Lyndon Johnson was his father’s political career.  Sam Johnson served in the Texas legislature from 1905-1909 and again from 1917-1925.  The elder Johnson was known for his tolerant views, which included opposing the Klu Klux Klan and supporting German-Americans residing in Texas during World War I.  Lyndon frequently attended sessions of the legislature during his father’s tenure and helped in his father’s 1918 campaign for reelection.  From his association with his father, Lyndon gained expertise in debating and aspiration for a career in politics (DeGregorio, 2001).
     Lyndon Johnson’s political career began in 1931, when he was hired as secretary for U.S. Representative Richard Kleberg, a Democrat from Texas.  After Franklin Roosevelt’s election to the presidency, LBJ became a strong New Deal advocate.  His loyalty and skills were noticed by the Roosevelt White House, and he was appointed Director of the National Youth Administration in Texas.  For two years, LBJ led a program which provided technical training and public works jobs to thousands of Texas youth (DeGregorio, 2001).
     LBJ began a twenty-four year legislative career in 1937 after winning a special election for the U.S. House seat in Texas’ 10th district.  He served in that post for twelve years, earning reelection six times.  His tenure in that post was interrupted twice, once by a failed attempt to win election to the U.S. Senate in a 1941 special election, and again by a seven-month stint in the U.S. Navy during World War II.  In 1948, LBJ won a razor-thin runoff victory for a seat in the U.S. Senate (Schulman, 2007).
     LBJ’s two terms in the U.S. Senate earned him accolades for his leadership skills.  In 1953, at age 44, he became the youngest-ever minority leader ever selected by a major political party.  At the time, Senator Richard Russell of Georgia observed that Johnson “doesn’t have the best mind on the Democratic side of the Senate; he isn’t the best orator; he isn’t the best parliamentarian.  But he’s the best combination of all those qualities” (Turner, 1985, p. 31).
     Two years later, Lyndon Johnson became the youngest man ever chosen as majority leader of the U.S. Senate (DeGregorio, 2001).  His organizational and persuasive abilities became legendary.  For instance, Turner (1985) identifies a series of contacts and favors which Johnson established to garner support for pending legislation, referred to as the “Johnson network.”  Similarly, Evans and Novak (1966) describe the “Johnson technique”—a series of tactics which LBJ employed to convince fellow senators of the correctness of his position.  Overall, according to the latter authors, Majority Leader Johnson relied on “shifting alliances and a flexible, non-doctrinaire approach” (p. 61) to accomplish his aims.  This effort to achieve consensus meant that he eschewed the extreme views and tactics employed by both political parties.  His strategy led to impressive legislative achievements, including the Civil Rights Acts of 1957 and 1960.  By the latter year, he was positioned for a run at the presidency (Schulman, 2007).
     LBJ’s failure to announce his candidacy for president in the 1960 campaign until shortly before the Democratic Party’s national nominating convention proved fatal.  He lost by a 2-1 margin in the delegate count to John F. Kennedy on the first convention ballot.  However, his popularity and potential to bring in southern and western state votes led to his selection as Kennedy’s vice presidential running mate.  The Kennedy-Johnson victory in the 1960 general election over the Republican ticket of Richard Nixon and Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. was among the closest in American history as far as the popular vote count, though the electoral vote margin of 303-219 made it seem more impressive.  As vice president from January 1961 to November 1963, Lyndon Johnson traveled extensively around the world and served as chairman of several presidential councils (Whitney and Whitney, 1993).
Taking Over: 1963-64
     The assassination of President John F. Kennedy in Dallas on November 22, 1963 propelled Lyndon Johnson into the role of chief executive.  Upon assuming the post, there were certain prevailing conditions which both helped and hindered the new leader.
     First, Kennedy’s violent death at such a young age—46—and his popularity at the time of his murder made him a martyr to many.  LBJ would have to find a way to honor the slain president while establishing an identity of his own in the White House.  On the one hand, he seemed to be almost the opposite of Kennedy, mostly in a negative way: older, from the Southwest rather than the Northeast, and generally less graceful and inspiring (Geyelin, 1966). On the other hand, LBJ’s Washington experience and political instincts were far superior to Kennedy’s.  This led LBJ to take several immediate actions which would be lauded even by Kennedy supporters.  After maintaining a low profile during the first few days following the assassination, President Johnson addressed a special joint session of Congress on November 28, 1963.  He called for expeditious passage of the civil rights bill initiated by the Kennedy White House.
Additionally, LBJ decided to retain most of Kennedy’s appointees through the end of 1964.
     A second factor relevant to the transition of government had to do with the international situation.  The Cold War with the Soviet Union had thawed somewhat since the Cuban Missile Crisis the year before, but in late 1963 was by no means over.  There were a number of foreign policy crises which the LBJ team would have to confront, including the recent coup against the leader of South Vietnam.  According to White (1964, p. 44), Johnson “knew all the intricate resources of command and communication at his disposal” because he had been given a major role in emergency planning; this had been rehearsed by the Kennedy administration in case of a nuclear attack.
     By most measures, President Johnson handled both the domestic and foreign policy issues which confronted him during his first year in office with aplomb.  His alliance with civil rights leader together with his positive relations with Congress during his first year in office helped to secure passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the most sweeping civil rights law since Reconstruction.  Evans and Novak (1966) credit the tone of the Johnson White House and the easy access which legislators had to the new president for the success which Johnson enjoyed during the 1963-1964 period.
     Although he pushed through the open-ended Gulf of Tonkin resolution in August 1964 on the questionable premise of an attack on the U.S. naval forces by North Vietnam, Johnson kept the situation in South Vietnam largely in check that year without a significant military commitment.  Helsing (2000, p. 15) holds that the “crisis in Vietnam was initially a minor irritant that needed to be handled efficiently so that the communists were kept at bay there and so that the failure there did not weaken his presidency in any way that would jeopardize his ambitious domestic plans.”
     The combination of Johnson’s first-year accomplishments and the perceived extremism of Arizona Senator Barry Goldwater, LBJ’s Republican opponent in the 1964 presidential campaign, led to a landslide election victory in the November election.  The Johnson-Humphrey ticket won 61.1 percent of the popular vote, 486 out of 538 electoral votes, and 44 of 50 states.  Democrats added to their majorities in both chambers of Congress (Whitney and Whitney, 1993).
Lbj’s Approach to Congress After 1964
     The LBJ team interpreted the 1964 election as demonstrating a liberal consensus and a mandate for action.  Yet, Kaye (1988, p. 84) observes that LBJ himself believed his support was “like a western river—wide but not deep.  He decided he would have to implement his program quickly, while Congress was still behind him.”  His approach to Congress was certainly conditioned by his legislative background.  He would--as he did in his positions as minority leader and majority leader of the Senate “push each Congress to its limits, to obtain the maximum legislative output that any particular Congress could be made to produce” (Kearns, 1976, p. 235).  This would be achieved through using his powers of persuasion, by developing an elaborate system for tracking legislation, and by knowing each member of Congress’s reasons for supporting or opposing administrative initiatives. Brands (1995, p. 26-27) believes that “Johnson brought to the presidency an ingrained tendency to fashion coalitions and seek consensus.”  Jack Valenti, Special Assistant to President Johnson, describes LBJ’s style of handling Congress in the following manner (1975, p. 194):

