T.E. Lawrence,
the Paris Peace Conference of 1919
and the Post-War Middle East Settlement

Richard M. Luppi
Oregon Institute of Technology

     Introduction: Thomas Edward Lawrence (1888-1935) has been described by various authors as a scholar, military strategist, adventurer, mystic, poet, and even a showman. This paper avoids such labels and focuses upon his efforts to support the Arab cause for independence, particularly after World War I as a diplomat and advisor for the British government. Regardless of how popular authors, historians, and political-psychologists have labeled him, he did influence the shaping of the Modern Middle East after the Great War. For that, there is no doubt.
     His Early Years: Born in Tremadoc, North Wales, in 1888, Thomas Edward Lawrence was the second of five illegitimate sons of a wealthy Anglo-Irishman named Sir Thomas Chapman. Chapman, a husband with four daughters, left his proper but disgruntled marriage when he fell in love with his family governess, Sarah Lawrence. Both later assumed the names, Mr. and Mrs. Thomas Lawrence, and lived a rather nomadic life until they finally settled in Oxford, England (Asher, 1999, pp. 7-9). T. E. Lawrence attended the City of Oxford High School for boys and then was admitted to Jesus College, Oxford, where he studied medieval history. While at Oxford, Lawrence came under the influence of an archaeologist, David George Hogarth. Hogarth directed Lawrence’s interests towards the Middle East. So much so that Lawrence undertook the study of Arabic and decided to write his thesis on crusader castles in the in the Middle East. Researching his thesis, he traveled in 1909 to Syria and Palestine, where he walked over 1,000 miles from Beirut to Haifa and from Acre to Aleppo, gathering information and making sketches and living like an Arab. Upon his return to England, he received First Class Honors for his thesis and decided to become an archaeologist. Having obtained his degree in Modern History in 1910, Lawrence then undertook postgraduate research the following year (Graves, 1976, pp. 12-15).
     With the assistance of his friend and mentor, David Hogarth, Lawrence was invited to undertake an archaeological excavation of the ancient city of Carchemish in northern Syria, under the auspicious of the British Museum. Working with Hogarth and R. Campbell-Thompson, Lawrence also met Gertrude Bell, who was to influence him for much of his time in the Middle East. In late summer, 1911, Lawrence returned to England for a brief time but returned back to Syria in November for a second season of excavation at Carchemish. Lawrence continued making trips to the Middle East as a field archeologist for the British Museum in both Syria and Egypt.
     It was during this time that Lawrence became most proficient in learning the culture, language and local dialects of the Arab people. At the same time, Lawrence had grown to dislike the Turks who controlled Syria and the rest of the Ottoman Empire and who had mistreated the Arabs and considered them inferior. He also disliked the Germans who were constructing the Berlin-to-Baghdad railroad line near Carchemish and propping up the decaying Ottoman Empire with German military advisors and money. Nor did Lawrence care for the French who had colonial ambitions in Syria. Instead, Lawrence supported the view that Arabia should be freed from Turkish rule and enjoy self-government, possibly as part of the British Empire (Graves, 1976, pp. 17-21).
     Just prior to the outbreak of the First World War, Lawrence was involved in espionage for the British government. In December 1913, Leonard Woolley and Lawrence were directed by the British Museum to join a Captain Stewart Newcombe of the Royal Engineers for an archaeological survey of the Negev Desert to the Sinai Desert on the Turkish frontier east of the Suez Canal. Given Turkish approval, its ostensible purpose was to “trace an ancient caravan route from Palestine to Egypt and identify some of the sites associated with the forty years’ wandering of the Children of Israel” (Asher, 1999, p. 115). The real purpose of the expedition was to map the area from Gaza to Aqaba for the British government should Turkey enter war against Great Britain, alongside Germany. The area was of strategic importance, as it would have to be crossed by any Turkish army attacking Egypt from the east. Such a political development would threaten British control of the Suez Canal and Britain’s link to the Indian Ocean and its Dominions and Colonies in the Far East and Pacific.
