National Symbols, Language Use, and Minority Attitudes
Kevin L. Dooley
MonmouthUniversity
Civic Nationalism versus Ethnic Nationalism
Regardless of ancestral claims, it must be understood that nationalism is recognized as a modern concept. Prior to the eighteenth century, identity was based largely on a composite of local and universal associations. One’s religious affiliation, economic status, or family histories were more appropriate indicators of one’s identity. This is an important distinction because it represents a falsification of one of the central tenets of nationalism: the belief that one’s national identity is understood by its continuity with the past, and more particularly one’s national past.
Fundamentally, nationalism is based on the belief that the present nation is linked to a set of similar individuals who currently exist and have existed within a particular group. Its beginnings are as vague as its rationale. For Gellner, the rise of nationalism in Europe was due to the transition from agrarian to industrial society by means of an uneven diffusion (1978). Economic trends motivated individuals to participate in national movements because economic development necessitated a certain level of cultural uniformity. For a society to move from “Agraria” through a process of industrialization, Gellner suggested that it was the state’s responsibility to provide a standard; one based on a common language and culture, described as the High Culture (1983).
Following this logic, culture was defined by the nation-state and perpetuated by the social institutions (school, church, place of work) and the populace at large. As Anderson had noted, ‘Culture’ and nationalism are entities the people of the state share which is imagined in some way to have been connected 1.) to a past, defined by traditions, customs, symbols, languages, and 2.) reliant upon a future where the same traditions will continue (1983: 7). What makes nationalism so unique is that it relies upon the hope or memory of the nationalist. In instances where states and nations lack coexistence, the memory of the nation could potentially fade. However, when state institutions are involved, national memory-loss is less likely to occur.
In Europe, centers of learning (schools) were also centers of citizenship, places where individuals learned how to act in accordance to the rules and mores of the “nation.” Because centers of learning were also centers of citizenship, what had developed during most of the twentieth century in democratic nation-states was the concept of “civic nationalism.” For decades it had been argued that civic nationalism referred to:
“…a community where the sovereignty of the people is located in the individual (the citizen) whose national identity is a sense of political community within a demarcated territory defining the social space that houses a culturally homogeneous group. It requires that people and territory must belong together and that the people are in possession of a single political will. There is a government that respects the law, rather than existing above the law, which indicates that civic nationalism is complementary to liberal democracy. Being such, civic nationalism as a social movement is said to be more democratic than the population of ethnic nationalism… the mass are more inclined to be incorporated into a high culture (via education), which gives them the same right of political decision as the elite” (Nikolas, 1999, p. 2).
This definition makes several distinctions between ethnic and civic nationalism while simultaneously arguing that the latter needs the former to be established. First, this definition argues that ‘civic’ nationalism is in some way the positive outcome of ethnic nationalism, and that its variety of nationalism is so unique that it is categorized as an entirely new entity altogether. Second, it is then also possible to assert that civic nationalism is found in states considered ‘liberal’ or ‘democratic,’ while ethnic nationalism is only the product of states considered ‘illiberal’ or ‘authoritarian’. The classic examples of Hitler and Mussolini’s respective fascist states are representative of the ethnic varieties of nationalism while the leading liberal democracies of Great Britain and the United States are representative of its civic varieties. Yet this dichotomy is based solely on the legal tendencies of the nation-state. Civic nationalism attempts to rest its social cohesion upon a set of beliefs based in the spirit of liberalism and democracy while ethnic nationalism is viewed as the primordial representation of the group based upon heritage and blood.
This dichotomy is therefore flawed because of civic nationalism’s necessary reliance upon ethnic nationalism. To suggest that the development of assimilation processes and democratic institutions logically led to the establishment of civic nationalism is inappropriate. If a particular society has to endure certain democratic tendencies combined with ethnic nationalism to produce a sense of civic nationalism, this is a case of a transformation and not a creation of a distinct political entity. To separate the two types of nationalism and to make an absolute distinction between non-democratic and democratic governments in terms of assimilation and nationalism is impossible.
