Politics and Public Opinion in Ukraine
Fifteen Years after Independence 

Marcus Stadelmann
The University of Texas at Tyler

     One of the great questions concerning the student of Ukrainian politics is whether Ukraine has truly become   a democracy after sixteen years of independence. If the answer is yes, what are the chances of Ukraine to maintain a democratic political structure in the future? According to Ilya Prizel (Dawisha and Parrott, 1997) a democracy must contain the following elements; First, civil liberties, including the freedom of speech, assembly and the press, have to be guaranteed. The Ukraine clearly meets this requirement since the successful 2004 Orange Revolution. In its 2005 annual freedom survey, Freedom House, for the first time, moved Ukraine from its partially free to the coveted free status (Taras, 2005). Next to the three Baltic States, Ukraine is the only former Soviet republic to have achieved this distinction.
     Second, an independent judicial system has to be in place and public officials have to be able to be held accountable by the public. Again, Ukraine fulfills this precondition for democracy. After the rigged 2004 elections, the Ukrainian Supreme Court overturned the election and scheduled new elections, a clear signal of an independent judiciary.
     Finally free, competitive elections need to be held, allowing the public to hold its elected officeholders accountable. At this point the Ukraine has held several free, competitive, and one fraudulent election in 2004, which was subsequently overturned by public and international pressure. The 2006 parliamentary elections were again considered free.
     Thus, on paper the Ukraine meets all preconditions for a successful working democracy. On the other hand the student of public opinion and government will notice certain democratic vulnerabilities that are usually associated with new democracies. A large portion of the public and the ruling elite still holds undemocratic values, acquired during the communist period. An even larger majority of the public is dissatisfied with the current political and economic situation, demanding change. Finally, political alienation, defined as a separation of the people from their political system, had been on the rise in Ukraine until the Orange Revolution of 2004 reversed this trend.
     This paper will analyze the current state of public opinion in Ukraine, by presenting comparative measures of political and economic satisfaction and dissatisfaction. In addition, the 2004 Orange Revolution, the 2006 parliamentary elections, and the 2007 constitutional crisis will be analyzed. The objective is to show that Ukraine has undergone dramatic changes since independence and that the Orange Revolution of 2004 has had a lasting impact on the Ukrainian public. Democracy and economic prosperity might just be in the future of the Ukrainian people.
The 2004 Orange Revolution
     With incumbent President Kuchma term-limited, the 2004 Ukrainian presidential elections were   wide open. The two front-runners were pro-Russian Prime Minister Victor Yanukovych and Western leaning former Prime Minister Victor Yuschenko. Yanukovych had received the open support of President Kuchma and Russian President Putin, while Yuschenko was favored by the President of Poland and the leaders of the Baltic States.
     Early on, the Kuchma administration threw its support and the whole governmental apparatus behind Yanukovych, openly attempting to intimidate Yuschenko supporters. On September 5, 2004, while having dinner with the Director of the Security Service, Igor Smeshko and his deputy Vladimir Satsyuk, Yuschenko was severely poisoned with dioxin. Not only did the dioxin alter his facial appearance, but it also restricted his ability to campaign. Only the decision to seek medial help in Austria saved Yuschenko’s life. Medical doctors in Austria found a thousand times the normal level of dioxin in his body. Only two people with this high level of dioxin poisoning have ever lived.
     Nevertheless, Ukraine went to the polls on October 31, 2004. With no candidate receiving the required 50 percent of the vote, the top two vote getters, Yuschenko with 39.87 percent and Yanukovych with 39.32percent, went into a runoff scheduled for November 21, 2004 (Hesli, 2006). Exit polls undertaken by Western polling firms such as Gallup widely projected a Yuschenko victory with about 54 percent of the vote. When the official results came in, Ukraine and the rest of the world were stunned. Yanukovych was declared the winner with 49.4 percent of the vote to Yuschenko’s 46.7 percent (Hesli, 2006).
     Mass protest, contesting the election results, began in the capital of Kyev as early as November 22, 2004. Over half a million Yuschenko supporters wearing orange clothing and carrying orange flags, orange being Yuschenko’s campaign color, marched through the capital protesting the result and alleging election fraud. International observers, including European Union representatives, and former U.S. President Jimmy Carter supported their allegations.
     Examples of fraud committed by the Yanukovych campaign included turnout of up to 127 percent in Eastern and Southern Ukraine, Yanukovych strongholds. Over half a million new and non-existent voters had been registered and ten of thousands of new absentee ballots had been cast for Yanukovych. Other examples of voter fraud included ballot stuffing, voter intimidation, and the forcing of patients in hospitals, university students, and prisoners to vote for Yanukovych.
     For this reason, Yuschenko declared himself the winner and took the oath of president in the Ukrainian parliament. While Western Ukraine and the capital supported Yuschenko’s claim, Eastern and Southern Ukraine, Yanukovych strongholds, proclaimed that they would rather secede than recognize Yuschenko’s victory,