His was the personal approach.  Man to man.  Phone to ear.  Come let us reason together. This is Lyndon Johnson talking.  Now, we don’t have to be as each other’s throats, do we?  Your country needs your held and so do I.  So it went.

     In the immediate post-1964 election environment, Democrats in Congress undertook a number of procedural changes which assisted the Johnson White House in achieving its aims.  These included permitting committee chairmen to call for a floor vote on any measure delayed by the Rules Committee for twenty-one days or more; forbidding individual members from obstructing conference committee consideration of bills passed by the two chambers in different forms; enforcing party discipline; and revising party membership of committees in the House to reflect the new majorities (Andrew, 1998). 
From Great Society to Great Decline
     President Johnson had announced in his 1964 State of the Union address a “war on poverty.”  Among the anti-poverty measures put in place were (1) a Work-Study Program, which provided jobs to enable students of low-income families to work their way through college; (2) the Work Experience Program, which furnished child day-care and other services to poor parents; (3) instruction for disadvantaged preschoolers (Head Start) and disadvantaged high school students (Upward Bound); (4) The Job Corps, which provided vocational training to youth from 16-21 years of age; (5) the Volunteers in Service to America (VISTA) initiative, which recruited volunteers to work and teach in low income areas (DeGregorio, 2001).
     In the Spring of 1964, partly as a result of questions from reporters, President Johnson gave his aides the task of coming up with a phrase to collectively describe his domestic programs.  Though the term “Great Society” was present in a draft of a previous speech, its first public utterance came at a May 22, 1964 commencement speech which LBJ delivered at the University of Michigan (Miller, 1980).  In the address, the president contrasted the previous half-century of American history with what he sought for the next fifty years: “For in your time we have the opportunity to move not only toward the rich society and the powerful society, but upward toward the Great Society.”  LBJ identified the goals of Great Society as broadly encompassing rebuilding cities, cleaning up the environment, and reforming education (Dallek, 2004, p. 156).  Langston (2002) notes that the NewRepublic and the Washington Post were first to use the Great Society label to describe LBJ’s domestic agenda.
     Most of the Great Society initiatives were presented, debated, and passed during the 89th Congress of 1965-1966.  The new laws included Medicare and Medicaid, the Voting Rights Act, the Older Americans Act, the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, the Higher Education Act, the Water Quality Act, the Air Quality Act, the War on Poverty, the Air Pollution Control Act, legislation to create he Department of Housing and Urban Development and the National Endowment for the Arts and Humanities (all passed in 1965), the Clean Water Restoration Act, the Fair Packaging and Labeling Act, the National Traffic and Safety Act, the Highway Safety Act, Model Cities, and legislation creating the Department of Transportation (all in 1966). [Later laws such as the 1967 Wholesome Meat Act and the 1968 Civil Rights Act are generally regarded as part of Great Society accomplishments as well.]  According to one source, Congress approved eighty of eighty-three White House legislative proposals in 1965 alone (Milkis and Nelson, 2008), while another source finds that eighty-nine of 115 recommendations were signed into law that year (Unger and Unger, 1999). Historian Theodore White (1982, p. 124), states that “no Congresses since Reconstruction, or perhaps since Roosevelt’s Seventy-third Congress of 1933-1934, did more to reorder the nation¼”
     At the same time the Johnson administration was bombarding Congress with domestic legislation at home, it was embarking on a massive escalation of U.S. ground troops in South Vietnam.  The troop commitment there reached 184,000 by the end of 1965 and 385,000 by the end of 1966 (Off, 2001).  As American casualties mounted, a number of consequences were felt by the Johnson White House.  First, LBJ’s public approval as measured by the Gallup Poll dropped to 43 percent in December 1966, an all-time low (Unger and Unger, 1999).  Second, the Johnson White House underestimated the financial expense of the two-front war, one against poverty in America and the other against the communists in North and South Vietnam.  This problem was compounded by LBJ’s reticence in asking for a tax increase until 1967 (Schulman, 2007).  Third, the administration’s credibility came under attack, and with it the consensus-building that was the central strategy of Johnson’s legislative approach (Geyelin, 1966).  Fourth, LBJ’s defensiveness about the situation in Southeast Asia led him to take sole credit for the laws Congress had enacted.  According to Kearns (1976, p. 300), LBJ had “violated his own principle of sharing publicity and credit in order to create a base of goodwill for the future.”  Fifth, an unexpected racial backlash had developed over some of his Great Society programs by middle-class whites (Schulman, 2007).
     The impact of the aforementioned factors led to deep losses of the Democratic majorities in Congress in the 1966 elections, with the Republicans gaining forty-seven House seats and three Senate seats.  The president’s liberal base had been virtually eliminated (Unger and Unger, 1999).  President Johnson himself recognized the difficult road ahead.  He admitted that he had “spent a good deal of my mandate to accomplish many controversial reforms” (Johnson, 1971, p. 443) and that it “will be more difficult for any new legislation we might propose” (quoted in Unger and Unger, 1999, p. 406).  Meanwhile, in a December 10, 1966 memorandum to President Johnson, Henry Wilson attempts to portray the post-election Republican mood in Congress.  He asserts that Republican leaders will continue to use race as a way to diminish Great Society achievements and will exploit the perceived credibility gap to the fullest.
     As 1967 began, perhaps Lady Bird Johnson (1970, p. 469) captured the mood best when she wrote on January 5 that “a miasma of trouble hangs over everything.”  Domestically, the executive branch was having difficulties implementing the plethora of Great Society programs (Redford and Blisset, 1981).  Further, the president’s partisans in Congress began to abandon him and even discuss a challenge to him in the 1968 presidential race (Divine, 1994).  That Congress was intent on holding down spending meant few new programs could be proposed let alone passed (Bernstein, 1996).  Sidey (1968, p. 103) states that the Johnson White House’s “legislative thrust in 1967 was toward consolidation, better administration and funding the programs that already had passed.”
     Though other foreign policy crises such as war in the Mideast occupied the Johnson White House in 1967, none was as serious nor dominant as the situation in South Vietnam.  By the end of that year, 486,000 U.S. military personnel were present there and over 16,000 servicemen had been killed since hostilities involving American forces began (Off, 2001).  The specter of almost daily anti-war protests dogged the president and his staff.
     The year 1968 is remembered as one of the most tumultuous in twentieth century American history.  The combination of intra-party challengers to President Johnson during the early presidential nominations contests and the Tet Offensive in South Vietnam—in which Viet Cong used the lunar new year to simultaneously attack military, diplomatic, and civilian sites—precipitated LBJ’s announcement of his refusal to seek reelection as president in late March.  The assassinations of Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. in April and Robert Kennedy in June together with race riots, the chaotic Democratic nominating convention in Chicago, and large-scale anti-war protests brought the nation to the brink of anarchy.  The fall general election campaign for president ended with a narrow victory by Republican challenger Richard Nixon over Vice President Hubert Humphrey (Whitney and Whitney, 1993).
Veto Strategy by the Johnson Administration
     Unlike the pattern in some presidential administrations—such as that found in the tenure of Harry Truman, Ronald Reagan, and Bill Clinton--the sudden loss of party control of one or both chambers of Congress did not occur during Lyndon Johnson’s administration.  In each case above, the presidents suffering party turnover in Congress reformulated their legislative strategy to include increased veto employment.  Hence, the veto was used in a position of weakness to portray a position of strength (Off, 2007).  Conversely, President Franklin Roosevelt (FDR) enjoyed party majorities in both legislative chambers throughout his twelve years in office, yet ranks second in annual issuance of public bill vetoes by regular means since 1889.  FDR often instructed his aides to bring him a bill to veto.  His veto use appears to be a consequence of his activist orientation and his intention to use all tools at his disposal in order to achieve success on legislation which he opposed (Off, 1997).
     For the Johnson White House, the veto appears to have been a necessary device, yet one which was used infrequently compared to presidential predecessors from FDR on who served a term or more.  Early in his administration, one of LBJ’s assistants observed that “[i]t is inevitable that the President will use the veto at some point.  It’s the best method to show Congress that he means business” (quoted in Light, 1982, p. 111).  In remarks made at the signing of the Pacific Northwest Disaster Relief Act in June 1965, President Johnson gave what is perhaps his clearest view of the veto’s role in his administration (Public Papers of the Presidents: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Volume II, 1966, p. 664):