David Brown has suggested that, “The difference between liberal and illiberal manifestations of nationalism cannot be explained by reference to the distinction between its civic and ethnocultural forms” (2000, p. 68). Liberal and illiberal tendencies of national governments are not positive indicators of the separation of the term nationalism into competing definitions. Civic nationalism is still heavily reliant on not only ethno-cultural nationalism but also a legal system based on equal rights and a common respect for law. However the legal system in even the most efficient and strongly balanced democracy was created by certain elites, and arguably created to benefit the elite classes who are represented as those who are a component of the national culture and tradition of the state.
National Symbols and Social Pressure
The creation of symbols within the nation is of great importance because it is believed that this allows individuals the opportunity to experience their collective identity or as Anderson (1983) has famously stated, an “imagined community.” John J. Macionis (2002) has defined a symbol as “anything that carries a particular meaning recognized by people who share a culture.” It is crucial to examine the last part of this sentence: “people who share a culture.” According to this definition, only those individuals able to recognize their identity within a group possess the level of awareness able to understand a symbol. Anyone removed from this culture is by definition unable to understand the complete significance of the symbol.
This assertion relies on a great deal of common sense. When a motorist in the United States objects to the actions of another motorist, a certain hand gesture is possibly displayed that symbolically represents a certain level of disapproval. To certain villages in sub-Saharan Africa or main land China, this display might have a different connotation or at the very least, no connotation at all. The culture in this example is centered on “automobiles” and in particular, a violation of some perceived driving norm or law. This is a classic example of the termsymbol because it represents comprehension to one group, while representing incomprehension to another group.
Assimilation and socialization processes are aimed at the creation of psychological connections between individuals of the state with national symbols. Because the creation of a united populace is the goal of the processes, schools have been centers of major socialization; but so have other centers of union, namely places of worship and places of business. The tie that binds the school, the church, and the workplace together is repetition and perceived necessity. All three venues are attended on a regular basis and have the social value of being of ultimate importance.
The school system, the place of worship, and the workplace serve an important function in national assimilation and the maintenance of national symbols because they connect the individual to the nation-state and foster a sense of commonality. Children enter the public school system, parents possibly attend a religious ceremony on a weekly basis, and most adults go to the place of employment on a daily basis. The children experience education at both the local level and community level, yet perform the same “duties” as students across the nation. The “church-goers” attend a weekly service in their own place of worship while feeling connected to others who attend different places of worship across the nation. Finally, individuals who are employed realize that others are involved in the workforce and that they are collectively contributing to the economy of the society in which they live. These three institutions rely on repetition, but they also link the individual in the local community to the overall imagined national community.
The school system, the place of worship, and the workplace are all areas that promote national symbols and are national symbols themselves. When American Christian churches sing “God Bless America,” and school children “pledge allegiance to the flag” in classrooms across the United States, symbols are binding the individual to the overall group. Even the economic system (capitalism), embraced by most modern, Western democracies, is based on individual self-interest for the betterment and success of the society-at-large, which Gellner (1983) says relies on the uniformity of the culture.
Thus, assimilation processes are only effective in the presence of available symbols. Symbols, rituals, traditions, etc., that are available because they are perpetuated by the educational system, the religious system, and economic system, which in most areas of the world is capitalism. Yet most immigrant and minority groups lack knowledge of the symbols because they initially lack entrance into the three systems. In theory these minority groups possess “cultural” or “national” symbols from other nation-states or isolated communities. It is only when the members of the minority groups enter into the aforementioned institutions are they able to observe the standards set forth in the business community and assimilate into the dominant nation.
In places, where seasonal and permanent migration is common among nation-states, minority discrimination has been prevalent. Individuals who were by choice or accident distanced from the influence of the nation and therefore the national movement and culture had only a few legitimate options. The minority group could either a.) conform to the dominant culture or b.) maintain its own culture. Individuals who chose alternative educational resources, alternative churches, and alternative economic resources eventually faced social and legal pressure.