     Lawrence and the Arab Revolt: The First World War broke out in Europe in August 1914 but did not spread to the Middle East until several months later. In November, The Triple Entente, Great Britain, France, and Russia, declared war on the Turkish Ottoman Empire after Turkey bombarded Russian Black Sea ports and closed the Dardanelles Strait to the Allies (Stokesbury, 1981, p. 104). Historically, Turkey viewed Russia as a threat to its empire, particularly its desire to have an outlet to the Mediterranean by controlling the Dardanelles Strait. In addition, the Turkish Sultan, Mehmed V and Enver Pasha, the Turkish Minister of War, were impressed with early German victories in the war and saw the war as a possible way to expand its empire. The decision would prove fatal to the Ottoman Empire, eventually leading to its dismemberment and six hundred years of Turkish rule.
     At the outbreak of the war, Lawrence was working for the British War Office, as a civilian, drawing a large scale map of the Sinai Desert. Because of his extensive knowledge of the Middle East, he was commissioned a 2nd Lieutenant in the British Army and sent to Cairo, Egypt, as an interpreter for British military intelligence in October 1914. Working in Cairo for almost one year, Lawrence interviewed prisoners of war, constructed maps, and received and interpreted information from British agents operating behind military lines (Graves, 1976, pp. 23-24). The head of all British intelligence services in Cairo was Gilbert Clayton, who British War Minister, General Horatio Kitchener, had complete faith in. Also working for British military intelligence was Sir Robert Storrs, an expert on the Middle East and diplomat. It was the British intelligence in Cairo, together with the British High Commissioner, Sir Henry McMahon, who influenced British foreign policy in the Middle East and not the Foreign Office in London. As such, it was those men who conceived the idea and its importance of an Arab revolt against Turkish rule (Fromkin, 1989, pp. 79-95).
     Turkish control of Arab lands was traditionally repressive. Arab secret societies dedicated to liberation from Turkish rule were forbidden, the Arabic language suppressed, and suspected Arab nationalists were hung. Turkish rule became even more repressive once Turkey entered the war because of its fear of an Arab revolt. Arabia was soon heavily garrisoned with Turkish troops at strategic ports, railroad centers, and cities, including the Holy City of Mecca. In Mecca was Hussein ibn Ali, the Sherif and Emir of Mecca, who ruled Hejaz and claimed descent from the Prophet’s family. He was the most powerful and independent Arab ruler in Arabia. In January 1915, Hussein discovered written evidence that the Ottoman government had decided to depose him, but would wait until after the war. Hussein then sent his son, Prince Feisal, to consult with other Arab leaders about a possible Arab revolt against the Ottoman government. Hussein soon learned that they would not revolt against Turkish rule unless they received assurances from the British government of Arab independence after the war (Fromkin, 1989, pp. 174-175). The year 1915 was bad for the British in the Middle East. A stalemate on the Western Front and the Gallipoli Campaign, which was designed to knock Turkey out of the war, was failing. At the same time, the British Army in Mesopotamia, present day Iraq, was making little headway against Turkish forces up the Tigris, and would later face a major defeat at Kut.al Amara, which was half way to Baghdad (Stokesbury, 1981, pp. 188-190).
