Sustaining His Stand: The Veto Record Of
President George Bush
Samuel
B. Hoff
Delaware State University
INTRODUCTION
The election of George Bush as president in
1988 signaled a continuance of Republican party control of the White House, a conservative approach to political issues, and
the perpetuation of divided party government. Ronald Reagan had confronted a
split or hostile party Congress throughout his presidency. No two consecutively
elected presidents had faced such an obstacle. However, there was little reason
to believe that George Bush would be constrained by the legislative process. As
a former diplomat, national party chief, and head of the intelligence
community, he had been well versed in the tactics of negotiation and
compromise; as the incumbent vice president, he had numerous allies in Congress
to rely on. So, George Bush entered the presidency with the promise of
resolving problems in social and economic affairs, together with the maturity
to tackle foreign policy crises.
This essay
evaluates the legislative orientation and performance of the Bush presidency by
focusing on the utilization of the veto. The objectives of the study are to
probe President Bush's approach to Congress; analyze the administration's
overall veto strategy; examine employment of regular and pocket vetoes,
together with congressional responses to the former; review Bush's views toward
the proposed line-item veto; and to compare veto behavior between Presidents
Reagan and Bush. The research endeavors to trace the record of our forty-first
president but likewise to discern the consequences of his term for executive
legislative relations during the second century of American constitutional
government. For the purposes of this essay, gridlock shall be defined as
prolonged inaction on national policy problems created by systemic and
political barriers.
BUSH'S APPROACH TO CONGRESS
Like his predecessor, George Bush's approach
to the legislature was a product of many factors. In a 1989 study assessing his
character, Freedman finds that Bush (p. 14) "has operated as a cautious,
accommodating man, avoiding taking stands and joining battle, gamely, bravely,
doing the job assigned to him," and that his (p. 22) "strength has
been in personal relations rather than in rhetoric or homework." Schwerzler claims that (1990: 4E) "The Bush
administration has been willing to get involved with legislation early in the
process on Capitol Hill, and Mr. Bush's personal contacts with legislators give
him an advantage in sounding out their mood and helping to .avoid unpleasant
surprises." Sinclair contends that a (1990: 19) "combination of
cooperation, conflict, and compromise that, in varying proportions, has
characterized relations between Bush and the Democratic-controlled Congress on
most issues..." Rose refers to Bush's tendency to make consensus a criteria for commitment as a (1991: 310)
"no-lose" philosophy.
Malecha and Reagan hold that President Bush's goal
(1992:13) "was a relationship in which the members of the different
branches of government subordinated partisan and institutional interests to the
good of the whole." Sinclair describes Bush's performance over the first
two years of his administration (1991: 1 71):
The record of Bush and the 101st Congress in nonbudget domestic policy probably delineates the
possibilities, character, and limits of policy change under conditions of
divided party control and no strong public demand for action. The policy
preferences of president and congressional majority were probably as similar as
they are likely to be under divided control. Nevertheless, on major
legislation, policy differences were frequently very large, and budgetary
stringency worked against the passage of major new legislation. The end result
was a respectable but unheroic record.
During his
final two years in office, President Bush faced both structural problems and
growing inability to subdue opposing political forces. Peele postulates that (1992:154) “Bush initially may have thought he could separate
domestic and foreign concerns, but he was to learn rather painfully that the
ability to act decisively abroad is dependent on the state of the economy at home.” Peele identifies ensuing tactics used by Bush (p.
155) “that naturally suited his style of government, and, more cynically,
fitted a situation in which federal resources were not available,” including
promoting some issues while negotiating on others. Malecha and Reagan state that although members of Congress initially applauded Bush’s
approach, (1992: 14), “it is common today to hear of the disappointment and
acrimony that mark his dealings with the legislative branch.” Donovan decries
that the (1992: 3452) “acid atmosphere and absence of federal funds left
Congress and the White House to battle over limited policy agendas–issues on
which ideology takes precedence and compromises are hard to reach.”