Inferiority and Group Discrimination
“In traditional society, the most relevant social identifiers were kinship, peer, gender, socio-economic and, in settled (non-nomadic) communities, territorial groups, the latter coinciding generally with the village” (Prazauskas, 1995, p. 2). Social and legal discrimination was based on these social identifiers. Thus, there emerged the prevalence and dominance of certain families and in particular, certain royal families who proscribed a legal code based on patriarchal traditions and religious affiliation.
Modern nation-states required the unification of its borders and its peoples. To perform this coterminous linkage of land with people, states proscribed legal codes based on its perceived dominant culture. Institutions, whose success was determined by the level of assimilation, helped to advocate and to coerce the people into the belief that the dominant culture is both necessary for the successes of the nation and the individual. Minorities faced and continue to face discrimination because they lack entrance into the institutions of the dominant culture. Groups with identities closest to the identity of the dominant culture assimilate more quickly than groups with a perceived difference or aversion to the dominant culture. It has been argued that “Ukrainians and Belarussians assimilated easily with Russians, while small Mongoloid groups like Mansi, Nanayans, (and) Eskimoes,… preserved their separate identity and are/were considered out of the mainstream” (Prazauskas, 1995, p. 2). The incentives to join the dominant national group are transmitted through the aforementioned institutions, however, minority acceptance is based on one’s access to those institutions, acceptance of the institutions, and the belief that a basic similarity exists.
Another obstacle that has faced many minority groups is isolation from their own culture. “In many cases a segment in the process of assimilation is simultaneously rejected by its own group and not yet accepted by the assimilating or dominant group”(Prazauskas, 1995, p. 2). Many times these minority groups, value families who attempt to embrace the assimilating culture’s symbols, traditions, rituals, etc as traitors to their own people, thereby adding additional pressure to the psychological struggle towards assimilation.
For Gellner (1983), modernization was the driving force behind nationalism and the desire for national uniformity. However several critics have suggested that modernization not only yields national uniformity but also minority discrimination as well. As certain members of the minority group witness benefits of the dominant nation, a desire for assimilation occurs. As the attraction leads individuals to make a positive cost-benefit analysis of their situation, they will leave their traditional way of life, for that of the dominant group. Examples of agrarian-based farmers who have had to conform to national standards and economic models for the benefit of their families illustrate this model of conformity.
Yet quite often those exposed to “modern ways” who have emerged from minority groups deny the dominant culture altogether and thus come to comprise nationalist-separatist movements. According to Dumont (1996), the Basque and Occitan movements have been motivated by individuals who had not only faced discrimination from the national government, but from their own minority groups as well. It appears that the propensity toward revolution or civil war increases when the motivation leads to the minorities’ belief in the desirability of national separation. Individuals will only partake in revolutions or civil wars when they truly believe that they are the focus of discrimination based on ethnicity, and that they believe that separation is beneficial.
One Nation, One State, One Language
According to Kelman (1973), individuals demonstrate two types of attachment to the nation-state: sentimental and instrumental (pp. 24-25).
“Sentimental attachment refers to the connection people have to the national system to the extent that they see it as representing them -- as being, in some central way, a reflection and an extension of themselves. Instrumental attachment refers to the extent that individuals see the national system as an effective vehicle for achieving their own ends and the ends of members of the other systems” (pp.24-25).
Unlike other symbols or sources of unity, national languages have the capacity to thrive despite changing social or national policies. Sentimental or instrumental attachments rely more heavily on national languages than quite possibly any other symbol or unifying vehicle.
At the sentimental level Kelman argues that a national language “serves as a major object and symbol of attachment because it links the present with the future and the speaker with people he/she will most likely never meet” (as cited in Rubin and Jernudd, eds., p. 31). Rarely will individuals develop relationships with individuals outside the traditional associations: family, workplace, schools, community, etc. Although the workplace differs from region to region and the school curriculum varies from place to place, the national language does not. It is an institution of unification and the most profound feature of one’s culture.