     On November 24, the Central Election Commission certified Yanukovych's victory. In protest, one million people assembled in Kyev and Yuschenko called for a general strike to cripple the country.  Two days later roundtable discussions began between Russia, the European Union, and Poland to resolve the situation. During these negotiations, the Ukrainian media broke its silence and declared on the air that massive voter fraud had taken place and that the media had been forced to lie and relay false information to the public. Yanukovych and his supporters now openly threatened with secession. The head of the Ukrainian military in turn mobilized 10,000 troops to break up pro-Yuschenko demonstrations. Only a split in the military and the siding of the security forces, a KGB successor agency, with Yuschenko, prevented bloodshed. Parliament soon passed a no-confidence vote in Prime Minister Yanukovych.
     Finally, the Ukrainian Supreme Court broke the deadlock on December 3, when it declared the election invalid and scheduled new elections for December 26, 2004. When the results came in, Yuschenko easily won with 52 percent of the vote to Yanukovych’s 44 percent. On January 23, 2005, Victor Yuschenko became the third president of independent Ukraine.
The 2006 Ukrainian Parliamentary Elections
     After initial euphoria, political and economic reality set in Ukraine by late 2005. In September 2005 President Yuschenko dismissed his Prime Minister Yuliya Tymoshenko, splitting the Orange coalition that had brought him to power. The official reasons cited were ineffectiveness of her government and lack of integrity, namely corruption. This move was opposed by 40 percent of all Ukrainians, while 36 percent supported it (IFES, 2005). However, a clear majority of Yuschenko supporters, 51 percent opposed it, while most Yanukovych supporters, 62 percent, applauded it (IFES, 2005). In addition some of Yuschenko closest allies, such as his Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council, Petro Poroshenkjo, were dismissed because they were accused of corruption. Not surprisingly this resulted in a change in public opinion in Ukraine, especially in the areas of public perception on political stability and corruption. According to polls the number of Ukrainians who believed that the country was on the right path to political stability fell by 50 percent (IFES, 2005). This coupled with economic slowdowns boded ill for the president's party in the 2006 elections.
     To make matters worse, a new electoral law had been implemented for the 2006 elections. For the first time pure proportional representation, with a three percent hurdle, was to be used. (Previously, Ukraine used a system similar to Germany, where half of the 450 members of the Rada were elected using proportional representation and the other half came from single member districts). As Table 1 shows, when the results of the election came  in on the evening of March 26, 2006, the big winner was Victor Yanukovych and his Party of Regions, winning  32.1 percent of the vote (World Factbook, 2007). In a clear rebuff to president Yuschenko, former Prime Minister Yuliya Timoshenko came in second. Her party entitled Yuliya Timoshenko Bloc received 22.3 percent of the vote (World Factbook, 2007). President Yuschenko’s party “Our Ukraine” came in third with just 13.9 percent of the vote (World Factbook, 2007). The Socialist and Communist Parties of Ukraine were the only other parties to win seats in parliament. With not one party winning an outright majority lengthy negotiations followed. Finally, when President Yuschenko agreed to allow Yuliya Timoshenko to become prime minister, a deal was struck on  June 22, 2006, to form a new Orange coalition consisting of the Yuliya Timoshenko Bloc, the Socialist Party of Ukraine, and the President’s Our Ukraine Bloc. However the next day, the Socialist Party defected to the Party of Regions and together with the Communist Party formed a left-leaning pro-Russian coalition, called the Alliance of National Unity. Victor Yanukovych became prime minister and the head of the Socialist Party Alexander Moroz the chairman of parliament.
(See Table 1)
The 2007 Constitutional Standoff
     The newly amended Ukrainian constitution, which had gone into effect January 2006, severely weakened the presidency, while enhancing parliamentary powers. Under the new constitution the parliament gained  the power to not only dismiss the President’s cabinet, including the prime minister, but to also appoint a new cabinet. With a 2/3 majority in parliament, the prime minister could now change the constitution, reject presidential vetoes, and impeach and remove the president.
     After months of political stalemate, with Prime Minister Yanukovych undermining the president consistently, successfully blocking most of his polices, President Yuschenko decided to dissolve parliament on April 2, 2007 and call for new elections set for June 2007.  The reason for the dissolution according to Yuschenko was an attempt by Prime Minister Yanukovych to illegally usurp power in an attempt to impeach the president. For the past few months Yanukovych had been luring away parliamentarians from other parties in an attempt to increase his parliamentary majority from 250 to 300. This would give him a 2/3 majority in parliament, enough to change the constitution, reject presidential vetoes, and even impeach and remove the president. While the constitution allows for parliamentary blocs to switch sides in parliament, this individual poaching of parliamentarians is not dealt with. Yuschenko claimed this as his reason to dissolve parliament, and further stated that the Ukrainian constitution does give the president the power to issues decrees, including the call for new elections.