     In October 1915, Sir Henry McMahon began an earnest series of written exchanges (ten) between himself and Hussein--the McMahon-Hussein Letters. McMahon was under orders from Kitchener not to lose alliance with Hussein. McMahon was evasive. He reluctantly entered into and dodged discussions about specific territories and boundaries while Hussein wanted all of the Arabian Peninsula as an independent Arab state after the war, including Palestine, Syria, and parts of southeast Turkey. However, McMahon agreed that after the war the Arabs should have independence, but, on the other hand, indicated that European advisors, principally British, would be needed to establish and administer the Arab countries. In essence, any independent Arab state would be British protectorate. At the same time, McMahon advised Hussein that since France also had an interest in Syria and Palestine, the British government could not make any assurances to Hussein which would be detrimental to the interests of her ally, France (Fromkin, 1989, pp. 182-185).Much of the negotiations faltered over a conflict between Arab and French interests in Syria. McMahon recognized that if the Arabs in Syria and Hejaz joined the Turks instead of rebelling against them, the British might lose the war and its position in the Middle East. However, Hussein eventually agreed that he would wave a full discussion of Arab boundaries until after the war--a decision he later regretted (Asher, 1999, pp. 142-143). In London, the British Foreign Office viewed McMahon’s commitment to Arab independence after the war as moot in as much as they believed the Arabs would never revolt against the Turks, and as such, the British government would not have to honor it commitment to the Arabs. As for the British government in India, it was concerned that it was not consulted beforehand and that Arab independence might incite Muslim independence in India. Sir Mark Sykes, British Member of Parliament and Middle East expert on a fact-finding tour, visited McMahon in Cairo on his way back to London from India. There McMahon convinced him of the need to promote an Arab revolt against the Turks and advised him that that Arabs would not revolt unless Britain took military steps to invade Palestine and Syria. In December 1915, Sykes reported back to his government his support for Arab independence, argued that there would be no successful Arab revolt against the Turks unless Britain launched an invasion of Palestine and Syria, and urged the creation of an Arab Bureau, as a section British Intelligence in Cairo under Gilbert Clayton. The Arab Bureau would be headed by David Hogarth, and include his protégé, T.E. Lawrence (Fromkin, 1989, pp. 170-188).The problem for the British government was to then to negotiate with the French a vision of the post war Middle East so that France would accept a diversion of British troops from the Western Front for a British military campaign in Palestine and Syria.
     Meanwhile, the Arab Bureau supported an Arab revolt under the leadership of Sherif Hussein. In June 1916, Princes Ali and Feisal, sons of Hussein, raised the banner of the Hashemite Kingdom in Medina, and in the name of all the Arabs, declared an end to the rule of the Ottoman Turks (Asher, 1999, p. 149).However, Hussein’s call to revolt fell on deaf ears throughout the Arab world and the Arab Bureau concluded six months later it would fail (Fromkin, 1989, pp. 222-223). In order to shore up the Hejaz Revolt, the Arab Bureau dispatched Sir Robert Storrs and his friend, T.E. Lawrence to Jeddah, a Red Sea port in Arabia. At this time, Lawrence ranked low in Arab Bureau circles, but Storrs viewed him as “super-cerebral” (Fromkin, 1989, p. 226). Arriving in Jeddah in October, Storrs and Lawrence met Prince Abdullah, one of Hussein’s sons. Abdullah proved a disappointment to Lawrence as a possible leader of the Arab Revolt, but Lawrence so impressed Abdullah that he was given permission to journey alone into the interior of Arabia and meet with Hussein’s other son, Feisal ibn Hussein. Upon meeting Feisal, Lawrence, at first glance, decided that Feisal not only looked the part but had the qualities to lead the Hejaz revolt against the Turks. As he later wrote, “I felt at first glance that this was the man I had come to Arabia to seek--the leader who would bring the Arab Revolt to full glory” (Lawrence, 1936, p. 91). Lawrence then suggested to General Reginald Wingate, later to replace Mc Mahon as High Commissioner in Egypt, that Hussein’s tribesmen should be used as irregulars in a British-led guerilla campaign against the Turks. This appealed to British military authorities in Cairo because they had no troops to spare at that time for the Arab Revolt. British authorities also accepted that Lawrence would serve as a British liaison officer and military advisor for Feisal. Subsequently, Wingate began to supply Lawrence with arms and large sums of gold with which to buy support from the different Arab tribes (Fromkin, 1989, p. 227).
     In December 1916, Lawrence and Feisal were in Yanbu when they began their guerrilla war by attacking the Hejaz Railway that ran south to Medina. Dynamite attacks on the railway and small arms attacks on troop transports forced the Turks to concentrate their attention on protecting the railway and repairing it. It also curtailed Turkish reinforcements and supplies from entering the fortress city of Medina. In July 1917, Arab forces mounted a successful and daring raid on Aqaba from the east, a garrisoned port held by the Turks and located in south Palestine in the Gulf of Aqaba. With the capture of Aqaba the way was then cleared for a British invasion of Palestine. The strategic port would enable the Royal Navy to not only disembark troops but also supply equipment for the campaign. In October 1917, British forces under General Sir Edmund Allenby invaded Palestine. Meanwhile, Arab forces advanced north securing Allenby’s right flank. In December, British forces captured Jerusalem and the race to Damascus began (Stokesbury, 1981, pp. 254-256).