Language also plays an important role for an individual at the instrumental level because as Kelman has noted, “the national language aids in the development of political, economic, and social institutions that serve the entire population” (as cited in Rubin and Jernudd eds., p. 32). While this has been greatly contested in recent years, it has been suggested that national languages allow movement and discussion among the different social classes. Individuals who feel marginalized because of race, religion, or class feel a sense of belonging to the national institutions and a greater connection with individuals who make up the majority of the state’s population.
Still, most minority groups speak languages other than (or in addition to) the national language. Over time these minority languages have become what Fishman (1968) defined as “dialects, pidgin languages, regional languages, or indigenous languages;” terms used in reaction to or in the presence of a dominant culture or a national language. For example, Kurdish, a language spoken by those individuals who claim Kurdish ancestry and ethnicity dwelling in Southern Turkey and Northern Iraq, is considered a “regional language” by the governments of Turkey and Iraq, but an “indigenous” and “national” language by the Kurds themselves (Hassanpour, 2000). Yet is the Kurdish language a “national” language or merely a regional one? This question has resulted in an on-going conflict that has existed between the Kurds and the governments in which they have lived.
According to a 1951 Report of the UNESCO Meeting of Specialists concerning language in education, there are ten types of languages spoken by the world’s population (as cited in Fishman, 1968, p. 132). Interestingly enough however, each delineation appears to be given in relation to other languages; some more dominant than others.
- Indigenous Language: the language of the people considered to be the original inhabitants of an area.
Lingua Franca: a language which is used habitually by people whose mother tongues are different in order to facilitate communication between them.
- Mother or Native Tongue: the language which a person acquires in early years and which normally becomes his natural instrument of thought and communication.
- National Language: the language of a political, social, and cultural entity.
- Official Language: a language used in the business of government—legislative, executive, and judicial.
- Pidgin: a language which has arisen as a result of control between peoples of language, usually formed with a mixing of the languages.
- Regional Language: a language which is used as a medium of communication between peoples living within a certain area who have different mother tongues.
- Second Language: a language acquired by a person in addition to his/her mother tongue.
- Vernacular language: a language which is the mother tongue of a group that is socially or politically dominated by another group speaking a different language.
- World Language: a language used over wide areas of the World. (as cited in Fishman, 1968, p. 132).
The delineation presented above is an account of the ways in which ethnic or political groups value their own language and the languages with which they come into contact. The Kurdish language, for example, is obviously a vernacular language, valued as such by both Kurds and Turks/Iraqis alike. It also must be considered an indigenous language. The major point of contention has to do with the label “national.” For the Kurdish language to be considered a “national language” it must be used politically, socially, and culturally. Although many argue that the political value of the language is non-existent because it lacks proper legislative representation, it obviously has political capital, because the governments of Iraq and Turkey fear its presence as a political tool of unity for the Kurds.
The most fascinating term that deals with language policy is the term dialect. Individuals have come to regard a dialect as both a form of the official language used in a specific geographic location and one that is secondary to the national language. The idea behind the term dialect comes not from the speakers, but from the “other” language community, usually the one in control of the government or elites.
This separation of the term language into a common and uncommon variety has created a subconscious disempowerment of the community speaking the dialect. Fishman (1972) has suggested that many negative symbols have been associated with the dialect. For example,
“If immigrants from region A came to be a large portion of the poor, the disliked, and the illiterate in region B, then their speech variety (Dialect A) will come to stand for much more than geographic origin alone in the minds of the inhabitants of region B, if they marry primarily only each other, engage primarily in their original regional customs, and continue to value only each other’s company, they may, in time, come to consider themselves a different society, with goals, beliefs, and traditions of their own” (Fishman, 1972, p. 16)
The emphasis must be placed on the connotation placed on the dialect itself. Speakers of the dialect are instantly treated as members of a lower class even if political representation is granted to them. The linguistic studies of Urdu and Hindi speakers in India by Das Gupta (1970) and regional minorities in European cities suggest that a cycle of poverty will continue until they either assimilate or leave the state altogether.