     Yanukovych and his supporters on the other hand claimed that the president had overstepped his constitutional powers and refused to abide by his decree unless so ordered by the Ukrainian Constitutional Court. Not certain  of the Court’s ruling, President Yuschenko quickly dismissed two judges for “violation of their oath” and appointed two new judges, who were more likely to back his call for new parliamentary elections.
     Yuschenko’s move was widely criticized in Russia, the Russian Duma even voting to officially condemn it.   At the same time, Yuschenko and his actions were cautiously applauded by the West.
Within days thousands of Ukrainians went to the streets to protest the president’s decree. Defense minister Anatoly Grytsenko soon proclaimed that the Ukrainian army would remain loyal to the president. Prime Minister Yanukovych escalated the situation when he forced a bill through parliament to block election funding making any election impossible in the near future. With elections costs estimated at 60-100 million dollars, the President and the National Security and Defense Council ordered parliament to finance the election.
     In an attempt to defuse the situation, Prime Minister Yanukovych pledged to reject the 12 parliamentarians who defected to his side and have them become independents in parliament. This conciliatory offer was rejected by the president and the political standoff continued. Finally, on  May 4, 2007, a compromise between president and prime minister was achieved.  Instead of the president calling for new elections, parliament would dissolve itself and call for elections, thus retaining the power over elections. New elections were scheduled for September 2007, and parliament voted to provide the funding. In addition both sides agreed to invite international observers to the country to make sure that election fraud would not occur.
Public Opinion in Ukraine
     When analyzing public opinion in the Ukraine an overwhelming dissatisfaction with the political and economic situation is visible. With the 2004 Orange Revolution public euphoria temporarily set in. However, this initial euphoria, brought on by the public’s victory over the entrenched establishment, begins to fade as early  as Summer  2005, when the country becomes inundated with political and economic problems. Tables 2 and 3 will show changes in Ukrainian public perception on the state of the economy and overall political trends from 1997 to 2005.
(See Table 2)
(See Table 3)
     As can be observed, political dissatisfaction had remained stable in the 90 percentile range until 2001, when  a period of economic growth increased public satisfaction. By late 2001, for the first time in Ukrainian democratic history, more than 10 percent of the population was satisfied with the economy. This number temporarily increased to 19 percent after the successful Orange Revolution, but fell back to 10 percent by late 2005. Now, a full 83 percent of all Ukrainians described the current economic situation as bad and only 10 percent considered  it good (IFES, 2005). Forty-three percent believed that their family’s economic conditions had gotten worse,  while only 14 percent stated that they were better off this year compared to last year (IFES, 2005). The country was also pessimistic about the future. Twenty-four percent predicted that they would be worse off next year, while 14 percent believed that they would be better off (IFES, 2005).  Twenty-eight percent expected for their economic situation to remain the same (IFES, 2005).
     Ironically, the public’s perception of the state of the Ukrainian economy is not rooted in reality.  The Ukrainian economy grew by 12 percent in 2004, making it Europe’s fasting growing economy. While, it slowed down to  2.4 percent in 2005, by 2006 it had again reached 7 percent growth (World Factbook, 2007). The public perceived this as economic decline, even tough revenue increased by 63 percent and inflation fell to 11.6 percent (World Factbook, 2007). As Taras Kuzio points out, public economic perception of the state of the economy   is “a handover from the transition of the 1990’s and not a perception pf economic reality” (Kuzio, 2005). Ukrainians after years of economic suffering are just unwilling to give credit for economic growth to their government.
     To make matters worse, Ukrainians are showing a lack of confidence in all governmental structures. Not one governmental institution can elicit support or trust from a majority of the Ukrainian public. Table 4 shows the severe misgivings that a majority of Ukrainians have about their government.
(See Table 4)
     Excluding the February 2005 results, there is widespread lack of confidence in most major political institutions, with the exception of the military and to a certain extent the presidency and local government. Clearly government in the Ukraine, especially at the national level is failing its population at this time. In addition the results demonstrate an underlying possibility for the eventual destruction of democracy in Ukraine by showing clear majority support for only one institution, namely an undemocratic one, the Ukrainian military.
     With the state of the economy being the major source of dissatisfaction for the country, how does the Ukrainian public feel about more and speedier economic reforms? Recent polls have shown that a vast majority of all Ukrainians support economic reforms. There are however two questions to consider when discussing the question of economic reform in Ukraine. The first question is whether the Ukrainian public supports market reforms or whether they are ready to go back to a system of centralized planning. The second question concerns whether the Ukrainian public supports rapid or slow, incremental, economic reforms for the country.