Clymer
claims that the 102nd Congress was (1992:A1) “notable for battles with President
Bush when one side or the other claimed victory but national problems like the
recession endured." Dewar declares that (1992: A33) "Over the
two-year life of the 102nd Congress, lawmakers brought a heavy load of
legislation on a wide variety of issues to the verge of enactment, only to be
thwarted by Republican filibusters in the Senate or presidential vetoes that
could not be overridden." Davis summarizes President Bush's legislative
record below (1992: 3841):
...Bush won a dismal 43.0 percent of the roll call
votes on which he took a stand in 1992. His score--11 percentage points below
his 1991 level--was the worst performance of any president at any point in his
term since CQ began keeping score 39 years ago. For every vote taken during the
four years, Bush won an average of 51.8 percent--the lowest of any firs term
president since CQ began tracking this variable in 1953.
Bush did even worse when measured against his own
legislative priorities. None of the three major legislative requests he made in
his State of the Union address--and economic package, school choice and a
health care plan--became law.
VETO STRATEGY
While not
mentioning the veto by name, George Bush pledged to oppose Congress when
necessary in his acceptance speech as Republican presidential nominee, stating
that (New York Times,: 8) "Congress will push me to
raise taxes and I'll say no, and they'll push, and I'll say no, and they'll
push again. And I'll say to them, read my lips, no new taxes." At a press
conference marking the first anniversary of his election to the presidency,
Bush fielded several questions about his domestic agenda. When asked what he
would do differently if bipartisanship did not work, the president responded in
the following manner (Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, 1989:
1695):
Exhort. What else can I do? Veto and exhort. Send
stuff down I can't accept: it goes back. A President has to show that's his
responsibility.
Various
authors have maintained that the Bush White House undertook a conscious veto
plan. According to Walsh, such a strategy was developed at the outset of Bush's
term (1990: 18):
The Bush administration came into office with a
sophisticated battle plan for using the President's naysaying power. Chief domestic advisor Roger Porter has spent years studying the veto as
a Harvard political scientist. One of Porter's major beliefs was that the veto
should not always be considered the end of a bill's evolution but only part of
an ongoing process of compromise.
Walsh
relays the view of a senior administration official regarding the role of the
veto below (p. 20):
The veto strategy lets us throw a monkey wrench into
the Democrats' plans and keeps them from governing from the Hill. But over the
long run, it really will not help us govern.
David Broder quotes Chief of Staff John Sununu as asserting that
President Bush will use a veto strategy (1990: 8) "not to threaten, but to
define guidelines as early in the process as possible, so that everyone
understands the kind of bill he can sign." As the 101st Congress
concluded, one study revealed that the (Jones, 1991: 61) "threat of vetoes
for legislation carried over to the final weeks of the second session,"
while another found that (Hook, 1990: 2991) "the Bush administration has
issued 120 veto threats since the beginning of 1989, and many are still outstanding
on pending legislation.” Rose finds that (1991: 313) "In his first two
years in office, President Bush has successfully vetoed more legislation than
any predecessor since President Ford."
During 1991
the president continued to rely on a veto strategy. Devroy notes that (1991: AI) "White House spokesman Marlin Fitzwater signaled
that the real thrust of domestic policy will be the same as it has been
throughout Bush's presidency--the veto,” and that the (Devroy,
1991a: A4) "White House has so perfected the art of the veto that it now
has graduated categories of threat, ranging from the threat made by a single
Cabinet member, to advice by 'senior advisors' to Bush, to veto statements by
Bush himself.” Ingwerson notes that (1991: 8)
"Bush has been very clear from early in the drafting of legislation about
what he would veto and why. He always follows through.” Clymer claims that the
White House veto strategy (1991: 22) "has dimmed the Democrats's self-image as the party that offers solutions.”
Malecha and Reagan
observe the following concerning President Bush's veto employment (1992a: 65):
Although most scholars of the presidency concede that
reliance on veto power signifies weakness rather than strength, Bush has
managed to earn respect for the "savvy" and "mastery" with
which he has wielded that power...Bush's success in using the veto can be
traced to his ability to cultivate an illusion of strength.