     Arab military successes convinced Lawrence that the Arabs were an effective guerrilla force and that they should be rewarded with independence after the war. Although Lawrence had a passionate belief in the cause of Arab freedom, he, like Gertrude Bell, did not believe they could effectively govern themselves immediately after the war. Moreover, Lawrence did not envisage a single Arab state but a number of semi-independent Arab states under the protection of the British Empire (Asher, 1999, p. 171). At this time, Lawrence’s main objective was a British and Arab victory against the Ottoman Empire. As such, he was committed to both the British and Arab cause in the Middle East which were one of the same.
     Other British Commitments to Middle East Partners: France and the Zionists: The future of the post-war Middle East was also the concern of others as well. Sir Mark Sykes had been busy since December 1915 forging an understanding with France. In January 1916, Britain and France concluded the Sykes-Picot Agreement which formed their political framework for a post-war Middle East. In that agreement, both Britain and France agreed to recognize and protect a confederation of Arab states in their respective zones of influence and have direct control in other areas. Essentially, France would oversee Syria, upper Mesopotamia, and southern Turkey, while Britain would oversee Arab land in lower Mesopotamia from Baghdad south and part of southern Palestine. An international administration would also be established in northern Palestine incorporating the cities of Gaza and Jerusalem (http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/mideast/sykes.htm,March 15, 2007). The French basically got what they wanted, the coastline of the Mediterranean from Adana to south of Beirut and a zone of influence from Damascus to Aleppo to Mosul. As for the British, they were initially willing to give France control of Syria and southern Turkey because they wanted France to be a buffer power against Russian influence in the Caucasus and the Middle East. The agreement also was critical for the British because it obtained French support for a British campaign in Palestine and Syria. As for the Arabs, both Britain and France recognized that the agreement was contrary to Hussein’s vision of the post-war Middle East. That is, a large independent Arab state encompassing the Arabian Peninsula and beyond and not a collection of Arab states under any European protectorate (Fromkin, 1989, pp. 188-195).
     The Sykes-Picot Agreement also omitted any reference to the interests of the Jewish people. Yet political Zionism--the organized Jewish movement aimed at a national return of the Jewish people to Palestine--had been a political force in the world since the late 19th Century, and by 1916 there was a substantial Jewish population living there (Fromkin,1989, p. 196). Moreover, proponents of Zionism had significant influence in the British government. Significantly, by the time the Sykes-Picot Agreement had been approved by both the British and French governments, the British had second thoughts. In order to protect the Suez Canal, Britain felt it should control ALL of Palestine. So Britain began to look for a way out of the agreement. The Jewish issue appeared to be the answer. With the change of government in Britain in late 1916, with Lloyd George as Prime Minister and Arthur Balfour as Foreign Secretary, Britain began to support the Jewish cause in Palestine. Such support was one way expressing British misgiving about the Sykes-Picot Agreement. In addition, the British government began to view a Jewish population in Palestine as a “ client people “ willing to protect the Suez Canal and British interests in the area, and wished to obtain world-wide Jewish support for their war against Germany and Turkey. The most famous Zionist in Britain during the war was Dr. Chaim Weizmann, at the University of Manchester. He was not aware of the strategic issues that favored British support for the Jewish cause any more than Hussein was aware of the strategic issues that favored British support for the Arab cause (Stevens, 2003, pp. 50-51). Finally, a letter of support was sent from the British government to the head of the British Zionist Federation in November 1917. That letter became known as the Balfour Declaration:

“His Majesty’s Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country” (Sachar, 1991, p. 97).

     The Balfour Declaration was just as vague as the McMahon-Hussein letters of support for the Arab cause. The Balfour Declaration promised no Jewish state, just a “national home.” Moreover, it also promised to safeguard Arab rights in the area as well. In addition, the boundaries of Palestine were not defined. Like the Arabs, the Jews were recruited to join the fighting in the Middle East. A Jewish legion was created by the British and served in the final campaign of the war against the Ottoman Empire. It consisted of 5,000 soldiers, about half of the size of the Arab forces under Feisal (Stevens, 2003, p. 51).