One can then argue that national governments endorse one or possibly a few official languages because of the belief that the society and future societies will benefit from the endorsement. The practice known as language planning has been the state’s attempt at the creation of citizens and more importantly citizens who are capable of understanding the basic laws of the land. Haugen (1961) has defined language planning as, “the activity of preparing a normative orthography, grammar, and dictionary for the guidance of writers and speakers in a non-homogeneous speech community” (p. 69). This definition seeks to explain the coercive tendency of the nation-state and its capacity to create a homogeneous setting out of a seemingly unmanageable heterogeneous society. It also assumes that the “language” is the only symbol capable of making this difficult transition.
Culture refers to behavioral patterns, ethnicity, symbols, tradition, and common language. What is often overlooked while examining language policy is the complexity of the concept of language itself. For many sociolinguists, language is more than just patterns of speech and a way of conveying information; it is also possibly one of the most common identifiers and realistic representatives of culture. According de Saussure (1983), there is a difference between “langue” and “parole;” the difference being the expression and value of the words.
De Saussure (as cited in Bally and Sechehaye eds., 1983) suggested that “parole” represents the words themselves, regardless of situational context and “langue” as the societal representation and meanings conveyed by its members. Group identity is necessary for one to fully understand the language. As de Saussure says, “language (langue) is a storehouse filled by the members of a given community through the active use of speaking… language is not complete in any speaker; it exists perfectly only within a collectivity” (as cited in Bally and Sechehaye eds. 1983, p. 83). And the reason that this “collective” environment is “perfect” is because it gives the people a common identity by which they can similarly experience and more importantly similarly describe the world around them.
Furthering the notion of “one language, one culture” is the idea of “one language, one economy.” When Gellner (1978) stated that “Language is more than a tool of culture, it is culture,” he referred to not only its impact on the social sphere, but its impact on the economic sphere as well. For Gellner, it was commonality of language that aided in the division of labor and created a market value for language use. Progress and development lent itself to national language policies and the creation of nationalism.
For Gellner, the idea of language as a separate, cultural identifier was impossible. A similar language united those entering into the capitalist system. During the Medieval Period language policies were non-existent because the economic structure of feudalism did not rely on the ability of the population at large to buy and sell and goods. The medieval serf relied on the protection of the lord, who in turn relied on the production of the estate. It was only as a result of the growing middle classes and increase in cities that motivated individuals to speak a common language, or more particularly, “parole,” since the collective identity had yet to be formed or realized.
Gellner’s “functional language concept” places the burden of nationalism on not only the socio-political machinery but also the socio-economic machinery. As the national governments of the 17th and 18th centuries were attempting to define a “specific territory” it became essential to also establish “able bureaucracies,” powerful enough to collect taxes from a seemingly heterogeneous group of strangers. A uniform language bridged the gap. The governments had become powerful enough to utilize the market system of capitalism and convince citizens of the economic importance of a standard language. Hence the standardization attempts in the 17th century of the French language (in France) and the eventual standardization attempts of Italian (in Italy) and German (in Germany) in the 19th century.