Eastland
determines that (1992: 73) "Bush's veto power was respected on Capitol
Hill, and his threats were influential." Fessler reveals the view of chief White House lobbyist Nicholas Calio,
who emphasized that the administration was able to achieve many of its goals
(1992: 3249) "by either vetoing bills it opposed or issuing veto threats that
forced lawmakers to compromise."
REGULAR VETOES AND CONGRESSIONAL
RESPONSE
President
Bush issued twenty-nine regular vetoes by regular means over his presidency. In
1989, the president rejected nine public bills, including six of domestic
content and three dealing with foreign affairs. Three of the domestic bills
vetoed included abortion funding. Four of nine public bills went unchallenged;
three were sustained by the House, and one by the Senate at the initial
reconsideration stage; and one veto--the last of 1989, which concerned
legislation permitting Chinese students to remain in the United States after
their visas expired--was sustained by the second chamber. Bush's large number
of first-year vetoes placed him in a three way tie among chief executives who
have served over the last century (see Table 1). Since the mean frequency of
first-year public bills vetoed by regular means from 1889 to 2001 is 2.3 (Hoff,
2003), Bush is far above the average in his utilization of the veto at that
juncture in his administration.
In 1990,
President Bush vetoed six public bills by regular means. Five bills pertained
to domestic policy, whereas one dealt with foreign trade. All of Bush's vetoes
were challenged by Congress. Three were sustained by the House and two by the
Senate after initial reconsideration. The president's first veto of 1990-like
the final one of 1989--reached the second chamber.
During
1991, the Bush administration vetoed three public bills by regular means. All
three pertained to domestic matter. One veto went unchallenged, while the
remaining two were sustained by the first chamber to consider override.
In the
final year of his presidency, George Bush vetoed eleven public bills by regular
means, nine on domestic legislation and two against bills pertaining to foreign
affairs. Of the eleven vetoes, two went unchallenged, four were sustained by at
the initial chamber stage, four were overridden by the first house but
sustained by the second chamber, and one--the last public bill vetoed by
regular means during the Bush administration--was overridden by both chambers. The
eleven public bill vetoes constitute 38 percent of President Bush's total over
his four years in office. In comparison, 37 percent of all public bill vetoes
issued between 1889 and 1989 occurred in the final year of a chief executive's
term (Hoff, 1991). While numerous, Bush's final-year total is not a record:
Franklin Roosevelt vetoed thirty-three public bills in 1940; Gerald Ford
rejected seventeen public bills in 1979; and William Taft returned sixteen
public bills in 1912.
Among the
subject matter of public bills vetoed by President Bush in 1992 were two bills
dealing with most favored nation trading status for China, a tax bill, an
appropriations bill for the District of Columbia, the motor-voter proposal,
family leave and family planning legislation, a campaign finance bill, a Sioux
Indian claims bill, and legislation proposing fetal tissue research. However,
it was S. 12, proposing deregulation of cable television that led to Bush's
first veto defeat.
In his
October 3 veto message, the president remarked that the cable bill (Weekly
Compilation of Presidential Documents, 1992: 1860) is clearly long on promises. Unfortunately, it is just
as short on relief to the American. families who are
quite rightly concerned about significant increases in their cable rates and
poor cable service... S. 12 tries to address legitimate consumer concerns, but
it does so by requiring cable companies to bear the costs of meeting major new
federally imposed regulatory requirements and by adopting costly special
interest provisions.
On October
5, the Senate voted to override the veto by a 74-25 vote, which matched the
original Senate roll call on the legislation. During the override debate,
Senate Minority Leader Robert Dole asserted (Zaldivar,
1992: 1) "This is an effort to embarrass the president The merits of this legislation have been forgotten." According to Zaldivar, the vote (p. 1) "came despite two weeks of
determined lobbying by the White House, with Mr. Bush personally appealing to
the bill's Republican supporters to switch. None did." Hours later, the
House overrode the veto by a 308-114 score, which was a significantly higher
margin of support that the original 280-128 vote. Reporter Diane Duston described the scene below (1992: 1):
Clapping, cheers, and hand-slapping erupted on the
Democratic side of the House floor as the vote total neared the magic number of
289, assuring the veto would be overridden. Democrats began chanting, "Go,
go, go" as the vote total crossed that number.