     Although Lawrence was later made aware of the secret Sykes-Picot Agreement, he continued to promise the Arabs that Britain would honor the right of the Arabs to establish an independent state in the Middle East after the war. Lawrence did so in order to have the Arabs continue their campaign against the Turks. He felt he had no other choice. His duplicity in the matter bothered him as he wrote in his book, The Seven Pillars of Wisdom,

“….I could see that if we won the war the promises to the Arabs were dead paper. Had I been an honourable adviser I would have sent my men home, and not let them risk their lives for such stuff. Yet the Arab inspiration was our main tool in winning the Eastern War. So I assured them that England kept her word in letter and spirit. In this comfort they performed their fine things: but, of course, instead of being proud of what we did together, I was continually and bitterly ashamed” (Lawrence, 1936, pp. 275-276).

     On Lawrence’s advice, the Arab army captured Damascus ahead of British forces on October 1, 1918 (Lawrence, 1936, pp. 643-647). As British forces moved into Damascus, Allenby met Prince Feisal for the first time at the Victoria Hotel. Allenby, through Lawrence as an interpreter, gave Feisal bad news. Feisal would have control over Syria, with the exception of Palestine and Lebanon, but only under the guidance of the French. In addition, he would be given a French liaison officer. Feisal rejected French claims in Lebanon and would not accept French guidance in Syria or a French liaison officer. He also declared that Lawrence assured him that he would have full control of all of Syria, with the exception of Palestine. Allenby then asked Lawrence if he had explained to Feisal the terms of the Sykes-Picot Agreement. Lawrence replied untruthfully that he had not. Upset, Feisal left Damascus and for Lawrence the war was over. He then requested from Allenby a leave to return to England. Lawrence was then determined to work for the Arab cause behind the scenes in Britain (Asher, 1999, p. 340). On October 30, 1918, Turkey signed an armistice with the Allied Powers. For his participation in the Arab Revolt, Lawrence was promoted to Lieutenant-Colonel in 1918.
     Arriving back in England, Lawrence was a national celebrity due to the American journalist and cinematographer Lowell Thomas. It was Thomas who created the myth of “Lawrence of Arabia” by his carefully crafted public lectures in England after the war, together with his public showing of such films as “With Allenby in Palestine” and “Lawrence in Arabia.” Thomas had been commissioned by the American government to produce material which would generate American interest and enthusiasm for the war, and the British government directed him to the more photogenic Middle East. There, Thomas met Lawrence in Jerusalem, and both recognized the power of the press and film. Lawrence’s stature in England only increased when he was promoted to full colonel and then politely refused military medals and a knighthood from King George V during a private investiture at Buckingham Palace. At that time, Lawrence was at the height of his fame and was dubbed by the English press as “the most interesting Briton alive.” Although Lawrence feigned a dislike for fame, he privately enjoyed it. However, Lawrence’s commitment to the Arab cause was real, and he was determined to use his influence to that end (Asher, 1999, pp. 351-352).
     Lawrence and the Paris Peace Conference: On October 29, 1918, Lawrence was invited to present his views to the Eastern Committee of the War Cabinet. He did so in a most uncompromising way. He did not envisage a single Arab state as Hussein had demanded from McMahon in 1916 but three. He believed Mesopotamia should be divided into two Arab states with a Hashemite Sharif in Baghdad, presiding over the northern part including Mosul, and another Sharif in Basra, supervising the southern portion. In addition, Prince Feisal should be enthroned in Damascus and rule all of Syria, except for Lebanon which should go to the French, and the Alexandretta district, which should be jointly run by the Allies. In Palestine, Lawrence warned that the Arabs would accept Jewish immigration as outlined in the Balfour Declaration in 1917, but would resist any attempt to establish a Jewish state there. Lawrence further suggested that a single British authority based in Egypt should oversee the fledgling semi-autonomous Arab states (Asher, 1999, pp. 343-344). Lawrence was well aware that the British faced a dilemma. According to Sykes-Picot Agreement, Mosul, in northern Mesopotamia, together with Syria and Lebanon were promised to the French. If Britain opposed French aspirations in Syria or part of northern Mesopotamia, how could Britain obtain from the French all of Palestine and Mesopotamia which she believed should be her sphere of influence in the Middle East? Britain soon recognized that the only way to obtain French support for her interests in the Middle East was by abandoning her support for the Arab cause. Significantly, in a meeting in London between Lloyd George and the French Prime Minister Clemenceau, Clemenceau informally agreed that Britain could have Mosul, thereby removing one stumbling block to the British ambition of having all Mesopotamia (Lloyd-George, 1972, p. 673).