For purposes of this article, it is essential to understand both national culture, and how national culture was created and by whom. If the creation of nationalism was essential to industrial development, as Gellner has suggested, who were the elites that motivated others in the nation-state to accept the “rules?” In 17th century France, it can be argued that developing a sense of nationalism was a political move created by Louis XIV as a way of gaining both acceptance and political authority. Those who refused to speak standard French, who lived within the territory known as France, were educationally, politically, and economically marginalized. These individuals (who spoke Breton, Occitan, Basque or any number of minority languages) had a limited chance of maintaining their cultural and linguistic past. Active participation in the process did not necessarily translate into full acceptance. Many groups participated because it provided them with the greatest amount of opportunity. Therefore, only one outcome is logically determined: those involved in the process of nationalism may have been coerced into the understanding of the nation rather than fully accepting that they were all ethnically united. If in fact those who feared exclusion and therefore joined out of fear or promise were coerced into the linguistic revolution what does this say of the terms “revolution” and “nationalism?” My guess is that coercion has a great deal to do with not only the development of national language laws/policies but also the overall concept of nationalism.
“Coercion of elites,” a topic of great concern to Motyl (1999) and others who critique much of the contemporary literature of constructivism, is of supreme importance to the understanding of not only national languages, but regional minority languages as well. The term “coercion” has come to mean an “initiation of force, fraud, or threat of force against others or their property” or simply, “the use of force to overwhelm the will of another (Oxford Dictionary, 2006). These definitions apply to incidences concerned with crime, extortion, or blackmail; yet seem implausible in discussions of language policies and/or national identity because these terms seem acceptable to the overwhelming majority of people.
In keeping with the Lockean order of natural rights and the Benthamite “logic of utility,” democratic nation-states actively sought majority (usually overwhelming majority) rights as the cornerstone of representative government. European governments may have lost absolute monarchy, but they gained a representative style of government, based on the logic of natural rights and majority rule. Nineteenth and twentieth century language policies were not given to the people as they had been in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; they were presented to the people as something the people had desired. Individuals chose to speak the national language not only because it promised them financial or political benefits, but also because it represented progressive democracy.
National symbols therefore must be considered both acts of acceptance and coercion. To suggest that the governments of Europe acted in a tyrannical manner when creating national languages is not a point of speculation. In this context it is at least plausible that Western European governments convinced the populations that it was in their collective best interests (economically, politically, and socially) to speak the national language. The people acquiesced because they themselves were now not only subjects of a king, but individual citizens being represented by a parliament, which also conveniently spoke the national language.
Democratic development gave the majority in the society the belief that their laws were just, not because they were “fair in principle” or based on some ethical consideration, but because the greatest number of individuals “representing” them in government recognized them as being just. Gellner’s “industrial thesis,” based on education and language as a rationally motivated choice is not defective, it is merely insufficient when explaining the standardization of national languages. His theory works better when one examines the development of regional languages and their importance in the beginning of capitalistic society.
Linguicide
As states developed and social and economic barriers were built, individuals continued to speak languages that were unrecognizable to many people outside of the particular region in which they lived. Majority-based government and society frowned upon these language communities, recently labeled, “Regional Language Minorities,” as being “outsiders” and “foreigners,” when in fact most “outsiders” had lived within the confines of the newly centralized nation-state, paid taxes, and many times had family lineages that stretched back centuries. Magocsi (1997) in his analysis of the regional language minority known as the Carpatho-Rusyns has suggested that this group has a distinct “homeland” but the regional boundaries of its “homeland” spread across the present day boundaries of four contiguous nation-states: Ukraine, Slovakia, Poland, and Romania, and are therefore invalidated. The Basques of Spain and France have also seen a deterioration of their culture through a similar process of nation-state building, national identity, formation, and linguicide.
The term “linguicide,” to which I have previously referred, is defined nicely by Hassanpour (2000) as the “deliberate killing of a language.” Although this definition sounds quite harsh, in actuality its harshness is derivative of the national policy to which Hassanpour refers, namely Turkish language policy. For purposes of this article, I have argued that “harshness” has less to do with the type of government and more with nationalism and the propagation of national identity. Skutnabb-Kangas (2000) has argued that “One of the reasons for linguicide (also known as linguistic genocide) is that it can reduce the number of (potential) nations, meaning peoples who could demand the right to first internal, then external self-determination” (p. 311). France is considered one of the most vibrant democracies on earth, yet even the French constitution seeks to actively promote the use of standard French (Constitution of the Fifth Republic of France, Art. 2, No. 2). The French government as well as the French nationalist majority, who in theory is represented by the French government, has marginalized regions clinging to alternative identities such as Basque, Breton, or Occitan.