Duston holds that opponents of the legislation (p. 1)
"blamed election-year politics for the override, but proponents said
consumer anger over soaring rates led to wide bipartisan support for the
measure." In an editorial following the override, the Baltimore Sun reflected
on the meaning of the action (1992: 26A):
In institutional terms, the veto override gives new
meaning to Mr. Bush's jibes about a "gridlock Congress." His pen was
half the problem; Democratic opposition to his programs was the other. The
legislative branch, for all its faults, was the branch of government that
finally, if only symbolically, broke the gridlock. You can be sure the next
president will try to reimpose executive supremacy.
President
Bush's twenty-nine public bill vetoes by regular means may be contrasted with
other chief executives. On a per year basis, Bush vetoed an average of 7.25
bills, placing him third on annual veto use among president serving since 1889.
Only Gerald Ford (15.30) and Franklin Roosevelt (8.75) have a higher annual
average of public bill vetoes by regular means (see Table 2). Galemore figures that (1992: 2) "President Bush has
vetoed about 2-3% of the bills presented to him by Congress, matching the
average percentage of vetoes by all Presidents. He has been overridden on only
one occasion...abetter success record than most
modern presidents." In fact, Bush's 75.9 sustain success percent at the
first house juncture of reconsideration is lower than the average success rate
of all other presidents over the last century (78.8 percent), although his
second chamber sustain success percent--96.55--is substantially higher than the
mean sustain success for all chief executives who faced second house votes from
1889 to 2001 (Hoff, 2003; see Table 4).
POCKET VETOES BY THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION
George Bush
entered office assuming that (Alston, 1990: 293) "the president can
exercise a pocket veto--that is, disapprove a bill by merely withholding his
signature--any time Congress adjourns for more than three days." Perhaps
to test congressional reaction, Bush pocket vetoed a minor measure intended to
facilitate passage of savings and loan bailout legislation during the August
1989 recess, the first such move attempted since 1970. Alston holds that
because (1990: 293) "the content of the measure was moot, the validity of
the veto went untested by Congress or the courts, although is
was seen by many on the Hill as an attempt to establish precedent."
Spitzer suggests that (1991: 39) "By picking an obscure, uncontroversial
bill, Bush may have hoped to minimize any challenge from Congress as to
procedure; indeed, little has been heard from anyone in Congress on this
action."
President
Bush applied the pocket veto to one domestic bill in 1989 .In 1990, the device was exercised five times--to four domestic
proposals, of which one was a private bill, and to one foreign affairs
proposal. The president's only pocket veto of 1991 was exercised against S. 1176,
the Morris K. Udall Scholarship and Excellence in National Environmental Policy
Act. In 1992, the White House issued ten memorandums of disapproval,
encompassing 59 percent of the total number of pocket vetoes released during
Bush's tenure in office. Among the topics of the bills rejected by this means
were Indian claims, cultural and resource study proposals, a bill to revise
administration of the federal courts, a military health care act, and a revenue
act.
Over his
four years in office, President Bush pocket vetoed a total of seventeen bills.
Of these, all but one concerned domestic legislation, and all but one pertained
to public bills. Bush's a total matches that of Richard Nixon, but does not
place him among the top ten chief executives in terms of pocket veto use (see
Table 3). Bush's extensive application of the pocket veto in his final year of
office is consistent with the findings of a recent study, which show that high
unemployment (7.4 percent in 1992) and later years with chief executives' terms
both significantly increase annual pocket veto frequency across the last
century (Hoff, 1994).