     In January 1991, the Peace Conference began in Paris. The French government of Prime Minister Clemenceau was determined to obtain for France the concessions outlined in the Sykes-Picot Agreement. In particular, French control of Syria and also Lebanon, with its Maronite Christain population. Prince Feisal was shunned by the French government. They claimed that Feisal was not on the list of official delegates and only after official complaints from the British government was he allowed to attend the conference but only as a representative of Hejaz Arab interests. From the French perspective, Feisal had no claim to Syria, both littoral and inland. As for Lawrence, the French viewed him as a meddler in Middle East affairs, especially when he was appointed by the British government as Feisal’s interpreter. During the conference, the French press mounted a vigorous campaign in support of French control of Syria and Lebanon and questioned the motives of Prince Feisal and Lawrence.
     At the Peace Conference, Feisal enjoyed the support of Prime Minister Lloyd George and the American President Woodrow Wilson. Lloyd George wanted the French completely excluded from the Middle East. He felt that the situation had changed since the 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement. He questioned the need for a French buffer zone in the Middle East against Czarist Russia in the aftermath of the Russian Revolution of 1917. Moreover, the British Prime Minister refused to withdraw British troops from Syria until the conference made a decision as to its future control. However, the British government was divided over whether it should honor the Sykes-Picot Agreement with France. There were those in the Anglo-Indian Office who believed that Britain could only obtain her interests in the Middle East by giving into French demands for Syria and Lebanon. They also feared that an Arab state in the Middle East would encourage Arab nationalism and threaten British control of Islam India. Others in the British Foreign Office felt strongly that promises made to the Arabs should be honored, even at the expense of alienating the French (MacMillan, 2003, pp. 382-383). As for the American President, Wilson was a proponent of “self-determination of peoples” and, as such, sympathetic to the Arab cause.
     On February 6, 1919, the Hejaz delegation, which included Prince Feisal, Colonel Lawrence, and other Arab leaders, were invited to present their case to the Peace Conference. Feisal argued that the Arabs wanted and earned the right to self-determination. Among other things, he sought a large independent Syrian state, free of foreign control. The only concession he was willing to make was French control of Lebanon and British control of Palestine. Feisal also called on France and Britain to honor their promises of Arab independence. Clemenceau believed Arab demands were extravagant. He was aware that French politicians (led by Picot) and French public opinion were demanding French control of Syria, and he was mindful of his nation’s support for the minority Maronite population in Lebanon. For their part, the American delegation understood that the Arabs did not want the French in Syria, even though they insisted they should be (Lloyd-George, 1972, p. 659). The uncompromising attitude of Feisal and Lawrence, together with the obstinacy of the French, ensured a deadlock regarding a post-war settlement of the Middle East. Exasperated by the deadlock, President Wilson suggested the formation of an inter-allied commission to visit Syria in order to ascertain the will of people as to their views regarding self-determination. The result was the creation of a commission headed by Dr. Henry King and Charles Crane with the authorization to seek out public opinion not only in Syria but also in Palestine and Mesopotamia.
     While the commission was in the Middle East, Lawrence busied himself in Paris by writing his Seven Pillars of Wisdom. He also accompanied Feisal to one last private meeting with Clemenceau, after the British government urged Feisal to make some accommodation with the French over Syria. The meeting between the Arab and the French Prime Minister proved fruitless, and Feisal returned to Damascus. With British troops still in the region, Feisal declared himself ruler in Damascus.