(See Table 5)
     As Table 5 shows, support for a market economy has increased quite dramatically in the last two years. The major reason seems to be economic growth and the victory of pro-Western candidate Yuschenko. Thirty percent of all Ukrainians do support a mixed economy, similar to Sweden, where the government owns parts of the economy and is able to support its public with a strong welfare state in the case of market failure. Interestingly, a small majority of all Ukrainians continue to prefer a centralized economy to a pure market economy, demonstrating continued support by about one-fifth of the populace for a return to a Soviet type economy.
     To answer the second question, there is widespread support for more economic reform, in any direction, market or centralized command. A full 41 percent of Ukrainians state that the pace of reform is too slow (IFES, 2005). Only 8 percent believe that economic reforms are occurring at the right pace (IFES, 2005). In addition 5 percent claim that reforms are occurring too quickly and a full 27 percent believe that reforms are not occurring at all (IFES, 2005).
Political Alienation
     As previously mentioned, Ukraine had been undergoing a severe process of political alienation until recently. This section of the paper will now focus on specific aspects of political alienation and attempt to measure them empirically. Some of the key questions posed to an electorate to measure political alienation involve whether the public understands the political process and whether it believes that it can influence the political process through political participation. In Ukraine, the Orange Revolution brought about a tremendous change to these questions. In 1999 a majority of the public did not understand the political process and further did not believe that they could make a difference or impact the decision making process through political participation in the form of voting.  As Tables 6 and 7 show, this had changed by 2004.  Now, an overwhelming majority of 87 percent profess knowledge of the political process while only 10 percent proclaim no knowledge.  After the Orange Revolution, for the first time in Ukrainian democratic history, a majority of Ukrainians, 53 percent, believed that they could influence decision-making in their country.
(See Table 6)
(See Table 7)
     To measure internal efficacy of the Ukrainian public, the following questions were asked: Does there exist a high level of interest in politics in Ukraine and does the Ukrainian electorate consider itself politically competent. As Table 8 will show, interest in politics in Ukraine has increased over the last few years. While being extremely high with independence in 1991, disillusionment did set in after the 1994 elections. By 1999, even though a presidential election year, for the first time in the history of independent Ukraine, a majority of Ukrainians expressed no interest in politics. This changed by 2001 and reached new heights after the Orange Revolution in 2004. Today almost three quarters of all Ukrainians profess an interest in politics and government.
(See Table 8)
     As these tables’ shows, Ukraine was indeed undergoing a severe crisis in political alienation.  Until recently, a majority of the public did not understand the electoral process well and over two-thirds of the public believed   that political participation, such as voting, would make no difference at all. However, the 2004 Orange Revolution changed all of this and today we see Ukrainians move away from a politically alienated electorate to a more democratic one, slowly approaching Western European levels.
     The most disillusioning aspect of the process of democratization in Ukraine involves the perception by the public of whether the Ukraine has really become a democracy or not. Table 9 will show how Ukrainians answered this question.
(See Table 9)
     A closer look at the data reveals that the belief in whether Ukraine is a democracy is closely related to geography, ethnic background, and candidate preference in the 2004 presidential elections. Table 10 shows this.
(See Table 10)
     Citizens of Southwestern, Northwestern, Western, and Central Ukraine are Yuschenko supporters who do belief in high numbers that Ukraine is a democracy. For example, in Southwestern Ukraine, 59 percent of all Ukrainians believe that Ukraine is a democracy.  The numbers in the Eastern part of the country, where most ethnic Russian live, and where Victor Yanukovych won 67 percent of the vote for president, are quite different. Only seven percent there believe that Ukraine is a democracy.
Conclusion
     This paper has shown that the Ukrainian electorate has slowly evolved over time. Recent political and economic crises have created a more sophisticated electorate. Ukrainians today are interested in politics and they do believe that political participation matters. Not surprisingly, this can be traced back to the successful Orange Revolution of 2004 where the Ukrainian people were able to overturn a fraudulent election. At the same time severe misgivings remain. People are unhappy with the state of the economy even though economic growth has been consistent for the last four years. In addition the Ukrainian people have not yet acquired confidence in their governmental structures, which is understandable with the ongoing political infighting, widespread corruption, and outside political interference.