THE LINE ITEM VETO PROPOSAL
A multitude
of presidents since Ulysses Grant have favored an item veto--the power to
delete, subject to congressional reconsideration, individual parts of
legislation--including Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman, Dwight Eisenhower,
Gerald Ford, and most recently Ronald Reagan. The Bush administration likewise
supported the tool, and forwarded diverse ideas for achieving it. The president
stated in July 1989 that he was not pushing for a constitutional amendment for
a line-item veto because (Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 1989:
2848) "I think something like that could probably be done legislatively.” Seib notes that in October 1989, the White House proclaimed
that (1990: A12) “Mr. Bush is considering simply declaring that the
Constitution gives him the power, exercising a line-item veto and inviting a
court challenge to decide whether he is right," a strategy contemplated
but rejected by Reagan personnel (Rapp, 1988). In 1990, the Bush administration
expressed willingness to consider tax increases at a May budget summit in
exchange for a line-item veto power.
In lieu of
an actual line item veto, President Bush employed presidential signing
statement, a tactic whereby the chief executive presents his own view of the
intent and meaning of a law. Devroy (1990) reports
that the Bush government attached a three-page statement to legislation
authorizing funding for the state Department, in which several of the law's
stipulations were criticized. Crovitz claims that
Bush used the devise to negate (1990: A15) "41 provisions in some 20 bills
that Congress passed" in 1990.
In the
ensuing presidential administration, the line item veto would be employed
pursuant to a law, the Line Item Veto Act of 1996. However, the law was
declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court two years later, negating
President Bill Clinton’s utilization of the tool on 83 items in 11 spending bills
(Hoff, 2003).
COMPARING REAGAN AND BUSH VETO BEHAVIOR
Several writers have
witnessed a clear distinction in veto behavior between Presidents Ronald Reagan
and George Bush. Former Republican congressman Lawrence DeNaris states (Schwerzler, 1990: 4E)
Clearly, Reagan and Bush take very different
approaches to the veto...Reagan used the veto as an expression of his ideology.
He’d take a stand on a variety of issues, whether he could sustain a veto or
not.
Walsh delineates differences between Reagan and Bush
veto styles below (1990: 19):
As his administration wore on, he made the mistake of
threatening more and more vetoes, then backing off without extracting important
concessions from the Democrats. That damaged his credibility because his
threats were not take seriously and his GOP allies were never sure whether he
would change his mind. By contrast, Bush tries to avoid antagonizing large
constituencies or inflaming congressional passions...
Hook holds that many lawmakers believed
that President Reagan was strong on threatening vetoes but often failed to
follow through, whereas President Bush (1990: 2991) "has made few empty
veto threats and has picked his fights with care." Eastland propagates
that (1992: 73) "in general, Reagan did not have as much credibility as
Bush. For unlike Reagan, Bush used the veto in every instance in which his
warnings did not result in change he could accept."
THE VETO AND THE BUSH PRESIDENCY
Given the
definition of gridlock offered at the outset of this study, it cannot be stated
that George Bush experienced this condition throughout his term as president, nor that the veto was the culprit in creating such a barrier
to progress and cooperation. For one, Milius maintains that presidential congressional comity during the 101st Congress
resulted in many important achievements. He finds that the (1992: 12)
"list of their accomplishments nonetheless gives the lie to those who see
divided government as a formula for gridlock; you didn't hear the word
then." Fessler details several notable victories
by the Bush team (1992: 3247):
His administration's support in 1989 helped end a
13-year deadlock over legislation to impose stricter clean air standards. He
compromised with Congress in 1990--to his later chagrin--to achieve a long-term
budget agreement that imposes some fiscal discipline over the following two
years.
His success in winning congressional endorsement of an
all-out war in the Persian Gulf helped solidify the 1991 international effort
against Saddam Hussein.
However,
by late 1991, scholars and commentators alike began to perceive the
ramifications of a growing stalemate between the branches of government. When
Bush was as the height of his popularity in the Fall of 1991, Sidey warned that (1991: 27) "George Bush
may want to start looking around for a victory or two to throw the Democrats
way lest he forget how lousy it feels to lose." According to Puerte (1992: 4A), "Political experts say veto
politics is a key reasons for the insurgent presidential candidacy of Ross
Perot." Burnham believes that (1992: 32) "in the changed economic and
political setting of 1992 [foreign policy and diplomacy skills] could not
compensate for the image of distrust, punctuated by standpattism,
that had grown up around him."