     The Ensuing Middle East Settlement: The commission did not report back to the Allied governments until the end of July after the peace treaty with Germany was signed. The commission was in favor of a temporary system of mandates, proposing the United States as mandatory power for Syria, Great Britain for Iraq, and excluding France entirely on the grounds that a French Mandate in Syria or elsewhere would lead to war with the Arabs (Lloyd-George, 1972, pp. 697-699). The commissioners also recommended abandoning the idea of creating in Palestine a Jewish state, which they believed could not be established without force. However, the King-Crane report was too late to have any effect on the settlement of the Middle East. President Wilson was ill and the U.S. Congress was withdrawing back into isolationism and was rejecting the Versailles Peace Treaty and membership in the League of Nations. Without American direction or support, Britain and France simply decided to make their own settlement. In September 1919, Lloyd George informed Clemenceau that Britain would be pulling troops out of Syria and Cilicia on November 1. Specifically, British garrisons in Cilicia would be replaced by French troops (in accordance with Sykes-Picot Agreement, an area of direct French control, but those in Damascus and Syria proper by an Arab force (Sykes-Picot Agreement--an area of French influence.) British troops, however, would remain in Palestine and Mesopotamia (Asher, 1999, p. 345). Lawrence viewed this as an Arab victory. He wrote Lloyd George, “…I must confess to you that in my heart I always believed that in the end you would let the Arabs down: so that now I find it quite difficult to know how to thank you. It concerns me personally, because I assured them during the campaigns that our promises held their face value, and backed them with my word, for what it was worth. Now in your agreement over Syria you have kept all our promises to them, and given them more than perhaps they ever deserved, and my relief at getting out of the affair with clean hands in very great ” (Wilson, 1990, pp. 619-620).
     Lawrence subsequently returned to England and resigned his commission in the British army. However, his gratitude to the British government was premature. With the withdrawal of British forces from Syria, the French were given the de-facto signal to occupy Syria. In March 1920, the General Syrian Congress, composed of Arab nationalists from Palestine, Lebanon, and Mesopotamia, declared Feisal King of “Greater Syria,” which included not only Syria proper but also Lebanon, northern Mesopotamia, and Palestine. This angered both the French, who were already in control of Lebanon (Cilicia) and desirous of Syria proper, and the British, who were seeking control of all of Mesopotamia and Palestine (Asher, 1999, p. 346).
     A month later, the Allied governments of Britain, France, Italy and Japan met at San Remo, Italy, and hammered out a resolution which “broadly reaffirmed the terms of the Anglo-French Sykes-Picot Agreement of 16 May 1916 for the region’s partition and the Balfour Declaration of 2 November 1917.” The resolution confirmed France as a mandatory power in both Syria and Lebanon, and Britain as a mandatory power in both Palestine and Mesopotamia. Britain also affirmed its commitment to establish a Jewish homeland in Palestine. The conference’s decisions were later confirmed by the Council of the League of Nations on July 24, 1922, and the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, which represented the Allied peace treaty with Turkey (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/sanremoconference, March 20, 2007). The final Middle East settlement with its mandate system was nothing more than “Middle East Time Bomb” because it was in direct conflict with both Arab and Jewish nationalism
     Three months following the San Remo Conference, French forces advanced out of Beirut, Lebanon, and defeated a small Syrian force near Damascus at the Battle of Maysalun in July 1920. The next day the French army entered Damascus, whereupon General Henri Gouraud visited the tombof Saladdin, kicked it, and said, “Awake Saladin, we have returned. My presence here consecrates the victory of the Cross over the Crescent.” King Feisal was then allowed to move into exile in Italy (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/battleofmaysalun, March 20, 2007).
     As prophesized by the King-Crane report, the French suppressed Arab nationalism in their mandate just as fiercely as the Turks. They muzzled the press and substituted French for Arabic in Syrian and Lebanese courts and schools. In addition, the French divided Syria and Lebanon into different administrative districts in an effort to exploit ethnic and religious differences. It was clearly an effort to dominate the area by setting one group up against the other. France’s commitment to Christian control of Lebanon under the Maronites, for example, frustrated the Muslim population and laid the foundation for tensions that still play a major role in Lebanese politics today. The British were equally clumsy with their mandate.