     ...I firmly believe in the independence and the integrity of the legislative branch of the Government, and I promise you that I shall always respect this.  It is deep in the marrow of my bones.  For this philosophy guides me still, and will always.
     Let none think I worship the veto.  I exercise it rarely and only when required.  I never welcome either the opportunity or the necessity to make use of that power in this office.  But I do believe that it is imperative to the order and to the success and to the strength of this great constitutional system...

     In his study of veto use by presidents from 1889 through 1968, Metz(1971, p. 407) finds that “[t]here is relatively little in Lyndon Johnson’s use and explanations for the veto power which is reflective of his domestic programs.”  He cites concern with inflation and the intention to keep foreign policy decisions in the president’s hands as two primary reasons for LBJ’s vetoes.  A 1993 study by Watson confirms those rationales.  Watson classifies explanations for four of LBJ’s public bill vetoes as evenly split between stopping fiscally unsound bills and preventing encroachments on the authority of the chief executive.  Watson (1993, p. 107) claims that the “Johnson administration also was sensitive to the desirability of providing members with advance notice of veto decisions.”  In one case, LBJ insisted that his staff call a senator late at night to inform him of the administration’s pending veto of a crime bill for the District of Columbia “even if it meant waking him up (which it did)” (p. 110).
Vetoes by the Johnson White House and Congressional Response to Them
     President Lyndon Johnson issued a total of 30 vetoes during his tenure.  As Table 1 shows, this figure places him closest to President Jimmy Carter (31) in overall veto use by chief executives from 1789-2001.  However, if the total is divided by year and type, the picture changes somewhat.  Table 2 displays the ranked average number of public bills vetoed by regular means annually over the 1889-2001 time frame.  LBJ’s average of 1.4 such vetoes per year is significantly less than the annual mean of 4.2 over the aforementioned span and places him between Warren Harding (1.67) and John F. Kennedy (1.33).  If such vetoes are subdivided by those presidents who served during periods of unified party control of the Congress and the White House between 1889 and 2001, as is presented in Table 3, LBJ ranks 12th out of 16 chief executives (Off, 2007).
     In analyzing regular public bill vetoes issued by the Lyndon Johnson administration from 1963-1969, the following frequency occurs: three in 1965, two in 1966, and two in 1967.  Hoff’s (2001) empirical study of influences on such veto frequency during periods of unified government discovers that a high number of public laws passed significantly augment veto use.  Because the total number of public laws passed during 1965 and 1966 (405 each year) far exceeds the annual average of public law passage from 1889-1997 (315), that variable may be used to explain veto frequency by the Johnson White House during the latter years.  Simply stated, the high level of bills enacted during the first two years of LBJ’s full term afforded the opportunity to veto more.
     Archival documents available at the Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library show that of the three public bills vetoed by regular means in 1965, two apparently had more support than opposition for passage.  The original version of the Pacific Northwest Disaster Relief Act, S. 327, was vetoed on June 5.  A May 29, 1965 memorandum from the Bureau of the Budget Assistant Director for Legislative Reference Philip Hughes to the White House summed up the position of eight administration offices to the legislation:       

Department of Agriculture-Approval
Department of the Interior-Approval
Small Business Administration-Approval
Department of the Army-No objection
Housing and Home Finance Agency-No objection
Department of Commerce-Does not recommend veto
Department of Justice-Defers to other agencies
Office of Emergency Planning-Not yet available