Table 1: 2006 Ukraine Parliamentary Election Results

Source: Central Election Commission of Ukraine

Table 2: Public Satisfaction with the Economic Situation in Ukraine (% of adult population).

Source:             Source: Source: International Foundation for Elections Systems Surveys July 1997/May 1998/June 1999/November/December 2000/September 2001/2003/February/November 2005 (Table rearranged by Author).

Table 3: Public views of the overall trend in Ukraine (% of adult population).

Source: Source: International Foundation for Elections Systems Surveys July 1997/May 1998/June 1999/November/December 2000/September 2001/2003/February/November 2005 (Table rearranged by Author).

Source: Source: International Foundation for Elections Systems Surveys July 1997/May 1998/June 1999/November/December 2000/September 2001/2003/February/November 2005 (Table rearranged by Author).

Table 5: Preferred Economic Model
“When thinking about our economic future, should our country develop a market economy or a centrally planned economy?”

Source: International Foundation for Elections Systems Survey, 1997/1999/2001/2003/2005 (Data rearranged by Author).

Table 6: Understanding the Electoral Process:
“How well do you understand the electoral process for the presidential elections?”

Source: International Foundation for Elections Systems Survey, June 1999/ November 2005 (Data Rearranged By Author).

Table 7: Voting Can Influence Decision-Making.
“How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement: Voting gives people like me a chance to influence decision-making in our country?”

Source: International Foundation for Elections Systems Survey, November 2005(Data rearranged by Author).

Table 8: Interest in Politics and Government

Source: Source: Source: International Foundation for Elections Systems Surveys July 1997/May 1998/June 1999/November/December 2000/September 2001/2003/February/November 2005 (Table rearranged by Author).

Table 9: Is Ukraine a Democracy:

Source: Source: Source: International Foundation for Elections Systems Surveys July 1997/May 1998/June 1999/November/December 2000/September 2001/2003/February/November 2005 (Table rearranged by Author).

Table 10: Region and Belief that Ukraine is a Democracy:

Source: International Foundation for Elections Systems Survey, November 2005 (Data rearranged by Author).

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