     Even after the Middle East settlement, Lawrence played a role for the British. Winston Churchill became colonial secretary in 1921, and his main adviser was Lawrence. Churchill decided to advance British interests in their Middle East mandates by placing into power men who he believed the British could control. On the advice of Lawrence, Feisal was made King of Iraq, formerly Mesopotamia, after arresting an opponent and manufacturing an artificial referendum. Iraq given to Feisal was based on boundaries without any consideration to the indigenous peoples. The Kurds, for example, were not consulted and Britain broke her previous promise to them supporting an independent Kurdistan. Likewise, Kuwait was split off from Iraq in order to compensate Ibn Saud for the loss of territory to Iraq. This angered the Iraqis. Churchill also created the state of Transjordan in 1922 by giving control of the area to Feisal’s brother, Prince Abdullah. The state consisted of 75-80 percent of land that had been formerly called Palestine. Land the Jews thought was promised to them under the Balfour Declaration. Churchill also limited Jewish immigration to what was left of Palestine in order to appease the Arabs. In time, both the French and British suffered under their mandate, as did the people they dominated. Smoldering political Zionism and Arab nationalism in Palestine and in Transjordan, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon taxed the resources of both Great Britain and France and neither one enjoyed a single year of peace in the Middle East. In 1946, France finally withdrew from Lebanon and Syria and in 1948, Britain withdrew from Palestine. Both powers left in frustration without resolving any of the conflicts that divided the people they once ruled (Stevens, 2003, pp. 52-53).
     Conclusion: The role of T.E. Lawrence in the shaping the post-war Middle East should be seen in the much larger context, that is, in terms of his many different roles and loyalties. First and foremost, Lawrence was a British officer and an Arab nationalist second. As such, his loyalties were to his country first and the Arabs second. Although his duplicity during the Arab Revolt haunted him, he continually encouraged the Arab Revolt knowing full well of the Sykes-Picot Agreement. Moreover, Lawrence never believed that the Arabs could successfully govern themselves, at least without initial British guidance. As a military adviser to Feisal during the Arab revolt, Lawrence was a courageous operational officer. However, he was not the great military strategist portrayed in film. Military strategy was decided in Cairo during the war and not by Lawrence in an Arab tent. As a diplomat for the Arab cause in Paris, Lawrence was as uncompromising as was Feisal, and he made many enemies. His friendship with Feisal, together with his promises to him of Arab independence during the revolt, blinded him to reality. As such, he was naïve to the true imperialist ambitions of both the French and British governments and unable to understand or manage the art of back-room diplomacy. As an historical figure, Lawrence was also responsible for the myth that was created about him and which endures to this day. Lawrence enjoyed the public stage and would use it to his advantage. When he later found it too unbearable, he retreated from it and eventually retired into history.

REFERENCES

Asher, Michael. (1999). Lawrence: The Uncrowned King of Arabia. New York: The Overlook Press.
The Avalon Project: The Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916. (2006). Retrieved on March 15, 2007, from http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/mideast/sykes.htm.
The Battle of Maysalun, July 1920. (2006). Retrieved March 20, 2007, from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/battleofmaysalun.
Fromkin, David. (1989). A Peace To End All Peace. New York: Henry Holt and Co.
Graves, Richard. (1976). Lawrence of Arabia and His World. New York: Charles Scriber’s Son.
Lawrence, T. E. (1936). Seven Pillars of Wisdom. New York: Doubleday, Doran and Co.
Lloyd-George, David. (1972). Memoirs of the Peace Conference, Volume 11. New York: Howard Fertig.
MacMillan, Margaret. (2003) Paris 1919: Six Months That Changed The World. New York: Random House.
Stevens, Dennis. (2003). Challenges to Peace in the Middle East. New York: Longman.
Sachar, Howard. (1991). A History of Israel. New York: Knopf.
The San Remo Conference. (2006). Retrieved on March 20, 2007, from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/sanremoconference.
Stokesbury, James. (1981). A Short History of World War I. New York: Morrow and Co.
Wilson, Jeremy. (1990). The Authorized Biography of T. E. Lawrence. New York: Atheneum.