     Despite the latter positions, BOB recommended a veto of S. 327 because
“[i]t violates the spirit of the division of power between the executive and legislative branches” in that it contained legislative veto provisions.  The veto was upheld without a challenge.
     The second public bill vetoed by regular means in 1965 was H.R. 8439, which was the Military Construction Authorization bill for Fiscal Year 1966.  The veto, released on August 21, followed the split recommendations of the Department of Defense, Department of Justice, and BOB over the bill’s passage, with BOB advocating a veto, Justice offering qualified disapproval, and the Department of Defense supporting passage, according to an August 18 BOB memorandum from Assistant Director for Legislative Reference Philip Hughes to President Johnson.  Again, the veto was not challenged by Congress.  Within a month, President Johnson approved a revised military construction bill.
     The final public bill negated by Johnson White House in 1965 was H.R. 3329, which was to incorporate the Youth Councils on Civic Affairs.  The bill was vetoed on September 10 despite a September 7 memorandum from BOB Assistant Director for Legislative Reference Philip Hughes to President Johnson which divulged that BOB and the government of the District of Columbia supported the legislation, that the Department of Justice did not recommend disapproval, and that the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare deferred to the Department of Justice.  In his veto message, President Johnson stated the following (Public Papers of the Presidents: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Volume II, 1966, p. 990): “For some time I have been concerned with the question of whether we are granting Federal chargers to private organizations on a case-by-case basis without the benefit of clearly established standards and criteria as to eligibility.”  The veto was sustained, as no override attempt was initiated by Congress.
     President Johnson vetoed two public bills by regular means in 1966.  The first bill negated was H.R. 2035, which matched pay increases for 9600 Star Route postal contracts to concomitant increases in the consumer price index.  A July 13, 1966 memorandum from BOB Assistant Director for Legislative Reference Wilfred Rommel to President Johnson reveals that the BOB and the Council of Economic Advisors recommended a veto of the bill, while the Post Office Department supported it and the General Accounting Office had no objection.  The veto was issued on July 19.  In his veto message, President Johnson contended that (Public Papers of the Presidents: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Volume
II, 1966, p. 742) “the principle that it embodies is inflationary¼It substitutes an arbitrary rule for the need to judge each case on its merits¼It is not fair to those who do business with the Government, and it is not fair to the taxpayers.”  Congress did not challenge the veto.
     The second public bill vetoed by regular means in 1966 dealt with strengthening the financial condition of the federal employees’ life insurance fund, which was created by the Federal Employees’ Group Life Insurance Act of 1954.  A September 3 memorandum from BOB Assistant Director for Legislative Reference Wilfred Rommel to President Johnson relayed that all four executive branch offices which were asked to express an opinion on the legislation—BOB, the Civil Service Commission, the Council of Economic Advisors, and the Department of the Treasury—recommended a veto.  In his September 12 veto message, President Johnson again cited inflationary concerns for his rejection of the bill.  He explains his position below (Public Papers of the Presidents: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966, Volume II, 1967, p. 1009):

The bill I am not returning—H.R. 6926—would increase life insurance coverage for Federal employees by over 30%--at an annual cost to the taxpayer of $90 million.  If we were to extend equivalent increases in fringe benefits to all American workers, we would be fueling the fires of inflation by nearly $3 billion.