Other
criticisms of the Bush record clearly miss the mark. O'Sullivan accuses the
administration of having a (1992: 43)""blindness to ideology...The
Bushmen thought of themselves as supreme pragmatists..." Yet, Bush was
consistent in at least two areas of conservative political preference
throughout his tenure: opposition to abortion, which he constantly used as a
justification to veto legislation which permitted liberalization of the
procedure, and free trade policy, which is displayed in his vetoes of bills
designed to punish China or limit textile imports.
Mullins and Wildavsky discover a (1992: 35) "striking
hierarchical pattern" in Bush's vetoes, suggesting that the, president
employed the tool effectively to defend (p. 36) "his party and his powers." Peele evaluates the forty-first chief executive's
success in the following manner (1992: 155):
Ultimately, the Bush presidency has to be seen in the
contest of a system that encourages deadlock and in which the responsibilities
of the chief executive are too great for any single individual. George Bush's
mixed performance as president in the 1990's may deserve applause rather than
condemnation.
George Bush
lost his reelection bid in 1992 in part because the voters rejected the premise
that conflict is better than nothing. Yet, the Democrats' electoral victory did
not preclude the reemergence of gridlock, as was starkly demonstrated during
the post-1994 Bill Clinton presidency. It is ironic that the veto–highly
criticized by Clinton in his campaign against Bush–turned out to be the tool
which got him off the mat and reestablished his authority following the
turnover of both legislative chambers to the Republicans (Hoff, 2003).
We are left
to ponder the impact of party and personality, of structure and style, and of
institution and individual on the American presidency. George Bush, like his
predecessors over two centuries, illustrated the boundaries and border less
potential of this unique office.
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Zaldivar, R.A. 1992. "Senate Votes Override Cable TV
Veto." Baltimore Sun, October 6, p 1,9A.
Table
1
FIRST YEAR PUBLIC VETOES BY PRESIDENTS, 1889-2001
1. Ford (1974) 14
2. F. Roosevelt (1937) 9
Nixon (1973) 9
Bush (1989) 9
3. Truman (1949) 8
4. F. Roosevelt (1941) 6
Truman (1945) 6
Reagan (1985) 6
5. Harding (1921) 4
6. Kennedy (1961) 3
L. Johnson (1965) 3
7. Carter (1977) 2
8. Eisenhower (1953) 1
Reagan (1981) 1
Table 2
AVERAGE NUMBER OF ANNUAL PUBLIC BILL VETOES BY PRESIDENTS, 1889-2001
1. Ford 15.30
2. F. Roosevelt 8.75
3. Bush 7.25
4. Truman 6.88
5.Taft 5.50
6. Reagan 4.63
7. Clinton 4.50
8. Eisenhower 4.38
9. Nixon 4.00
10. Cleveland 3.75
11. B. Harrison 3.50
12. Hoover/Carter 3.25
13. Wilson 3.13
14. T. Roosevelt 2.25
15. Coolidge 2.20
16. Harding 1.67
17. L. Johnson 1.40
18. Kennedy 1.33
19. McKinley .25
Mean=4.36
Table 3
POCKET VETO LEADERS, 1789-2001
1. F. Roosevelt 263
2. Cleveland (1st) 128
3. Cleveland
(2nd) 110
4. Eisenhower 108
5. Truman 70
6. Grant 48
7. Reagan 39
8. McKinley 36
9. Coolidge 30
10. B. Harrison 25
Table 4
PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESS IN PREVENTING VETO
OVERRIDES, 1889-2001
President #of Veto
Overrides % of
Vetoes Sustained
________________________________________________________________________
G.H.W. Bush 1 96.55
Taft 1 95.45
T. Roosevelt 2 94.46
Eisenhower 2 94.29
B. Harrison 1 92.86
F. Roosevelt 9 91.43
Cleveland II 5 87.80
Carter 2 84.62
Truman 12 78.18
Hoover 3 76.92
Wilson 6 76.00
Reagan 9 75.68
Ford 12 73.91
Nixon 7 70.83
Coolidge 4 63.64
McKinley 0 ---------
Harding 0 ---------
Kennedy 0 ---------
L. Johnson 0 --------- |