Immediately following World War II, the United Nations in 1948 attempted to secure linguistic and cultural rights as part of the document that would eventually be known as the, “International Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.” As Capotorti (1979) and Kangas (2000) have noted, linguistic, cultural, and physical genocide “were seen as crimes against humanity,” but unfortunately, “when the Convention was finally accepted by the General Assembly, Article III, which covered linguistic and cultural genocide, was not adopted” (Caporti, 1979, p. 37). Therefore, individual governments were and are allowed to continue the practice of linguicide on the grounds that it protects the “national interest.”
So, linguicide is a reality, but governmental support varies from country to country. “An integral element of the policy has been the suppression of academic study of dialects, geography, and history (Hassanpour, 2000, p. 1) There are numerous accounts of individuals charged with criminal offenses for speaking a particular language or dialect. Welsh and Scottish Gaelic speakers have continually faced discrimination in Scotland and Great Britain. The 1976 Race Relations Act (RRA), whose purpose was racial and minority protection, does not protect autochthonous language groups because they are not considered “racial groups” or even “ethnic minorities (McLeod, 1998, p. 2) “Section 3(1) of the Act provides that the term ‘racial group’ means a group of persons defined by reference to color, race, nationality or ethnic or national origins, and within the framework of the “racial group.” So, in order to secure the Act's protection, any community outside those valued as specifically British, must necessarily be classified as a “racial group.” Unprotected individuals seeking employment need to demonstrate that they are in fact worthy of protection from the Race Relations Act. However in doing so, they as individuals may gain “racial minority” status, get a job because of their “status” and begin to face animosity from their own language community (who may not have been successful in proving their minority status) and of course from the dominant majority in the United Kingdom.
In Slovenia, the newest entrant into the European Union: “adequate minority protection is accorded only to the ‘autochthonous’ national minorities, i.e. autochthonous Roma, Hungarians, and Italians. However, even autochthonous Roma do not enjoy the same level of minority protection as Hungarian and Italian minorities” (McLeod, 1998, p. 2). Because the term “autochthonous” is defined in the connotative or cultural sense, it only is constitutionally defined (by Slovenia) in relation to speakers of identifiable nation-states or individuals considered “native” to the state. According to the executive summary of EU Map, entitled, “Minority Protection in Slovenia (2001), the government of Slovenia only offers constitutional rights (rights to bilingual administration, education, and parliamentary representation) to Hungarian and Italian minorities while rights are not guaranteed to at least 7,000 Roma and other “non-autochthonous minority groups” (Open Society Institute, 2001, p. 1).
Because the United Nations, the European Union, the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance and many non-governmental organizations dealing with human rights consider linguistic minority protection a priority, the nation-state, the only important actor in the realist’s vocabulary, is having its sovereignty challenged. Groups who claim national autonomy are once again challenging the concept of nationalism, the cornerstone of the nation-state itself, but are having greater success because of the growing technological and financial interconnectedness of the world, the rise in the power and number of minority centered international organizations, and in many ways the dominance of the English language and American influence.
Conclusion and Thoughts for Further Research
While linguicide has been a major concern for linguistic minorities in both the presence of democratic and authoritarian regimes, its prevalence seems to have waned within certain regional governance models like the European Union’s Committee of the Regions (CoR) and European Bureau for Lesser Used Languages (EBLUL). These new governmental arrangements (for now, solely in Europe) have given priority to issues deemed universal rather than national. As more and more states shed their national sovereignty in order to represent the multitude of voices, regional/global regimes will continue to gain power. If this trend continues, the role of the state will be challenged. It will be interesting to see how much sovereignty the state is willing to shed.
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