Congress did not challenge the veto of H.R. 6926.
     The final two regular public bill vetoes issued during Lyndon Johnson’s presidency occurred in 1967.  H.R. 11089 was similar to H.R. 6926, which was vetoed in the previous year, except that it would have increased life insurance coverage for federal officials and Members of Congress in addition to federal employees.  An August 7, 1967 memorandum from BOB Assistant Director for Legislative Reference Wilfred Rommel verifies that BOB, the Council of Economic Advisors, and the Department of the Treasury suggested a veto of the bill, whereas the Civil Service Commission recommended approval but with a signing statement.  President Johnson vetoed the bill on August 12, holding that the bill (Public Papers of the Presidents: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1967, Volume II, 1968, p. 759) “places too heavy a burden and levies too heavy a charge on the American taxpayer by providing private insurance out of public funds.”  Congress did not challenge the veto.  The similar subject matter and proximity between H.R. 6926 and H.R. 11089 together with their fate qualifies as a veto chain, according to Cameron (2000).
     H.R. 162, a bill to grant masters of certain U.S. vessels a lien on those vessels for their wages and for certain disbursements, was vetoed on December 8, 1967.  A December 2 memorandum from BOB Assistant Director for Legislative Reference Wilfred Rommel to President Johnson illustrates the positions of four executive branch offices on the legislation.  While BOB and the Department of Commerce recommended a veto of the bill, the Department of Transportation advocated approval and the Department of the Interior had no objection.  President Johnson argued in his veto message that the measure (Public Papers of the Presidents: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1967, Volume II, 1968, p. 1108) “could lead to far greater government subsidies for the merchant fleet—and place an undue and unnecessary financial burden on the American taxpayer.  It could also lead to extended litigation.”  Congress did not challenge the veto.  Instead, a revised bill was passed and signed by the president in April 1968.
     Table 4 indicates ranked presidential success in preventing veto overrides from 1889-2001.  Lyndon Johnson is one of four chief executives over the latter span to enjoy a 100 percent success rate in having his public bill vetoes sustained, joining William McKinley, Warren Harding, and John Kennedy.  It should be noted that all of those presidents had a majority of party members in Congress throughout their tenure.  In his study of congressional responses to public bill vetoes from 1889 through 1988, Hoff (1992) taps a presidential support model to explore influences on probability of first chamber overrides.  He finds that the two variables most responsible for reducing probability of initial override are bills dealing with domestic matters and partisan support in the first chamber reconsidering the veto.  Although domestic bill vetoes comprised the area of legislation in 77 percent of initial reconsideration decisions over the century from 1889 to 1989, they accounted for six of seven, or 85.7 percent of public bill vetoes during the Lyndon Johnson presidency.  Similarly, the average percentage of party members in the first chamber to consider override of public bill vetoes was much higher during LBJ’s White House years (64.7 percent) than for all presidents who encountered initial override decisions emanating from their vetoes from 1889 to 1989 (53.5 percent).
     Jong Lee’s (1975) study of presidential vetoes and congressional overrides from the Washington to the Nixon administration develops a categorization which combines the latter two features.  He labels Lyndon Johnson’s veto record as part of a “co-operative pattern:” few vetoes and few if any overrides.  In such instances, “the president was reluctant to or did not feel the need for resorting to the veto power to impose his will, or that the Congress was not in a position to reassert itself against relatively few exercises of the power by the president” (p. 528).  As opposed to public bills, private bills affect less people and are usually limited to immigration, claims for compensation from the government, land titles, and military pensions.  Very few studies have been published which have examined private bill vetoes.  Among the reasons for this dearth of research are problems in classifying them (Taylor, 1971), the greater visibility of public bill vetoes (Ringelstein, 1989), and a succession of laws which transferred responsibility for private bill matters to the executive branch (Watson, 1993). 
     Hoff’s (2003) study overcomes methodological challenges inherent in examining private bill vetoes.  His analysis spans the century from the Ulysses Grant through the Lyndon Johnson administration—a period which is “particularly appropriate in the case of private bill vetoes” (Taylor, 1971,
 p. 38)—and includes only regular private bill vetoes involving individuals.  Hoff formulates a PIE model to investigate probability and frequency of private bill vetoes which encompasses personal, institutional, and environmental factors.  The nine-variable model explains almost half of the variance in private bill veto use from 1869 to 1969.  Whereas the annual average of such vetoes over the latter duration is 6.8, Table 5 reveals that Lyndon Johnson vetoed five private bills by regular means which dealt with individuals over the length of his presidency, including one in 1964, three in 1965, and one in 1966.  Two variables in the PIE model which significantly reduce the number of annual private bill vetoes are military conflict and the first term of a president’s tenure.  Both of these factors help to explain LBJ’s below-average frequency of private bill veto issuance.
     Table 6 indicates the number of pocket vetoes issued by chief executives from 1889 to 2001.  If all such vetoes are counted, Lyndon Johnson ranks 14th among presidents over the latter span.  If only  pocket vetoes of public bills are counted, LBJ is tied with John F. Kennedy with six such vetoes, including three released in 1966 and three in 1968.  Hoff’s (1994) examination of influences on pocket vetoes of public bills from 1889 to 1989 finds that the average annual number of such vetoes over the latter time frame is 3.58.  That LBJ’s annual average is 1.2 is best explained by the Democratic majority which controlled Congress throughout his tenure in the White House.
     Three pocket vetoes of public bills issued by President Johnson in 1966 were issued within two days, including two on the same day.  On November 13, he negated a District of Columbia crime bill and the Geothermal Steam Act of 1966.  A day later, a bill relating to ownership of certain lands along the Colorado River was pocket vetoed.  Two years later, a very similar bill was likewise pocket vetoed, as were bills attempting to amend the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 and the Agricultural Act of 1956 (Presidential Vetoes, 1789-1988, 1992).

Conclusion: The Veto and the Johnson Presidency
     Chapter 19 of Lyndon Johnson’s 1971 presidential memoirs, The Vantage Point: Perspectives on the Presidency, 1963-1969 is titled “Biting the Bullet.”  The chapter reviews the administration’s extended battle with Congress to achieve a tax surcharge.  In doing so, it offers incisive comments about the general relationship between Congress and the president in the American political system.  For instance, LBJ identifies differences in constituencies, information, and time perspectives between the executive and legislative branches.  He admits that “no matter how many time I told Congress to do something, I could never force it to act” (p. 461).  For LBJ, the veto was a method to remind Congress of its obligations, as he did in a May 3, 1968 press conference: “I think the time has come for all of the members of Congress to be responsible, and even in an election year, to bite the bullet and stand up and do what ought to be done for their country” (p. 454).  Overall, veto employment by President Lyndon Johnson seems to contradict the stereotype which conceives of the tool as either wholly positive or negative.  Rather, it was regarded as a beneficial in that it saved the country billions of dollars in wasteful spending, but baneful in that it was the consequence of a stalemate between the legislative priorities of Johnson White House and Congress.
     Four decades after his service as America’s 36th president, Lyndon Johnson continues to be simultaneously revered and reviled.  He “bestrode the world of American politics like a colossus, embodying in his ambition and compassion, his opportunism and vision, his anti-communism and his dedication to the wretched of the earth, all the events and controversies that dominated his era” (Schulman, 2007, p. 177).  His presidency was, as historian Robert Dallek (2004, p. 377) finds, “a story of great achievement and painful failure, of lasting gains and unforgettable losses.”  Yet, even with the setbacks during his presidential tenure and with his disappointment at how his successor sought to negate the impact of his Great Society programs, Lyndon Johnson believed that the judgment of history would ultimately be on his side.  At it pertains to his utilization of the veto, LBJ would probably not want victory as much as vindication.  This research permits the reader to determine whether that goal has been achieved.

General References
Andrew, John A.  1998.  Lyndon Johnson and the Great Society.  Chicago: Ivan R. Dee.
Brands, H.W.  1995.  The Wages of Globalism: Lyndon Johnson and the Limits of American Power.  New York: Oxford
      University Press.
Bernstein, Irving.  1996.  Guns or Butter: The Presidency of Lyndon Johnson.  New York: Oxford University Press.
Cameron, Charles M.  2000.  Veto Bargaining: Presidents and the Politics of Negative Power.  New York: Cambridge
      University Press.
Dallek, Robert.  2004.  Lyndon B. Johnson: Portrait of a President. New York: Oxford University Press.
DeGregorio, William A.  2001.  The Complete Book of U.S. Presidents: From George Washington to George W. Bush. 
      New York: Gramercy Books.
Divine, Robert A., editor.  1994.  The Johnson Years, Volume Three: LBJ at Home and Abroad. Lawrence: University
      Press of Kansas.
Evans, Roland, and Robert Novak.  1966.  Lyndon Johnson: The Exercise of Power.  New York: The New American
      Library, Inc.
Geyelin, Philip.  1966.  Lyndon B. Johnson and the World.  New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers.
Helsing, Jeffrey W.  2000.  Johnson’s War/Johnson’s Great Society: The Guns and Butter Trap.  Westport, CT: Praeger.
Hoff, Samuel B.  2007.  “Fair Deal or No Deal: The Veto Record of President Harry S. Truman.”  Lincoln Journal of Social
      and Political Thought, 5:1, p. 38-66.
Hoff, Samuel B.  2003.  “None for One: Examining Influences on Presidential Private Bill Vetoes.”  New England Journal
      of Political Science, 1:1, p. 1-33.
Hoff, Samuel B.  1992.  “Presidential Support and Veto Overrides, 1889-1988.” Midsouth Political Science Journal, 13:
      Summer, p. 173-189
Hoff, Samuel B.  2001.  “Presidential Vetoes Amid Party Majorities.” National Social Science Journal, 17:1, p. 26-38.
Hoff, Samuel B.  1994.  “The Presidential Pocket Veto: Its Use and Legality.”  Journal of Policy History, 6:2, p. 188-208.
Hoff, Samuel B.  1997.  “The Veto Record of FDR,” in Mark Rozell and William Pederson, editors, FDR and the Modern
      Presidency: Leadership and Legacy.  Westport, CT: Praeger, p. 167-183.
Hoff, Samuel B.  2001.  “Vietnam Conflict,” in John Powell, editor, Magill’s Guide to Military History.  Pasadena, CA:
      Salem Press, p. 1602-1606.
Johnson, Claudia T (Lady Bird).  1970.  A White House Diary.  New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston.
Johnson, Lyndon Baines.  1971.  Vantage Point: Perspectives on the Presidency, 1963-1969.  New York: Holt, Rinehart,
      and Winston.
Kaye, Tony.  1988.  Lyndon B. Johnson.  New York: Chelsea House Publishers.
Kearns, Doris.  1976.  Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream.  New York: Harper and Row, Publishers.
Langston, Thomas S.  2002.  Lyndon Baines Johnson. Washington: CQ Press.
Lee, Jong R.  1975.  “Presidential Vetoes from Washington to Nixon.” Journal of Politics, 37, p. 522-546.
Light, Paul C.  1982.  The President’s Agenda.  Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Metz, John Carl.  1971.  “The President’s Veto Power, 1889-1968: An Instrument of Executive Leadership.”  Ph.D.
      dissertation, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh.
Milkis, Sidney M., and Michael Nelson.  2008.  The American Presidency: Origins and Development, 1776-2007. 
      Washington: CQ Press.
Miller, Merle.  1980.  Lyndon: An Oral Biography.  New York: Ballantine Books.
Presidential Vetoes, 1789-1988.  1992.  Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office.
Redford, Emmette S., and Marlan Blisset.  1981.  Organizing the Executive Branch: The Johnson Presidency.  Chicago:
      University of Chicago Press.
“Remarks at the Signing of the Pacific Northwest Disaster Relief Act,” June 17, 1965.  Public Papers of the Presidents:
      Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Volume II.  1966.  Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office. 
Ringelstein, Albert C.  1989.  “The Justifications for and Policy Content of Presidential Vetoes.”  Ph.D. dissertation,
      New Orleans: University of New Orleans.
Schulman, Bruce J.  2007.  Lyndon B. Johnson and American Liberalism: A Brief Biography with Documents.  Boston:
      Bedford/St. Martin’s.
Sidey, Hugh.  1968.  A Very Personal Presidency: Lyndon Johnson in the White House.  New York: Atheneum Publishers.
Taylor, Frederick E.  1971.  “An Analysis of Factors Purported to Influence The Use of, and Congressional Responses to
      the Use of, the Presidential Veto.”  Ph.D. dissertation, Washington: Georgetown University.
Turner, Kathleen J.  1985.  Lyndon Johnson’s Dual War: Vietnam and the Press.  Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Unger, Irwin, and Debi Unger.  1999.  LBJ: A Life.  New York: John Wiley and Sons.
Valenti, Jack.  1975.  A Very Human President.  New York: W. W. Norton and Company.
“Veto of Bill Authorizing Automatic Price Increases in Star Route Postal Contracts,” July 19, 1966. Public Papers of the
      Presidents: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966, Volume II.  1967.  Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office.
“Veto of Bill Granting Masters of Vessels a Lien on Those Vessels for Their Wages and Certain Disbursements,”
      December 9, 1967. Public Papers of the Presidents: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1967, Volume II.  1968.  Washington:
      U.S. Government Printing Office.
“Veto of Bill to Incorporate the Youth Councils on Civic Affairs and for Other Purposes,” September 10, 1965.  Public
      Papers of the Presidents: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Volume II.  1966.  Washington: U.S. Government Printing
      Office.
“Veto of Bill to Increase Life Insurance Coverage for Government Employees, Officials, and Members of Congress,”
      August 12, 1967. Public Papers of the Presidents: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1967, Volume II.  1968.  Washington:
      U.S. Government Printing Office.
“Veto of Federal Employees Life Insurance Bill,” September 12, 1966.   Public Papers of the Presidents:
      Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966, Volume II. 1967. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office.
Watson, Richard A.  1993.  Presidential Vetoes and Public Policy.  Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
White, Theodore. H. 1992.  America in Search of Itself: The Making of the President, 1956-1980.  New York: Warner
      Books.
White, Theodore. H. 1965.  The Making of the President, 1964.  New York: Atheneum Publishers.
Whitney, David C., and Robin Vaughn Whitney.  1993.  The American Presidents.  Garden City, NY: Doubleday Book
      and Music Clubs, Inc.

Sources from the Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library
May 29, 1965: Memorandum from Bureau of the Budget Assistant Director for Legislative Reference Philip Hughes to President Lyndon Johnson, Reports on Enrolled Legislation
August 18, 1965: Memorandum from Bureau of the Budget Assistant Director for Legislative Reference Philip Hughes to President Lyndon Johnson, Reports on Enrolled Legislation
September 7, 1965: Memorandum from Bureau of the Budget Assistant Director for Legislative Reference Philip Hughes to President Lyndon Johnson, Reports on Enrolled Legislation
July 13, 1966: Memorandum from Bureau of the Budget Assistant Director for Legislative Reference Wilfred Rommel to President Lyndon Johnson, Reports on Enrolled Legislation
September 3, 1966: Memorandum from Bureau of the Budget Assistant Director for Legislative Reference Wilfred Rommel to President Lyndon Johnson, Reports on Enrolled Legislation
December 10, 1966: Memorandum from Henry Wilson to President Lyndon Johnson, Central Files
August 7, 1967: Memorandum from Bureau of the Budget Assistant Director for Legislative Reference Wilfred Rommel to President Lyndon Johnson, Reports on Enrolled Legislation
December 2, 1967: Memorandum from Bureau of the Budget Assistant Director for Legislative Reference Wilfred Rommel to President Lyndon Johnson, Reports on Enrolled Legislation

Table 1
Ranked Total Vetoes by Presidents, 1789-2001

Table 2
Ranked Average Number of Annual Public Bill Vetoes by Presidents, 1889-2001*

Table 3
Ranked Average Number of Annual Public Bill Vetoes by Presidents
During Periods of Unified Party Government, 1889-2001*

Table 4
Ranked Presidential Success in Preventing Veto Overrides, 1889-2001

Table 5

Ranked Private Bill Vetoes by Presidents, 1869-1969*

Table 6
Ranked Pocket Vetoes by Presidents, 1889-2001